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ABSTRACT
The COVID-19 pandemic and the responses taken to combat it caused enormous changes
to the everyday lives of people around the world. Jordan, in its early success against the
virus and with its large refugee population, represents a unique country in which to study
these everyday impacts. From May to August of 2021, I conducted ethnographic
fieldwork in the Jordanian capital city of Amman while working with the refugee
nongovernmental organization the Collateral Repair Project. In this thesis, I explore the
COVID-19 Spectacle, examining the ways in which policies and discourses at the
national and international scales bled into the everyday of the individual. To do so, I
consider the implications of government narratives of “oneness” and commitment in
Jordan, contrasting these narratives against differential pandemic surveillance. I then
examine the ways in both individuals and organizations in Amman altered their everyday
practices to reduce the spread of COVID-19, taking a particularly close look at such
changes in the spaces of public transportation. Lastly, I consider the ways in which both
the Jordanian government and individuals in Amman attempted to gain access to
COVID-19 vaccines, concluding by reflecting on the possibilities of a post-pandemic.
My research sheds light on both a global sense of shared pandemic experience and the
ways in which inequalities at a variety of scales differentiated such experiences.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
I leaned back against a cement wall, snacking on kanafeh and watching hundreds pass through the
wasat al-balad (downtown) of Amman, Jordan. The cool breeze carried with it a sense of
normalcy. Old men gathered on the street corner, speaking passionately about the news of the
day. Children sprinted up and down the block. There were no face masks in sight, no concerns of
physical distancing. The date was March 14, 2020. Two weeks earlier, the government had
discovered the first confirmed case of COVID-19 in Jordan (Alqutob et al., 2020). Three days
earlier, the World Health Organization (WHO) had declared COVID-19 a pandemic (Mahase,
2020). Yet, no one I knew in Amman was worried about COVID-19; the virus was somewhere
else, not here.
I felt my phone vibrate in my pocket. Once, and then another time, and then another.
Suddenly, I was inundated with urgent texts about flight availabilities. What was my plan? When
was I getting out? The Jordanian government had just announced the indefinite closure of the
country’s international borders, starting in only three days. I rushed to my apartment and booked
a ticket back to the United States, leaving the next day.
Two years on, there have been more than 430 million cases of COVID-19 and 6 million
deaths globally (Dong et al., 2021). As the pandemic spread, it caused not only death and
economic crisis but also a reorganizing of social structures (Katila et al., 2020). Government
responses to the COVID-19 pandemic were unprecedented, restricting the movement of people
and making enormous efforts to reduce public life (Manderson & Levine, 2020; Love & Wu,
2020). As Fuentes (2020, p. 24) noted, “the threats of the COVID-19 era are deeply biosocial,
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disrupting body, mind, and community.” Moreover, the pandemic caused us to carefully restrict
the ways in which we engage with one another, having important consequences on our everyday
encounters (Katila et al., 2020).
A few days after my departure from Amman, the Jordanian government called for
physical distancing, halted all international travel, and transferred authority over its pandemic
response to the Minister of Defense (Alqutob et al., 2020). Over the following months, up until
my return to Amman in May 2021, there were 720,000 confirmed COVID-19 cases and 9,200
deaths in Jordan (Ritchie et al., 2021). By then, the government was in its early steps of a
vaccination program, having administered 800,000 doses to a population of 10 million (Ritchie et
al., 2021).
Hello Again, Amman
“All passengers may now board Royal Jordanian Flight 506 to Amman,” crackled out over the
Cairo International Airport intercom. I grabbed my backpack and stepped into line, both anxious
and excited for the three months to come. It was May 17, 2021, a little over a year and two
months since the World Health Organization (WHO) had declared COVID-19 a pandemic.
I fumbled with my COVID-19 test as I approached the counter. After a cursory glance at
the date and the word “negative” on my test, the crew member held a temperature gun to my
forehead. When that showed a normal temperature, I was allowed to scan my ticket and board. As
I entered the plane, the flight crew – dressed head to toe in white, disposable medical coats,
masks, and gloves – handed me a “Safety Essentials” kit. The kit contained extra face masks,
hand sanitizer, and wet wipes.
Alongside the usual safety instructions, the cabin crew announced the “mandatory public
health instructions” over the speakers, requiring passengers to keep their masks on and to avoid
gathering for the entirety of the flight. After this announcement, the crew walked up and down the
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aisle, asking anyone with their mouth or nose uncovered to pull up their mask. After this check, I
glanced around the plane to try to gauge people’s responses.
The man across the aisle from me kept his mask under his mouth as much as possible,
only pulling it back up whenever the cabin crew passed by. The woman next to me kept her mask
on for the whole flight, passing on drinks and food to seemingly avoid removing it. She wore a
special clip that connected her mask to the back of her hijab. Towards the end of the flight, the
entire plane was given dinner, with most removing their masks to eat at the same time.
In many ways, my flight into Amman was a microcosm of my experiences there,
observing everyday life in the pandemic from May to August of 2021. Government and airline
interventions attempted to prevent the spread of COVID-19 and push narratives of safety and
responsibility. The cabin crew acted as surveillant and disciplinary forces for those attempting to
resist these interventions, though many still found ways to resist. The everyday practices of the
passengers were altered in the name of the preventing the spread of COVID-19, particularly in the
context of transportation, but these practices were implemented differently by individuals. Still,
these procedures and practices would change again in the context of more widely available
COVID-19 vaccines.
Everyday Life under the Spectacle of COVID-19
This thesis examines the everyday impacts of both the pandemic and the responses to it in
the context of Amman, Jordan. I situate my research within critical work on disease and medicine
in the disciplines of geography and anthropology. Like all pandemics, COVID-19 was
fundamentally geographic in nature. It brought the “where” of disease, a long-time focus of health
and medical geographers, to the forefront of our imaginations (Finn et al., 2020). Medical
geography has historically specialized in the application of concepts, methods, and quantitative
techniques in order to address spatial issues in disease and medicine distribution (Franch-Pardo et
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al., 2020). However, in response to calls for a more critically informed medical geography, more
recent trends have emphasized the cultural geographies and politics of health, with a focus on
difference and inequality (Chen et al., 2020). During the COVID-19 pandemic, geographers
called for “more-than-human” and “more-than-viral” approaches to the pandemic that attended to
the differential social, ecological, economic, and political circumstances in which it took place
(Searle & Turnbull, 2020; Klingberg, 2020).
Medical anthropologists have also contributed substantially to understanding the impacts
of epidemics and pandemics through their effects on social and economic life (Manderson &
Levine, 2020; Farmer, 2006). In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, anthropologists have
examined the ways in which the virus spread along existing lines of structural vulnerabilities
around the world (Team & Manderson, 2020). Anthropological research has considered the
inherent politics present in both the pandemic and the responses to it, investigating these politics
in the contexts of xenophobia, inequality, and racism in addition to the biological impact of
COVID-19 (Hardy, 2020). Anthropologists have also focused on the ways in which – though the
COVID-19 pandemic itself was novel – the interventions taken to combat it drew on existing
patterns of epidemic and pandemic responses (Ennis-McMillan and Hedges, 2020).
Discourse and interventions of the state have been key focuses of geographical and
anthropological study during the COVID-19 pandemic. Wynn (2021) discusses how states
utilized ethical discourses of proximity to conflate biological contagion and national security
during the pandemic, particularly through the spectacle of military-police enforcement of
quarantine laws. In the context of South Africa, Levine and Manderson (2021) argue that the
spatialization of existing privilege and inequality caused state COVID-19 responses to echo
controls under apartheid. Similarly, inequities in pandemic-related arrests and deaths in the
United States illustrated the ways in which the state attempts to foster life for White Americans
while simultaneously disallowing life for Black Americans (Rouse, 2021). Moreover, citizens not
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only lived through state responses to COVID-19 but actively constituted and participated in them
(Trnka, 2021). Such state interventions were not unique to the COVID-19 pandemic, occurring
often in the context of previous disease outbreaks. During the 2016 Zika epidemic, for example,
discourses and interventions of the U.S. government transformed Puerto Rican women into
“intervenable objects” which required potentially dangerous chemical regulation under the
justification of protecting future unborn babies in the mainland United States (Patchin, 2020).
Geographers and anthropologists have also looked closely at imaginations and ethics of
risk during the COVID-19 pandemic. Strong et al. (2021), for example, argue that public
discourse of COVID-19 responses used language of risk to transform the ethical relationships
between proximity and contagion. In turn, moralized narratives of risk were wielded against the
social interactions of marginalized groups – such as gay men – in ways not true for dominant
groups (Strong, 2021). Such patterns in the context of COVID-19 are not unlike the narratives
and language of risk historically and contemporarily wielded against women in the context of a
different biomedical experience: childbirth. False dichotomies that frame actions as either “safe”
or “dangerous” are frequent in the “better safe than sorry” approaches to prenatal care and
breastfeeding (Lyerly et al., 2009; Wolf, 2007). In turn, these dichotomies push women towards
what Wolf (2007) calls “total motherhood,” a moral code that forces mothers to be experts in
everything in order to protect their children, often at the expense of the mothers themselves.
Narratives of risk during the COVID-19 pandemic similarly pushed people to integrate enormous
amounts of information and forms of responses in order to be “safe.”
State and public discourses during the COVID-19 pandemic also framed certain
marginalized groups as potentially infectious or dangerous Others, resulting in tangible harm to
those targeted. Individuals of Chinese and East Asian origin, for example, faced increased racism,
xenophobia, and discrimination in many countries during the pandemic, in part because of the
early use of damaging labels like the “Chinese Virus” by prominent politicians and media
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(Tessler et al., 2020). Governments also discussed migrants and minorities more broadly as
spreaders of disease. In India, for example, the ruling party and media targeted Muslims as
“supercarriers” and likened them to suicide bombers for protesting a new citizenship law (Bieber,
2020). Furthermore, language of “heroism” by governments and the public alike early in the
pandemic obscured the inequalities present between different forms of work, making “essential”
synonymous with expendable (Catungal, 2020; Brown and Pearson, 2020).
Discursive Othering has been historically common in the context of disease outbreaks,
including, but by no means limited to, the HIV/AIDS epidemic and the 2014 Ebola outbreak
(Farmer, 2006; Monson, 2017). Such discourses have occurred even at the scale of the individual,
such as the transformation of Mary Mallon into the villainous “Typhoid Mary” for what officials
at the time considered her reckless behavior and uncooperative attitude in light of being the first
known asymptomatic carrier of disease (Wald, 2008). Troublingly, Mallon’s tale became
prominent in media depictions of the COVID-19 pandemic, caricaturizing her as an almost
fairytale villain who committed acts of treachery until she was justly punished and framing both
groups and individuals not following state COVID-19 policies as similarly recalcitrant (LaMotte
& Mascarenhas, 2020; Smith, 2020). Yet, Othering has not been limited to contexts of disease.
Said (1978) argues that the Orient is a human-made construction, discursively created by the
West as a backwards Other against which to find itself superior. Culcasi (2010) likewise posits
that the Middle East as a region is socially constructed, with the people who inhabit it Othered
through its ties to notions of instability, Islamic fundamentalism, and anti-Americanism.
It is in part because of the consistent Othering of people living in the Middle East that
medical anthropologists working in the region have sought to use shared and relatable
experiences with illness and health care to debunk negative stereotypes of Muslim people (Inhorn
and Sargent, 2006). Hamdy (2008), for example, has explored the ways in which poor Egyptian
kidney-disease patients understand and experience their illness within the larger sociopolitical
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contexts of Egypt. Her work reflects calls for a critical-interpretative approach to medical
anthropology, which blends the cultural interpretation of the meanings that people assign to
illness with analysis of the structures of political economy that influence health (Lock & ScheperHughes, 1990; Joralemon, 2017).
Drawing on De Genova’s (2013) Border Spectacle, my research examines what I call the
COVID-19 Spectacle. For De Genova (2013), the border serves as a space of performative
enforcement through “emphatic and grandiose” gestures of exclusion. In turn, the day-to-day
material practices of immigration and border policing become enmeshed in spectacular discourse
and representation, making the material and spectacle inseparable (De Genova, 2013). Yet, this is
not to say that the spectacle is without consequence. The Border Spectacle bleeds into the
everyday lives of the migrants who navigate it. For some, these impacts come in the forms of
deportations and deaths, but for most, border-making practices serve as an obstacle course or
endurance test to create and cultivate lifelong conditions of precarity (De Genova and Roy, 2020).
The COVID-19 Spectacle has proven similarly “emphatic and grandiose.” News media
around the world flashed images of overwhelmed hospitals and data of case counts and deaths
regularly. Public officials closed borders, implemented unprecedented lockdowns, and called on
their citizens to make enormous changes to their everyday lives. In the context of Amman, the
Jordanian government launched spectacular campaigns across television, radio, social media, and
specially designed apps to showcase the dangers of the pandemic and the enormity of the
government’s responses to combat it. My research is, in part, an exploration of the macrolevel
policies and discourses in Amman that created the COVID-19 Spectacle. However, the primary
focus of my research is on how the COVID-19 Spectacle bled into the everyday, how individuals
and families lived in such times. To explore this, I take the reader into the spaces of homes, taxis,
cafés, and soccer matches. I draw attention to the tattered signs outside restaurants that reframe
the spectacle as advertisements and to the disposable face masks hung by the door when needed
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and left crumpled in the street when not. I ask what the spectacle meant to people in Amman
attempting to navigate the “new normal” of life in a pandemic. Drawing on research by critical
geographers and anthropologists, my research seeks to analyze the COVID-19 Spectacle through
the lens of the everyday.
Design and Methodology
To accomplish my research, I conducted a case study with ethnographic methods in Amman,
Jordan from May to August of 2021. Because effective ethnographies require longer term
immersion in the field than was feasible for me at the time, implementing ethnographic methods
into a more focused case study allowed me to achieve an appropriate depth of understanding for
my research. In such case studies, ethnographic methods help the researcher to better understand
the culture of interest, while bounding the case study provides focus and depth regarding the
phenomenon of interest (Angers and Machtmes, 2005). Given that my study was interested in the
impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on people living in Amman, my research focused heavily on
understanding the cultural situation of Amman and how that situation shaped experiences with
the pandemic, a topic for which ethnographic methods are useful. Similarly, because my focus
was on the everyday, the depth and richness of information provided by a case study was ideal for
exploring how the pandemic had influenced these everyday events.
My participant observation focused on two groups. The first was largely centered around
a Jordanian man named Ayman. Ayman is a difficult man to describe, though I came to know
him quite well. He is compassionate, kind, and patient. He is a devout Muslim and a middle child
with eight brothers. His mother was born in Lebanon after her family fled Palestine; she moved to
Jordan early in her life, where she gave birth to and raised Ayman and his brothers. Ayman
identifies strongly with both his Palestinian heritage and his Jordanian national identity. He would
often jokingly introduce me as Palestinian to employees in stores we visited together because he
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saw me as part of the family, a joke which left the employees confused more often than laughing.
Ayman was married to a Jordanian woman named Layla, both in their mid-30s to early-40s.
Together, they had four children. Their eldest was a relatively quiet 12-year-old girl, and their
other three children were rambunctious boys of ages 10, 8, and 6 respectively. Ayman had
worked as an engineer for much of his life before I met him, but he had lost his job early in the
pandemic. Unable to find formal work, he ran an informal maintenance business from a small
office space near his home, storing supplies around the home wherever he could find space.
Though Ayman made some money on the side through this work, with his job as an
engineer lost, most of the family’s income came from people like me: foreign students studying
Arabic that the family hosted through a local language institute. Layla worked in the home: taking
care of their four children, cleaning their apartment, and cooking for both the family and the
students they hosted. I lived in a one-bedroom, one-bathroom apartment separated from that of
Ayman’s family by a concrete wall that had seemingly been added as an afterthought. The door to
my apartment exited into the family’s driveway, where the children could be found playing from
sunrise to sunset. The family home was in the neighborhood of Al-Jubeiha, an area in the north of
Amman home to a number of popular restaurants, cafés, and shopping centers as well as several
universities. Ayman often bragged to me about the cooler weather there, caused by the
neighborhood sitting atop a hill near the outskirts of the city. Through Ayman and his family, I
met a number of their relatives and friends, as well as shop owners and employees in the area
around Al-Jubeiha. Ayman’s family also frequently included me on weekend family outings,
bringing me to restaurants, parks, and museums throughout the city.
My second participant group came from my time working as a Data and Research Fellow
at the Collateral Repair Project (CRP). CRP is a nongovernmental organization with two offices
in Amman: one in the impoverished neighborhood and former Palestinian refugee camp of
Hashemi Shamali in East Amman and the other in the wasat al-balad (downtown) of the city.
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Incorporated as a 501(c)(3) nonprofit in the United States for donation purposes, CRP describes
itself as “a grassroots effort to bring much-needed assistance to refugees and other victims of war
and conflict – those commonly referred to as ‘collateral damage’” (Collateral Repair Project).
CRP primarily provides financial assistance – in the forms of emergency cash and food vouchers
– and educational classes to refugees who have left the camps and live in the city of Amman.
Although these efforts focus primarily on Syrian and Iraqi refugees, CRP also works with smaller
populations of Yemeni, Sudanese, Somali, and Palestinian refugees, in addition to impoverished
Jordanians. CRP brought me into their organization as a researcher because they were interested
in better understanding the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on their community members.
They tasked me with surveying and interviewing a diverse subset of their beneficiaries. I also
taught a beginner-level English for a class of approximately 10 – about half Jordanian and half
refugee – over Google Meet.
Through my time working at CRP, I grew close to many of my coworkers. As an
organization, CRP workers are split fairly evenly among three groups: Jordanians, refugees, and
“expats.” These groups serve a wide range of roles in the organization from volunteers to interns
to full-time employees. The Jordanians who work there tend to come from relatively high
socioeconomic classes, and the “expats” consist of a wide mix of relatively well-off Americans,
Europeans, and Australians who have moved to Jordan for relationships, studies, and a number of
other reasons. Much of my time spent outside of CRP and away from Ayman’s family was spent
with friends I made through CRP. Groups of current and former CRP workers in Amman run in
relatively tight circles that meet often. These relationships brought me into restaurants and stores
in Hashemi Shamali during working hours and around the relatively wealthy neighborhoods of
Jabal Lwebdeih, Jabal Amman, and Abdoun in West Amman outside of work. They also brought
me into spaces of leisure around the city, from soccer matches to pool halls to hammams.
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In terms of my own role as the research instrument, I am a 25-year-old, white,
heterosexual, cisgender man who spent most of his life in the metropolitan area of Columbia,
South Carolina. My family was upper middle class growing up, and I work as a graduate student
now. I am an advanced Arabic speaker who previously lived, studied, and worked for nine
months in Amman prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. My positionality and relative privilege
frame the ways in which people interacted with me in Amman and the lens through which I
conducted my research. I am passionate about issues of health care access and migrant rights,
issues that I sought to explore through my research in Amman from the early formulations of this
work. Outside of my relationships with Ayman’s family and people associated with CRP, I spent
much of my time navigating Amman, traversing the city by foot, taxi, and bus. I also visited a
number of cafés, restaurants, and stores on my own, both for the sake of my research and out of
personal interest.
As a supplement to participant observation and as part of my role at CRP, a coworker and
I launched an online survey for CRP community members living in Amman to take on the ways
in which they perceived and were impacted by the pandemic. We received partial results from
223 individuals and completed results from 136. Of the 136 people who completed the online
survey, 36 answered that they would be willing to talk more about their experiences with the
pandemic in a follow-up interview and provided a phone number to reach them at. I was able to
reach 26 of these participants by phone, conducting semi-structured interviews with them over
approximately 30 minutes on the impacts of the pandemic in their daily lives. 24 of these
interviews were in Arabic, and two were in English. An English translation of the interview guide
used across these phone calls can be found in Appendix A.
Finally, I conducted an analysis of publicly available documents from the Jordanian
government and news media relating to the pandemic and the responses to it. I used Jordanian
government press releases, social media pages, and apps to examine the ways in which actors in
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the government framed and discussed topics relating to the pandemic. I also analyzed documents
from external organizations, including international agencies and news media, to consider
Western discourse of the COVID-19 pandemic in Jordan.
It is worth noting that none of my participants ever discussed direct experiences with
COVID-19 over the course of my research. Perhaps none of them had experienced the disease
firsthand, or if some had contracted the virus, perhaps these individuals did not feel that this
experience was as relevant as other difficulties they had faced during pandemic. Still, this means
that the focus of this thesis is more on life in the shadow of COVID-19, altered tremendously by
efforts taken to avoid and combat the virus, than it is about the experiences of the many who lived
with, suffered from, and died of COVID-19.
Chapter Outline
In the following chapters, I examine the COVID-19 Spectacle and its lived everyday impacts in
Amman, Jordan, shedding light on both a global sense of shared pandemic experience and the
ways in which inequalities at a variety of scales differentiated such experiences. In Chapter 2, I
consider the ways in the which the Jordanian government represented its COVID-19 policies and
responses through narratives of equality, “oneness,” and nationalism and the ways in which
Western new sources presented Jordan as a country “on the brink.” I then take a closer look at the
government’s practices of discipline and surveillance to ensure these policies in Chapter 3, with a
particular eye towards police control and self-surveillance of curfews and mask wearing,
exploring how such practices were often implemented unevenly.
In Chapter 4, I examine the ways in which both businesses and individuals altered their
everyday practices in order to “stay safe” from COVID-19 and how such practices shifted as the
pandemic wore on. I then take a closer look at the impacts of practices of “makeshift safety” on
the daily transportation of many in Amman alongside the Jordanian government’s opening of its
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new Bus Rapid Transit system in the midst of the pandemic in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, I explore
the ways in which both the government and individuals sought to access COVID-19 vaccines and
perceptions of such efforts. I conclude in Chapter 7 by considering the “post-pandemic”
implications of the Jordanian government’s interventions and the changes to everyday life in the
name of combatting the spread of COVID-19 alongside growing anxieties in Amman that there
may never be a “post-pandemic.”
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CHAPTER 2
“OUR SUCCESS IS IN OUR COMMITMENT:” GOVERNMENT
NARRATIVES OF COVID-19 IN JORDAN
As I stepped off my flight into the Queen Alia International Airport (QAIA) the night of May 17,
2021, other passengers pushed past me, eager to claim their place in the long line ahead. A
Jordanian military officer, dressed in full uniform, was the first face I saw after stepping out of
the jet bridge. He barked orders at the people in line ahead of me, telling them to ready their
paperwork and not cut in line. Behind him, rope barriers circled back and forth, as nearly a
hundred people waited to be called on.
At the end of the line stood a woman garbed in blue disposable scrubs and a surgical cap.
A pair of goggles was strapped to her forehead, and she pulled her mask below her mouth to
shout, “Have your QR code ready for the PCR.” At the time, the Jordanian government was
requiring all passengers – vaccinated or not – to take a COVID-19 test in the airport immediately
upon arrival. The QR code was scanned as evidence that you had paid the 20 JD (28 USD) fee for
the test. The woman held up an example form and pointed to the QR code on it.
Yellow stickers lined the walls of the hallway, reading, “Keep a safe distance” with an
image of two men with 2 meters between them. Circles on the floor along the line indicated the
intended distance for physical distancing, but they were seemingly ignored and unenforced as
passengers packed in as tightly as possible. The speakers of the airport cycled between English
and Arabic, repeating “Maintain physical distancing, and always wear a protective mask.”
Around me, my fellow passengers all had masks on, but many had them pulled down under their
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nose or mouth. The woman behind me wore a cloth mask with the words “STAY SAFE”
embroidered on in English.
As I reached the front of the line, I saw a series of individual testing booths ahead. Each
booth was essentially sealed with just enough space for the employee to sit inside with the testing
equipment and a laptop. The glass shield on the front side of the booth had two holes: one at waist
level to scan the QR code through and one at head level to conduct the test through. I was
directed to one such booth for my COVID-19 test. The man inside scanned my QR code and took
my passport, placing a white sticker on its back. He then reached through the top hole, quickly
swabbing the inside of one of my nostrils. After this, the man pulled down his mask and asked me
about what I was planning to do while in Jordan. As I continued down the hallway, a man at a
desk quickly checked to ensure I had the white sticker on my passport.
As I entered customs and immigration, a new booth had been erected since I had last
visited Jordan. A large sign at its top described it as the “Ministry of Health and Wellness
Tourism Desk,” but the booth sat empty. Hand sanitizer stations dotted the airport with the
phrases “Keeping Yourself Healthy, Keeping Everyone Healthy” and “QAIA Cares.” Stickers on
trash cans instructed passengers to “Dispose of used masks and gloves in designated waste bins.”
Adjacent seats were blocked “For Your Health and Safety.” Larger signs hung around the airport
with images telling passengers to “Maintain 2M Distance from Others,” “Sanitize Hands Every
30 Minutes,” and “Always Wear a Mask and Gloves.” At the bottom of each such sign, was the
warning “Subject to Legal Liability.”
During my three months in Amman, nowhere were COVID-19 regulations taken as
seriously as in the airport. This was likely in part because of perceptions of airports as spaces of
perceived risk and mixing, with people arriving from outside places. It was perhaps also because
of the airport’s symbolic value as a representation of the Jordanian government and its response
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to COVID-19. For foreigners visiting Jordan, the airport was likely to be their first impression of
the country, as it was for me, and the government wanted to create certain narratives about the
pandemic in Jordan. Phrases like “QAIA Cares” and “For Your Health and Safety” placed the
government’s COVID-19 policies in a framework of morality, advertising its responses as just.
The phrase “Keeping Yourself Healthy, Keeping Everyone Healthy” and behavioral demands of
passengers represented calls to action for the airport passengers, ones that are of course still
“Subject to Legal Liability.”
In this chapter, I explore representations of the Jordanian government, its polices, and its
people throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. I focus, first, on the government’s narratives of
equality and “oneness” regarding its pandemic response, despite the ways in which such
narratives ignored existing structural inequalities exacerbated by responses to the pandemic.
Next, I consider the ways in which the Jordanian government called its people to action to fight
the COVID-19 pandemic, alongside how such calls tied into the government’s attempts to create
a unified national identity. These “emphatic and grandiose” policies and discourses at the national
scale reflect the macrolevel of the COVID-19 Spectacle, resulting in impacts at the scale of the
individual which will be the focus of later chapters. It is worth noting – as with many aspects of
the COVID-19 Spectacle in Jordan – that much of the rhetoric pushed by actors in the Jordanian
government in regard to the COVID-19 pandemic was not unique; governments and corporations
around the world frequently framed their responses as ones of care and unity.
Still, government discourses in the context of COVID-19 in Jordan expressed an
interesting contrast. Despite the many ways in which the population of Jordan could be imagined
as distinctly not “one,” actors in the government drew on language of “oneness” in their
conceptualizations of biopolitics and individualized calls to action in an attempt at a form of
nationalistic statemaking. I conclude this chapter by considering how these frameworks differed
from Western representations of Jordan and the Jordanian government’s responses to the
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pandemic. Western sources often framed Jordan as a country on the brink of collapse through
Orientalist language of instability, despite the many commonalities of experience Jordan shared
with states around the world.
“We are All like One”: Government Narratives of Equality
I propped my back up against the wall, placing a pillow between myself and the concrete behind
me. I stretched out my legs and covered them with my blanket as I pulled up my list of phone
numbers for the day. Because of the pandemic, I had been conducted many of my interviews over
the phone. I punched in the number of one of my survey respondents, knowing little more about
her than the survey answers she had provided. I knew that she was a 34-year-old refugee from
Sudan living in Amman, and I knew a handful of her opinions on the pandemic and the
government’s responses to it.
The first step was to make it to the phone ringing. Some survey respondents had provided
numbers that were either fake or no longer worked, despite answering that they would be willing
to talk more about their experiences with the COVID-19 pandemic in an interview. When I was
met with the low ring of the phone connecting, I breathed a first sigh of relief. Next, the
respondent needed to pick up. After a couple of rings, she did. “Hello! My name is Patrick
McKenzie. I am calling because you said in a survey about the impacts of COVID-19 that you
would be willing to speak more about your experiences in an interview,” I described in Arabic. I
continued, explaining the purpose of my research and answering any questions she had, before
ensuring one more time that she was willing to participate.
“Great! For my first question, do you feel that you have experienced the pandemic
differently as a refugee than a Jordanian might have?”
“No. Kulna zay wahid,” she responded firmly, roughly translating to the statement, “We
are all like one.” I was surprised by her answer. Most of the refugees I had spoken with up until
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then had answered, “Of course,” before diving into some of the reasons they felt that way.
However, as my phone interviews continued, I found that her sentiment was not uncommon. 9 of
the 26 refugees who I interviewed similarly answered that everyone had experienced the
pandemic the same in Jordan, with nearly identical language. This held true even as many later
discussed their struggles with issues unique to refugees in the country, such as a legal inability to
work. As my interviews continued, I wondered where this notion of “oneness,” in which certain
refugees were quick to point out inequalities they faced but hesitant to relate them the pandemic,
might have originated from.
In many respects, the Jordanian population is particularly not “one.” Jordan is a country
of approximately 10 million people (Nazer & Tuffaha, 2017). Of these, 2.2 million are Palestinian
refugees registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), of whom most
– though not all – have full Jordanian citizenship (UNRWA, 2019). However, many claim that
the proportion of people with Palestinian heritage in Jordan is substantially higher than the
number of refugees reported by the UNRWA. The most often cited statistic in conversation is that
nearly half of all Jordanians are of Palestinian descent. It is common for individuals and families
to identify themselves in conversation as either “Jordanian-Jordanian” or “Palestinian-Jordanian.”
Yet, tensions still exist between these groups. On a taxi ride during my first time in Amman, a
German friend asked the driver if he was “Jordanian-Jordanian” or “Palestinian-Jordanian.” The
driver reached into the crack between the seat in his car and brandished a pistol, holding it in the
air. “I’m Jordanian-Jordanian. I have this for Palestinians,” he replied passionately. While such a
harsh stance is uncommon, Jordanians who are less comfortable with the presence of Palestinians
often cite a time known as “Black September,” described as an attempted coup by Palestinians
against the Jordanian government in 1970.
In addition to the large number of people in Jordan who identify as Palestinians, at times
framing themselves as refugees and at other times not, an additional 750,000 refugees registered
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with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) live in Jordan. Of these
refugees, the vast majority - 655,000 - are from Syria. Jordan is also home to significant
populations of Iraqi, Yemeni, and Sudanese refugees. 83 percent of refugees registered with the
UNHCR live outside of refugee camps in urban areas like Amman, most of whose health care
needs remain largely unmet (UNHCR, 2019; Nazer and Tuffaha, 2017). As with Palestinians,
tensions exist between Jordanians and refugees. I have had frequent conversations with
Jordanians in many contexts about their feelings about the poor state of the Jordanian economy.
While most blame government corruption for at least part of these issues, some have expressed
their concerns that the government has invested too many resources into supporting refugees and
not enough into supporting its own people. Such a perspective is not unique to Jordan; concerns
of migrants taking resources and jobs are common in much of the world.
Beyond differences of national identity and citizenship, large class disparities exist
among the Jordanian population. Though income inequality in Jordan as a whole – based on Gini
coefficients – is lower than in most countries with similar GDPs and is substantially lower than in
the United States and United Kingdom, considerable differences exist between demographic
groups (UNDP, 2015). Among the governorates in Jordan, Amman is the most socioeconomically
unequal. Income inequality in Amman is associated with lower education level, younger head of
household age, and larger family size (UNDP, 2015). Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic greatly
exacerbated Jordan’s existing unemployment issues. In early 2021, 25% of the population was
unemployed. During this period, youth unemployment rates reached as high as 48%, and
women’s participation in the country’s labor force fell to only 14% (World Bank, 2021a).
From my experience, upper-class Jordanians live substantially different everyday lives
from their lower- and middle-class counterparts. Upper-class Jordanians that I have known
frequently traveled and lived outside of the country, often studying in private schools throughout
their childhood and attending university in Europe or the United States. They had luxurious
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homes and habits, and they rarely struggled to find work. On the other hand, middle- and lowerclass Jordanian friends of mine were often unemployed, bouncing between short-term and
informal work that paid little. For many of them, the costs of housing and food posed substantial
challenges, holidays and celebrations required bank loans, and most were only able to leave the
country once on their pilgrimages to Mecca (also often funded through loans). Disparities in dayto-day life are widespread in Jordan, and the economy and unemployment are enormous concerns
for almost everyone I have known there.
Given the many ways in which the Jordanian population is often not conceived as “one,”
I was surprised to find that many refugees voiced their experiences with the pandemic as such.
Perhaps such notions originated from the Jordanian government’s efforts to push narratives of
equality, particularly for refugees, in its early messaging of the pandemic. Jordan made
international headlines as one of the first countries to start vaccinating refugees against the
COVID-19 pandemic. In response, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi stated,
“Once again Jordan has shown exemplary leadership and solidarity in hosting refugees. The
country has included refugees in every aspect of the public health response to the pandemic,
including the national vaccination campaign, proving how it should be done to keep everyone
safe” (UNHCR, 2021). A humanitarian NGO’s magazine similarly placed Jordan on a pedestal
for its “leadership” in vaccinating refugees, arguing that “Jordan set another first by creating a
vaccination center within one of the largest refugee camps in the country” (Nayes, 2021).
The UNHCR Jordan Representative Dominik Bartsch further argued that the success of
the organization’s vaccination campaign in Jordan was “very much connected to the
government’s decision to include all persons on Jordanian territory – nationals and refugees,”
with the aim “to leave no one behind” (Aldroubi, 2021). In an article by UNICEF in Forbes, a
nurse working for the Jordanian Ministry of Health is similarly quoted arguing for equal
opportunity vaccination, “We all live together regardless of our nationality, and when the virus
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spreads, it doesn’t distinguish between refugees and Jordanians” (Hart, 2021). She continued,
“That is why our work is so important – it is for the protection of everyone in Jordan” (Hart,
2021). The Jordanian Minister of Health similarly framed the government’s vaccination campaign
as targeting “the most vulnerable populations” (WHO, 2021). In response to receiving World
Bank funding to promote COVID-19 vaccine access, the Minister of Planning and International
Cooperation argued that the funds would be useful for the government’s efforts to promote
“early, climate-resilient, and inclusive recovery” from the pandemic (World Bank, 2021b).
Yet, the Jordanian government’s discourse of equality in its responses to the COVID-19
pandemic was not limited to its vaccination campaign alone. In the early months of the pandemic,
the government often framed pandemic response as a joint effort undertaken by everyone in
Jordan. On World Health Day in 2020 – during the first lockdown – the government posted a
video to Facebook in which nurses at the Prince Hamza Hospital repeated the phrase “Al-urdun
a’waa” (Jordan is stronger). The video was captioned, “For the dear Jordanian people, a thank
you as large as the homeland and our hearts are with you, heroes.” This video framed the
lockdown as a sacrifice being undertaken equally by the Jordanian people – and by proxy others
in Jordan – in an effort to combat the pandemic. In a video posted to the Prime Ministry of
Jordan’s Instagram page, Prime Minister Omar Al-Razzaz is asked by a reporter about the
expected economic impacts of the pandemic. He responds, “As we were transparent in
announcing the numbers and cases of the coronavirus, we will announce with the same
transparency about numbers, economic indicators and tough choices.” Drawing on the COVID-19
Spectacle as evidence of transparency, the statement implies an equality of access to all
information that government possesses, be it case-related or economic, framing the Jordanian
public as equal participants in the pandemic response.
Moreover, the Jordanian government often framed its pandemic responses as inclusive,
for both refugees and vulnerable Jordanians. For example, in response to Jordan receiving an
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additional $290 million from the World Bank to provide cash support to vulnerable households
and workers affected by the pandemic, the Minister of Planning and International Cooperation
stated, “The Government of Jordan is carrying out large social protection programs to reduce the
impact the COVID-19 crisis is having on the most vulnerable Jordanians,” which this financing
would strengthen in turn (ReliefWeb, 2021). I encountered similar arguments when asking
Jordanian friends of mine about access to COVID-19 testing in Jordan. My friends would
frequently point to the price of these PCR tests – capped at 35 JD (50 USD) by the government,
which they imagined as low – as evidence of government efforts towards inclusive pandemic
response. In the next breath, they would often compare these prices to those found in other
countries, particularly the United States, with PCR tests costing over a hundred of dollars.
Claims that framed the Jordanian government as equal and inclusive in its pandemic
responses were reflective of Foucauldian biopolitics, in which a state’s claims to legitimacy and
power become based on its ability to “make live” for its population (Lemke, 2011). Under this
justification, governments gather systematic knowledge about their populations and implement
targeted interventions at the population level to increase the well-being of segments of their
population, often at the expense of other segments (Lakoff, 2017). In the context of the pandemic,
actors in the Jordanian government drew on narratives of their interventions and the COVID-19
Spectacle as helping to “make live” for all in Jordan, emphasizing efforts to include the
vulnerable. Yet, biopolitical narratives of equality and inclusivity in government interventions
ignored existing structural inequalities exacerbated by the pandemic, a sentiment expressed by
many I spoke with in Amman.
Returning to my initial example, 17 of the 26 refugees I interviewed felt that they had
faced substantial hardships during the pandemic because of their status as a refugee in Jordan.
Moreover, in my interviews, I frequently asked refugees and Jordanians how the Jordanian
government had been helpful in adapting to the pandemic. The most common answer I received
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by far was that the government had not been helpful at all. As one Jordanian woman told me,
“There was no help from the government, no programs at all.” My participants frequently spoke
about the ways in which their circumstances had disadvantaged them during the pandemic, with
no help from the supposedly equitable and inclusive government responses. A Palestinian man I
spoke with, for example, told me about the hardships he faced during the lockdown as the
government cut off his salary as a teacher. Friends of his were similarly fired from their work
without protection by the government. Moreover, early in the lockdown when people in Amman
were still not allowed to use their cars to grocery shop, he had to walk nearly five kilometers to
the nearest bakery to buy food. Though this is just one example, the inequities of responses to the
COVID-19 pandemic in Jordan will be explored in greater depth in the coming chapters.
The Jordanian government’s rhetoric of equality in pandemic response also pushed it to
hold its own members accountable for their own violations of pandemic policies. In March 2021,
the Jordanian government was hit with a series of such scandals. The Jordanian Ministers of the
Interior and of Justice, two of the highest-level officials in the cabinet in charge of enforcing
pandemic rules, were caught attending a banquet in a restaurant that violated COVID-19
restrictions at the time (Oweis, 2021). In response, Prime Minister Bisher al-Khasaweh – who the
king had appointed in October 2020 to restore public trust through pledges of curbing government
corruption – fired the two (Al-Khalidi, 2021b). The next week, oxygen supplies ran out in a
government-run hospital in As-Salt, causing the deaths of nine COVID-19 patients as medical
staff failed to act (Al-Khalidi, 2021c, 2021d). Prime Minister al-Khasawneh responded by firing
Minister of Health Nazir Obeidat, who stated that he took “full moral responsibility” for the
deaths (Omari, 2021a).
Despite this firing, however, protests spread throughout Jordan. Hundreds defied the
nightly curfew and in As-Salt, Amman, Irbid, Karak, and Aqaba, with many chanting “Down
with the government. We don’t fear coronavirus” (Al-Khalidi, 2021c). In turn, King Abdullah II
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made a public visit to the hospital, with phone footage shared across social media showing him
angrily scolding the hospital director, saying, “How could such a thing happen? This is
unacceptable” (Omari, 2021a). The king ordered the hospital director to submit his resignation,
and the government suspended the head of health services for the Balqaa province as well
(Omari, 2021a). Prime Minister al-Khasaweh responded with a public statement on television,
saying that “The anger definitely hit all of us. The anger regarding this government mixed with
shame because of this fault” (Oweis, 2021). During that appearance, al-Khasaweh continued,
“What happened is a huge and flagrant mistake, unjustified and unacceptable,” stating that “the
government alone assumes full responsibility for what happened” (Omari, 2021a). Further
implications and narratives of this incident will be explored in the sections to come.
In December 2021, five senior health officials – including the hospital director – were
sentenced to three years in jail for the deaths caused by this incident (Al-Khalidi, 2021e). Only
two weeks later, another doctor was arrested while on duty for working while infected with
COVID-19. The doctor was described as “flouting coronavirus precautionary measures” and
“endangering the health of other people” (Al Amir, 2021). The firing of high-level ministers and
the arrests of these health officials evidence the ways in which government narratives of equality
under COVID-19 responses pushed the government to publicly punish those who violated such
restrictions, even from positions of power. The spectacle of such acts reinforces government
discourse of equality and inclusivity, furthering the belief that “all are like one.” The framing as
all people in Jordan as equals under pandemic responses in turn justified government efforts to
individualize the public health response, placing the burden and blame on the Jordanian people.
Burden and Blame: The Individualization of Pandemic Public Health
My friends and I stepped out of a chain wings restaurant, the honking horns and roaring engines
of traffic filling our ears. The bright lights of the bustling and wealthy restaurant district of
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Abdoun held back the darkness of the night. Stuffed from dinner, we huddled in a circle and
chatted as we waited for our respective Ubers to head home. Across the street, I spotted a
billboard depicting COVID-19 safety precautions, half obscured by the leaves of the tree in front
of it. I quickly pulled out my phone, snapped a picture, and slipped my phone back into my
pocket. I noticed that my friends had become silent, and I turned to be met with quizzical looks
on their faces. “Did you just take a photo of that billboard?” a Jordanian friend of mine asked. I
had grown so used to taking photos of any COVID-19 sign I saw that I had forgotten that it might
look a bit strange. I laughed and explained that it was part of my research; I thought that there
was something interesting going on in the language people used to describe the pandemic. “Well,
what do you think is interesting about this one?” he inquired.
“I don’t know yet,” I replied, “I’m just taking pictures of everything I can for now so that
I have it later.” The conversation shifted to another topic, and I looked back at the billboard. What
was interesting about it? At first glance, it seemed relatively standard. There were infographics
showing physical distancing, hand washing, mask wearing, and avoiding large gatherings. The
only words were along a banner at the top in a tiny font, almost illegible from where I stood
across the street. In Arabic, it read, “The epidemic is not over. Our success is in our
commitment.” Next to this, was a logo I did not recognize that simply read, “Elak w feed.” I
would later learn that “Elak w feed” was the name of a joint awareness campaign, launched with
the cooperation of the Jordanian Ministry of Health. The name was meant to convey the
campaign’s goal of sharing important information relating to the pandemic while also sounding
like the word “COVID” – in Arabic pronounced with an “f” instead of a “v” and with an
elongated “i” – when said quickly. As the Ministry of Health described on its website, the
campaign was designed to “encourage the adoption of healthy behaviors among children,
adolescents and parents, in order to reduce the spread of disease and prevent it” through three
main pillars: news, information, and action (Ministry of Health, 2021b).
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“Elak w feed” was only one of many awareness campaigns launched by the Jordanian
government over the course of the pandemic with the goal of changing the behaviors of the
country’s population. Such campaigns, which worked to place the burden of stopping the spread
of the COVID-19 pandemic on individuals, were consistently included in posts and infographics
on the official Instagram of the Prime Ministry of Jordan. The first of many such posts came on
April 3, 2020, with a post in Arabic that translated “Do your duty, #Stay_At_Home” and a
caption that read, “We can all do our duty.” A month later, another post came that read, “Standing
more than 2 meters apart means standing the face of the sickness and eliminating it,”
accompanied by an image of two men wearing masks and chatting at a distance with the shadows
of superheroes with billowing capes. A few weeks later, with the first Eid during the pandemic,
the Prime Ministry of Jordan released a series of posts relating to celebrating “Eid from afar,”
calling it “the right of your neighbors.” The most aggressive of these posts showed an icon of a
call from a woman over a video chat with the words, “If you love her, celebrate her from afar.”
As the summer continued and cases declined in Jordan, the Prime Ministry responded by
posting an infographic of two men pushing an arrow, representing the number of COVID-19
cases, with the skyline of Amman in the background. One man is wearing a mask, pushing the
arrow away from the dangerous red and yellow zones and into the new, safer blue zone. The other
man is not wearing a mask and is pushing the arrow in the opposite direction, clearly straining the
man with the mask. Around this image, the post reads, “We have not finished yet.
#Our_Success_Is_In_Our_Commitment,” representing the first use I noted of the phrase from the
billboard I saw in Abdoun. The next day, the Prime Ministry of Jordan posted a series of
infographics with the heading, “We have not finished yet” alongside images of COVID-19
precautions and the hashtag “#Our_Success_Is_In_Our_Commitment_To_All_Of_Us.” In the
first of this series, these images surrounded a man wearing a mask with the subheading “Protect
yourself.” In the next, they surrounded a toolbox wearing a mask with the subheading “Protect
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your work.” Another featured an image of a house-shaped key with the subheading “Protect your
home,” and the last had Amman’s landmark blue mosque with the subheading “Protect your
mosque,” both adorned with masks.
The same week in June 2020, the Prime Ministry of Jordan made its first posts about a
new application named AMAN, which means “Safety.” The app was developed by a group of
“tech-savvy volunteers” named the COVID-19 JOTECH COMMUNITY and was intended for
contact tracing, tracking user locations and notifying them if they came near someone who later
tested positive for COVID-19 (Kayed, 2020). Though no one ever checked for me, some websites
still listed installing the app as a requirement for passengers on planes to enter Jordan when I
arrived. The first post regarding the AMAN app on this Instagram page depicts the words “Wear
a mask” in the shape of a face mask with the subheading “Stay understanding and stay secure and
safe,” deliberately ending on the Arabic word aman. The next post similarly shows two men
standing two meters apart with the subheading “Keep a safe distance,” again ending on the word
aman. The captions of both posts call for readers to “definitely download the AMAN app.”
Months later, to again encourage Jordanians to install the AMAN app, the Prime Ministry
of Jordan Instagram page posted another series of infographics. Three of these infographics
depicted standard images showing and telling people to wash their hands, wear masks, and
maintain social distancing; the fourth, however, showed a phone with the AMAN app logo on it
and the text “Download the AMAN app in order to keep everyone safe.” A final image puts the
four infographics together with the text “To ensure you protect yourself and others from the
coronavirus, follow these steps.” Days later, the final post on the Prime Ministry’s Instagram
page about the AMAN app depicts a neon caution sign with the caption, “Infection chains are
broken by the right preventive methods. Wear a mask. Keep a safe distance. Wash your hands
well. Download the AMAN app.” Interestingly, the launch of this second campaign to encourage
Jordanians to download the AMAN app coincided with continuing largescale protests in Jordan.
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Following a nationwide strike in September 2019, the Jordanian Teachers’ Syndicate had
negotiated a pay increase for teachers in the public sector. However, because of the COVID-19
pandemic, the Jordanian government decided to freeze all public sector pay increases until the
end of 2020 (Mimoune, 2020). In response, the Jordanian Teachers’ Syndicate announced plans
for another strike in July 2020. The government responded to these plans by arresting 13 board
members of the Syndicate’s governing council and ordering a two-year closure of the Syndicate
headquarters and all of its branches across Jordan. In turn, teachers protested the closure of the
Syndicate but were met with public displays of force, internet blackouts, and further arrests
(Mimoune, 2020). Jordanian authorities also instituted a gag order to prevent journalists from
reporting on either the initial arrests or the subsequent protests, resulting in the monitoring and
arrests of journalists as well. United Nations experts called on the Jordanian government to
reverse these actions, describing the situation as alarming and a violation of freedom of
expression (UN News, 2020).
The protests continued into September 2020, with participants demanding the release of
those arrested, until the government instituted a nationwide ban on large gatherings through
Defense Order 16. The Prime Ministry of Jordan accompanied the announcement of this defense
order with another series of Instagram posts. On September 19, 2020, the account posted an
infographic with a background showing a large crowd and the following caption:
Violation of Defense Order 16 can increase the probability of greater injuries. Do not be a
cause of the spread of the infection. Everyone who holds a gathering in violation of
Defense Order 16 is punished by imprisonment from three months to a year or a fine of
not less than 1000 dinars and not more than 3000 dinars. Everyone who is present or
participates in any of the gatherings referred to by Defense Order 16, which passes
attendance numbers over the allowed amount will be punished by a fine of 100 dinars.
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Posts the following day reiterated these points, emphasizing the punishments for large gatherings.
Alongside further threats of fines, these posts included the language “When we commit to
Defense Orders 11 and 16, we all contribute to limiting the spread of the pandemic” and “Let’s
protect ourselves by avoiding large gatherings.”
Importantly, rhetoric that placed both the burden of and blame for pandemic responses on
individuals in Jordan was not limited to the Instagram page of the Prime Ministry of Jordan. In
response to the hospital deaths from oxygen shortage and subsequent protests in March 2021
discussed earlier, King Abdullah II described spiking infection rates as “frightening” and said that
he was “saddened” by how the country was now struggling to curb the latest outbreak (AlKhalidi, 2021f). The Interior Minister more directly linked the protests to these rising cases on
television, saying, “Right of expression is safeguarded but gatherings at this time increase
infections” (Al-Khalidi, 2021f). Similarly, in response to rising case numbers in late July 2021, a
member of the Jordanian National Epidemic Committee criticized Jordanians for not following
COVID-19 safety precautions during the Eid, saying “There have been scenes of people not
wearing masks at all… Many people visited each other and attended weddings without following
health measures” (Xinhua, 2021b). Both instances represent cases of government officials using
the COVID-19 Spectacle to blame Jordanians for the issues they.
Another app developed jointly by the Ministry of Health further frames pandemic
response as an onus of the individual. The app “Sehtak,” literally translating to “your health,” is
an informational and awareness-based app that delivers daily updates on COVID-19 statistics and
provides resources to learn more about the virus and the responses to it. The tagline of the app,
present right under its name, is “With awareness, we defeat corona.” As part of the app’s
awareness-raising resources, it links to a series of videos from the summer of 2020 developed by
the Jordanian government to inform the public. One such video opens with an image of dominos
falling. Those that have fallen have an image of the virus on them while those that have yet to fall
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depict people. The dominoes with people on them are protected by a single hand that has stopped
the chain. Over this image, text calls on the Jordanian people to be that hand and use preventive
measures to stop the spread of the virus. Another video follows a man named Majd on his trip to
the supermarket. In it, he is depicted as rude and inconsiderate as he ignores the cashier asking
him to follow COVID-19 safety precautions by pulling up his mask and wearing gloves. With
each mistake Majd makes, a buzzer sounds accompanied by a red “X.” The video ends with a
narrator saying, “The virus is still here.”
Such advertising materials and calls for changes to individual behavior by actors in the
Jordanian government as part of the COVID-19 Spectacle were reflective of broader trends since
the 1980s across a wide swath of medical circumstances towards the individualization of public
health. Though public health initiatives aim to combat population-level issues, their rhetoric often
remains distinctly focused on individual behavior change, obscuring larger discussions of
important structural factors at play (Waggoner, 2013). For example, Waggoner (2013) argues that
– in the context of preconception care initiatives – the individualization of public health acted to
reframe adverse birth outcomes and health disparities as issues of personal responsibility. The
intention of my argument here is not to say that individual behaviors were not important in the
context of the COVID-19 pandemic; behavioral changes like mask wearing and physical
distancing at the individual level were without a doubt significant in reducing the spread of the
virus. Yet, focusing solely on individual behaviors allowed governments – both in Jordan and
around the world – to ignore structural vulnerabilities that were simultaneously present, such as
the differential impacts of lockdowns and the differential risk of exposure to COVID-19 based on
employment and socioeconomic class.
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“Your Homeland Needs You:” Statemaking and Pandemic Nationalism
“We’re going to the tank museum today. Do you want to come?” Ayman asked me, as I stepped
out of my apartment on a warm Friday morning. I happily accepted his invitation and found
myself packed in between his three sons on the way a few hours later. I had never heard of the
museum before and had little idea what to expect. We turned a corner and were suddenly greeted
by a massive complex of glass and concrete formed into sharp angles. Tanks and flags lined the
way to the front door. It was the largest museum I had seen in Jordan by far. As we approached
the gate, I expected the guard to turn us away. I had tried to visit a number of museums in
Amman so far that summer, and all had been closed because of the pandemic. Darat Al-Funun, an
art museum in downtown Amman that people often worked at, had a sign taped to its main
entrance that said the following in both English and Arabic:
In line with the measures issued by the Prime Ministry to prevent the spread of the
coronavirus, including to avoid large public gatherings, Darat al-Funun closes its doors to
the public from Monday, March 16, 2020, until further notice. We wish you good health,
and keep safe.
Similarly, the View Amman Exhibition, a museum dedicated to the history and development of
the city, had the following taped over the sign that listed its open hours, “Dear visitors, the exhibit
is closed starting today 3/15/2020 and for further notice. Based on the decision of the Council of
Ministers and for public health safety.”
I looked expectantly at the guard, waiting for him to deliver the news that the museum
was closed. Instead, he gestured us through a metal detector and welcomed us into the complex.
The boys immediately sprinted to the nearest tank, with the oldest quickly climbing to the top.
Ayman beamed with pride and ran over. “Take his picture! Take his picture!” he shouted to me.
Before we entered the museum, I had taken nearly 50 photos of each of the three boys posing on
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the various tanks outside. This was the happiest I had seen Ayman or his sons that summer, and I
was excited to share this moment with them.
As we stepped into the museum, we put on our masks, but I was surprised to find no
signage even mentioning the pandemic, a very rare occurrence among enclosed private or public
spaces in Amman. The museum formed roughly a loop, depicting important military moments
throughout Jordan’s recent history. Behind the tanks of different eras, descriptions on plaques and
the walls described the fight against the Ottoman Empire and the Arabization of the Jordanian
military. Ayman would encourage the boys to climb under the ropes of the exhibits for more
photos, pretending to scold them whenever an employee would complain. We soon reached the
first of two main exhibits in the museum: the Battle of Karama. Patriotic music swelled as we
entered; it was a massive room with life-size mannequins of soldiers fighting the Israeli military,
accompanied of course by the tanks they used. Ayman’s oldest son excitedly described the battle
as “Jordan’s greatest victory.” As we exited this room, we entered the central atrium of the
museum: a helicopter hanging above us and a jeep in front of us. The walls encircling the atrium
were filled with military garb and memorabilia, all depicting King Abdullah II during his time in
the Jordanian military. Ayman excitedly asked for a picture of the family in front of the exhibit.
As I snapped photo after photo of Ayman and his children until one satisfied him, I
thought about the purpose of the museum. Why was it the only one open during the pandemic?
Why was it seemingly funded and maintained substantially more than other museums in Amman?
One explanation of this phenomenon might be the role of war in statemaking. For Weber (1946),
the state and violence are inherently intertwined, going so far as to define the state as that which
“claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force” (p. 4). On the other hand, Tilly
(1985) argues that states are more akin to protection rackets, suggesting that “war makes states”
in the sense that states create violence in order to justify their own existence. From either
perspective, warmaking plays an essential role in statemaking. During my Arabic classes in
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Jordan prior to the pandemic, I had once needed to ask Jordanians on the street what the greatest
moment in Jordanian history was. While some said Jordan’s independence, most said the Battle
of Karama. War is central to the production of a Jordanian sense of national identity, and the
Royal Tank Museum is a tool to encourage that production.
Yet, Jordanian national identity is complex. “Black September” – the 1970 civil war
between the Jordanian military and the Palestinian Liberation Organization – for example,
resulted in many Palestinian causalities and the destruction of Palestinian camps in Jordan at the
time. Its legacies have resulted in lasting systematic discrimination against Palestinian-Jordanians
(Culcasi, 2016). In an attempt to encourage Jordanians to unite under a common identity, King
Abdullah II launched a government advertising campaign known as “Jordan First” in 2002
(Culcasi, 2016). The campaign sought to shift national discourse away from its previous focus on
the Arab world and Palestine and towards a focus solely on Jordan as a state. In 2006, a follow-up
campaign was launched with the similar goal of alleviating tensions and bringing about national
unity called, “We Are All Jordan” (Culcasi, 2016). Culcasi (2016) suggests that these campaigns
were largely ignored but not forgotten.
Actors in the Jordanian government seemingly envisioned the COVID-19 pandemic as
another opportunity to further the production of a Jordanian national identity, and they did so
through narratives of pandemic responses as part of a war against COVID-19. The Instagram of
the Prime Ministry of Jordan was again a site of such rhetoric. On World Health Day in 2020, for
example, a post depicted three health care workers in full protective garb in front of a map of
Jordan. The start of the caption read, “We send our regards to all health workers who are on the
front line of defense in the face of the novel virus pandemic.” The caption went on to call these
workers “unknown soldiers working in hospitals and laboratories, who work to preserve our
safety,” further cementing the narrative of war. It ended by asking Jordanians to write letters for
health care workers, thanking them for their service. The first such letter, written by the Prime
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Minister, is included with the post. Another post quoted Prime Minister Al-Razzaz praising the
epidemiological survey teams, saying, “You are in the front trench to defend citizen health, and
we are proud of you.”
Yet, narratives of war were not reserved for health care workers alone. In May 2020, the
Prime Ministry of Jordan called for Jordanians to stay at home through an Instagram post. It
reads, “Your homeland needs you, help your country and stay home.” These words sit in front of
a map of Jordan. In smaller font below, the post continues, “Protect yourself, protect others.”
Similarly, as I stepped off a bus in one of the most trafficked circles in Amman, I spotted a
billboard placed under a line of Jordanian flags. The billboard read, “al-shabab al-amjad,”
roughly translating to “the glorified youth.” Next to these words, photos of five young people
form the shape of Jordan. One is seemingly a health care worker wearing an N95 mask and a full
body, protective white suit that obscures all identifying features. A woman wears a disposable
surgical mask, a hijab, and scrubs. A man wears a surgical mask, a hard hat, and goggles,
seemingly depicting a construction worker. The remaining two people are a woman and a young
boy; the woman is wearing dress clothes and the boy is seemingly in a scouting uniform, with
both smiling and not wearing masks. The implication of the billboard seems to be that all people
in Jordan are important to the country’s pandemic response, all of them are “the glorified youth.”
Moreover, the phrase “al-shabab al-amjad” begins a stanza in the Royal Anthem of
Jordan. The stanza reads, “The glorified youth / Are your devoted soldiers / Their resolve will
never subside / And die away / Because from you / They learn perseverance” (National Anthem).
Written in 1946, the “you” in the Jordanian national anthem refers to the “King of the Arabs,”
today King Abdullah II (National Anthem). By drawing on this phrasing, this billboard connects
those combating COVID-19 to the “devoted soldiers” of the anthem, implicitly praising them –
and in turn the Jordanian people – for “resolve” and “perseverance” in the face of the pandemic.
The logo in the bottom corner of the billboard is that of the Greater Amman Municipality, but the

34

billboard itself speaks to a greater nationalism of Jordan, further framing the responses to the
pandemic as a form of warmaking and thus statemaking.
“On the Brink:” Western News Discourse of the Pandemic in Jordan
While representations of the COVID-19 pandemic from actors in the Jordanian government
framed pandemic responses as statemaking practices of nationalistic duty and protection in a war
against the pandemic, Western media largely did the opposite, relying on Orientalist tropes to
frame Jordan as an unstable country on the brink of collapse. An article published by the U.S.based think tank Middle East Institute was titled “Could COVID-19 push Jordan to the edge?” In
it, only weeks after the first confirmed COVID-19 cases in Jordan, the author describes Jordan’s
economy as “floundering” and “fragile” and its COVID-19 restrictions as too harsh. He suggests
that, while the Jordanian people may support these restrictions for now, this support represents
only “momentary amity” that is unlikely to endure (Al-Ajlouni, 2020).
Yet, Jordan received relatively little coverage from Western media sources following the
article by the Middle East Institute, likely in part because the country maintained relatively low
case counts. In his landmark book Orientalism, Said (1978) suggests that Western depictions of
the “Orient” have largely framed the region as a discursive Other: backwards and uncivilized.
Such depictions have emerged and gained legitimacy from the hegemony of the West, rooted in
notions of European superiority and born out of Western political interests. The languages and
concepts embedded in these interests and beliefs bleed into how the West imagines and represents
the Middle East (Said, 1978). Tropes of Middle Eastern “backwardness” were present in the
Middle East Institute’s early coverage of the COVID-19 pandemic in Jordan. Yet, the early
success of the Jordanian government following the publication of this article perhaps provided
little additional fodder for an Orientalist framing of Jordan, particularly as many Western
countries struggled to contain the virus.
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Moreover, the lack of media coverage regarding Jordan’s relative success reflects what
Briggs (2004) calls the “political economy of public discourse,” in which certain narratives and
understandings of disease outbreaks are elevated while others are erased. In the case of the
COVID-19 pandemic, early privileged discourses were often evocative images of suffering and
data that carried the implication – as Sontag (2003) suggests in the context of the modern hypersaturation of images of suffering – that suffering cannot be stopped, inviting us to be spectators to
the inevitable. When it became apparent that Jordan’s early pandemic experience would neither
fit Orientalist tropes nor provide distant images of suffering, media attention turned elsewhere.
Yet, in March 2021, as new developments allowed the potential for such discourses to reemerge,
media focus shifted to Jordan.
Following the firing of the Jordanian ministers of the interior and of justice for attending
a banquet against COVID-19 violations, an article published by Reuters described this firing as
occurring “amid rising discontent over worsening economic conditions and curbs on public
freedoms under emergency laws” (Al-Khalidi, 2021g). Moreover, it tied the seemingly unrelated
incident to Prime Minister Bisher al-Khasaweh’s desire to “accelerate IMF-guided reforms,”
reforms which the article describes as “crucial to economic recovery in Jordan from the blow of
the coronavirus pandemic” (Al-Khalidi, 2021g).The article further suggests that Jordan’s
commitment to IMF reforms thus far was what had allowed the country to “maintain stable
sovereign ratings” during the pandemic, and it points out the IMF’s praise for the Jordanian
Finance Minister Mohammad Al-Ississ for his handling of the Jordanian economy during the
pandemic (Al-Khalidi, 2021g).
One week later, as protests erupted across Jordan in response to the hospital deaths
discussed earlier, more foreign news sources took interest in Jordan. In late March, for example,
Jewish News Syndicate posted an article entitled, “COVID-19 and economic crisis have Jordan on
the brink” (Menachem, 2021). The article describes the protests as threatening “the stability of the
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Kingdom,” arguing that the country “urgently needs health and economic assistance”
(Menachem, 2021). The article proceeds to say, “Jordan cannot cope with the coronavirus crisis,”
blaming the economic situation on Syrian refugees and rising case numbers on “the government’s
failure to close its land borders with Syria and Iraq” (Menachem, 2021). Though as an Israelfocused news source Jewish News Syndicate might approach such an article from a particular
perspective, this framing soon became commonplace among other sources. Days later, Reuters
published another article, describing Jordan’s cemeteries and hospitals as overwhelmed due to
increasing cases. The article describes how public trust in the Jordanian government’s public
health service was at a “record low” due to the “gross negligence” of the hospital incident. The
article concludes by stating, “Anger over the crisis, which has pushed unemployment to record
24%, sent hundreds of demonstrators on to the streets” (Al-Khalidi, 2021h).
However, Western media truly turned its attention towards Jordan on April 3, 2021. On
this day, Prince Hamzah bin Hussein – the half-brother of King Abdullah II who was removed as
crown prince in 2004 – broadcast a video in English to BBC, declaring that he had been placed
under house arrest and that other officials had been detained (Said et al., 2021). In this broadcast,
Prince Hamzah suggested that the house arrest was an attempt to silence him, and he criticized
the Jordanian government and implicitly King Abdullah II, stating, “This country has become
stymied in corruption, in nepotism, and in misrule” (Said et al., 2021). Jordanian authorities, on
the other hand, asserted that they were investigating a foreign-backed attempt to destabilize the
country. In its initial article breaking the story, The Wall Street Journal described Jordan as a
“key partner in U.S. security efforts” in the Middle East and important to “Israel’s stability,” a
framing of Jordan that would become common in the week to come (Said et al., 2021). The next
day, The Wall Street Journal published a follow-up article, framing the situation as a “rift within
the royal family” which “threatened to upend politics in this critical U.S. Middle Eastern ally”
(Said and Malsin, 2021). The article goes on to cast doubt on assertions by Jordan authorities of a
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foreign-backed plot based on the lack of arrests involving the military, stating “The arrests could
be part of an attempt to generate a perceived threat to keep Jordan on the radar” to keep the
support and focus of its allies like the U.S. and Saudi Arabia (Said and Malsin, 2021).
A day later, Jared Malsin – an author on the latter Wall Street Journal piece – was
interviewed by NPR. Malsin used the interview to again downplay the possibility of the
involvement of a foreign entity in the situation. He stated that diplomats were “skeptical of the
government’s narrative,” instead framing the arrests as a crackdown on dissent (Inskeep and
King, 2021). Malsin described Prince Hamzah as “an embodiment of the kind of discontent that
you’re seeing in Jordan right now” based on the economy and pandemic, concluding that the
arrests are “really an expression of those internal tensions” (Inskeep and King, 2021). Through
this framing, Western media sources transformed the Jordanian government’s claims of a foreignbacked plot into a “royal rift” with Prince Hamzah on the side of the Jordanian people. In turn,
Western media sources identified the hospital incident as the reason for this “royal rift.” A
Reuters article published on April 8, for example, was entitled “The sudden visit to COVID
victims’ families that sparked Jordan’s royal rift.” In it, the author describes how Prince Hamzah
visited the families of the patients who died after the hospital ran out of oxygen before Prince
Hussein did the same, “upstaging” his “younger rival for the throne” (Al-Khalidi, 2021i). This
caused Jordanian authorities to “accuse him of involvement in activities aimed at destabilizing the
country” (Al-Khalidi, 2021i). Though Prince Hamzah pledged his allegiance to King Abdullah II
days after the initial house arrest, the article suggests that the event “has shaken the country’s
reputation as a stable country in a volatile region” (Al-Khalidi, 2021i).
However, The Guardian published an article a little over a month later, entitled “Did
Jordan’s closest allies plot to unseat its king?” that cast doubt on this assessment. This article,
instead, suggests that the U.S. Embassy told the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate that
Prince Hamzah was attempting to sow dissent as part of a larger plot by the United States and
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Saudi Arabia (Chulov and Safi, 2021). The authors allege that Jordan’s defiance of President
Trump’s “Deal of the Century” had angered Jared Kushner and Prince Mohammed bin Salman,
leading them to sow dissent against King Abdullah II through Prince Hamzah and other contacts
in Jordan. The article quotes a regional intelligence source, saying “The upshot is that Trump lost
and it all fell over” (Chulov and Safi, 2021). While it is impossible to verify one story over the
other, the article in The Guardian provided a substantially different perspective from the articles
that came before, supporting the Jordanian authorities’ initial claims of a foreign-backed plot
rather than reframing the event as a “royal rift.”
Yet, when the Heritage Foundation published a report months later describing the events
surrounding Prince Hamzah’s arrest, the foundation framed their takeaways based on the first
narrative, even while alluding to the latter. Written as a set of takeaways for President Biden
ahead of his first meeting with King Abdullah II, the author argues that “growing regional
instability makes Jordan’s bilateral relationship with the US more important now than ever,”
describing Jordan as “a critical U.S. partner in a tumultuous region” (Robinson, 2021). In a
section entitled “The calm before the storm?” the author points out how the Jordanian people are
“increasingly frustrated” because of socioeconomic conditions worsened by the pandemic. The
report argues that Jordan has historically maintained stability because of “tribal support and a
united royal family,” both of which have been called into question by Prince Hamzah’s “coup
attempt” (Robinson, 2021). In response to these concerns, the Heritage Foundation suggests that
President Biden should focus his conversation with King Abdullah II on promoting economic
freedom, deterring Iranian interference, reducing Israeli-Palestinian tensions, and mitigating the
impacts of COVID-19. Regarding the impacts of COVID-19, the author suggests, “America’s
adversaries will use the chaos of COVID-19 to divide the United States from its partners, sow
division and disinformation, and exert greater influence over Jordan’s young, vulnerable
population” (Robinson, 2021).

39

This report shares much in common with that of the Middle East Institute in March 2020.
It focuses heavily on the potential dangers that Jordan’s “weak” economy and the COVID-19
pandemic pose to the stability of the Jordanian government, a concern only because of the United
States’ use for Jordan as an ally in the Middle East. In turn, it suggests economic and political
reforms that seemingly have little to do with what stirred the protests and sedition on which these
reforms are justified, completely ignoring the potential role of the United States itself in these
matters. Like most Western news sources that reported on Jordan during the pandemic, both the
report’s analyses and suggestions are based on Orientalist perspectives in which Jordan is “on the
brink” of collapse, with only the United States and other Western countries to save it.
Conclusions
In my conversations in Jordan, I never met anyone who described Jordan as “on the brink” in the
ways that Western news sources insisted it must be. People frequently complained about the
economy, the pandemic, and corruption, but rarely did people believe that such complaints were
part of a greater push towards “instability.” If anything, I encountered the opposite sentiment. On
a car ride home from work one day, a Jordanian friend of mine brought up the Arab Spring, “The
atmosphere of Amman was electric in those days,” he told me, “People were ready for change. It
was all anyone could talk about. Today, it feels like everyone has just given up.” While the
protests in Jordan over the course of the pandemic suggest that my friend may have been
exaggerating – or that the people pushing for change may have shifted – his perspective stood in
stark contrast to Western media representations of Jordan as a country one bad day from collapse.
Moreover, his perspective contrasted that of statemaking and nationalism that actors in
the Jordanian government attempted to create. To my friend, the pandemic response was not a
roaring success that showcased Jordan’s “oneness” and the perseverance of its people; it
represented reluctant submission and acceptance. Yet, these representations of pandemic response
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were not unique to Jordan. Many governments crafted narratives of equality and called their
citizens to action in the name of protecting themselves and others from the pandemic. Similarly,
citizens of many states responded to COVID-19 restrictions with anger and protests, but few
claimed that the United Kingdom or Germany were “on the brink” for such events. Thus,
representations of and by the Jordanian government fell at a unique intersection of nationalistic
statemaking and equality on the one hand and Orientalist instability on the other, with each vying
for attention and legitimacy within the greater COVID-19 Spectacle.

41

CHAPTER 3
POLICING A VIRUS: UNEQUAL ENFORCEMENT OF PANDEMIC
SURVEILLANCE
It was a cool summer night as I approached the gate of the largest soccer stadium in Amman. I
was joined by three friends of mine: a Jordanian, an American, and an Australian. As we
approached the military officer stationed at the gate, we readied our phones to show him our
tickets. He turned to my Jordanian friend and quickly said in Arabic, “This gate isn’t for you. You
need to go around to the other side.” After a couple minutes of back and forth, we learned that
this was the entrance for VIPs, who had their own section in the stadium for this game. By the
time we finished chatting with the officer, it was 8:00 pm: 30 minutes before the game began. We
started the nearly 45-minute walk around the fence of the stadium to the back entrance.
As we walked along the sidewalk, we passed three murals spray-painted on the wall: a
globe wearing a mask, two Jordanians wearing masks, and a person in a hazmat suit holding a
personified COVID-19 virus molecule. Below these images were the words “Stay Safe, Stay
Strong” in English. As we neared the entrance for non-VIPs, we passed vans parked on the side
of the road selling team flags and shirts. When we finally arrived at the correct gate, we were
greeted by more uniformed officers next to daunting military vehicles. The officers scanned my
ticket and checked my temperature with a temperature gun, then allowed me to pass. After only a
few hundred feet, I encountered another military checkpoint, at which my ticket was checked
again alongside my proof of vaccination. I went through three more military checkpoints, having
my ticket scanned at each, before entering the stadium. These checkpoints included one
additional vaccination check, two identification checks, and one a full-body search.
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The Jordanian government had recently reopened in-person attendance for its national
soccer games to anyone who had received their first dose of a COVID-19 vaccine more than 21
days prior to the game or anyone who had received two doses. The Facebook post describing the
reopening procedures said that tickets would be sold exclusively online upon reopening “for the
safety of our dear fans” and to “promote social distancing measures.” The ticket website showed
physically distanced seats across the stadium with at least one empty seat between each person at
5 JD, about 7 USD, each. Upon seeing the announcement, I rallied my three friends to attend the
upcoming game between Al Faisaly and Al Ramtha.
As my friends and I stepped into the stadium, the bright lights shining on the field filled
my vision. As I glanced around, I noticed that all but one section of the stadium ahead of us was
completely empty. I guessed that this section must be for the VIPs. I turned around and saw the
section we had entered completely packed, with so few empty seats that my friends and I had
difficulty finding four together for us to sit in. All promises of physical distancing had
immediately vanished upon entering the stadium, and – because the stadium was outside – there
was no requirement for people to wear masks. When my friends and I attempted to sit in one of
neighboring empty sections, the guards that lined the stairs stopped us and pointed us towards the
few empty seats in the other section. I can only suspect that attendees were packed into this
section for ease of cleaning the station, but such a layout directly contradicted the assigned and
distanced seats for which we had initially bought tickets.
We took our seats a few minutes after the game had started. As the packed crowd stood
and shouted in celebration of Al Faisaly’s first goal, I was struck by three aspects of the security
and surveillance of the game. I first contemplated the security contradictions that the Jordanian
government had implemented to host a “safe” soccer game in the midst of the pandemic. While
my vaccination record had been heavily scrutinized twice before I was allowed to enter the
stadium, physical distancing in the stadium was not only not required but actively prevented.
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Next, I was struck by the ways in which COVID-19 security and surveillance had seemingly been
seamlessly integrated into existing notions and practices of security. Military officers who would
previously have only scanned tickets, checked identifications, and conducted body searches
added vaccination checks to their tasks, blending notions of government protection from
terrorism with protection from COVID-19.
However, I was perhaps most struck by the difference in treatment in these security
procedures between my Jordanian friend and my two non-Jordanian friends. When we arrived,
my Jordanian friend and I shared one ticket document, while my American and Australian friends
shared another. They passed through the militarized checkpoints without ever having their
vaccination records checked. When my American friend had forgotten to bring any form of
identification, the officer waved him through without hesitation. When we went through full-body
searches, the officers apologized to my non-Jordanian friends and I for the formality. On the other
hand, despite the fact that we arrived as a group, my Jordanian friend received no such apologies
for his search. Both he and I – I suspect because we shared a ticket document – had our
vaccination records and identifications checked thoroughly twice. These differences in treatment
illustrate the ways in which seemingly equal surveillance and disciplinary mechanisms were
applied unequally in Amman throughout the pandemic.
In this chapter, I explore the implementation of discipline and surveillance techniques by
the Jordanian government during the COVID-19 pandemic, and how this implementation shaped
the perceptions of pandemic responses held by people living in Amman. The COVID-19
pandemic provided the Jordanian government – and many governments around the world – with
the opportunity to extend existing techniques of population control and to develop new
techniques under the justification of the COVID-19 Spectacle. Looking particularly at these
extensions in the contexts of lockdown, curfews, and mask wearing in Amman, I argue that the
Jordanian government extended its efforts of control not only through enforcement of such
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policies by police and military officers but also through the self-surveillance of many in Amman.
However, these extensions of control were not applied equally across Amman; those with statuses
of privilege often did not feel or experience such policies in the same ways as those without. I
conclude by considering how such discipline and surveillance mechanisms operated in distinctly
unequal ways, targeting Jordanians of lower socioeconomic status while largely ignoring – or
being ignored by – wealthier Jordanians.
Problems with the Police: Surveillance Experiences in Amman
The vapors of the shisha and electronic cigarettes clouded the cooled air as we gathered on
couches around a small table of nuts and candies on the patio of an apartment in the upscale
neighborhood of Abdoun. It was early in my time in Amman, and I had accompanied my host
family to visit Layla’s sister. Layla was Ayman’s wife, and she was excited for me to meet her
extended family. An older man approached the couch I sat on and thudded down next to me. He
turned to me and in flawless English asked how I was doing. Ayman quickly turned to him and
scoldingly said, “No English! He wants to practice his Arabic.”
After we made our introductions, the man addressed Ayman, “I heard you had a problem
with the police.” Ayman shook his head, obviously frustrated, and burst into story. He and a
friend had been standing by the street in front of the friend’s apartment, chatting and drinking tea,
when a police car rolled by. The officer stepped out of the car and approached the two. He
scolded them for not wearing masks and warned them that next time he would fine them.
The man interrupted, “If your friend was a government employee, there would have been
no problem.” Ayman responded with a laugh of agreement, and the man began a story of his own.
He had similarly felt harassed by the police for not wearing a mask in the street around his
apartment. For almost 15 minutes, the two ranted about their interactions with police throughout
the pandemic, frustrated by the inconsistencies of treatment they had faced. Throughout this
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conversation, they spoke of masks not as a tool for combatting the COVID-19 pandemic but as a
requirement to avoid police interactions.
This connection extended beyond Ayman and Layla’s family in Amman, even bleeding
into the ways in which businesses framed their own mask policies. One afternoon, for example
Ayman and I drove to the outskirts of Amman in search of a new set of dishes for the family
kitchen. We first stopped at a place with the name American Goods Store. As we entered, I first
noticed a box of disposable masks and a bottle of hand sanitizer by the door. From my periphery,
I then spotted a small sign, cut out of carboard and dangling from the roof with scribbled Arabic
handwriting that read, “Do not enter without a mask” in small white letters. Below this, in a larger
red font were simply the words “Police Control.”
A café in Jabal Lwebdeih, popular with many of my Jordanian friends, similarly taped a
printed sheet of paper to their front door. A small photo of a disposable mask sat in the bottom
left corner, and the paper read, first in Arabic and then English, “In line with defense orders, entry
is prohibited without wearing your mask.” Such signs similarly framed mask wearing as a
practice to prevent disciplinary action by the police or government, rather than as a practice for
individual or community safety. In the next chapter, I further explore the ways in which various
businesses and organizations represented and enforced COVID-19 regulations in Amman.
Yet, police enforcement of pandemic practices was not limited to mask wearing;
lockdowns and curfews across the pandemic faced similar policing measures. In March 2020, at
only 69 confirmed cases of COVID-19 in Jordan, the government declared a state of emergency
and ordered the army to seal off the city of Amman, placing residents under total lockdown with
no permitted ability to leave their homes. Two days later, the government expanded this
lockdown nationwide, deploying the army across the country to enforce it (Mimoune, 2020).
After another two days, the inability for many to access food and medicine caused authorities to
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relax these measures slightly, allowing people to walk to their nearest grocery stores and
pharmacies and to travel in cases of medical emergency. Such restrictions remained in place for
two months – until May 2020 – when the nationwide lockdown was lifted but a nightly curfew
remained in place (Mimoune, 2020).
One evening, Ayman and I sat next to each other on the worn couch in his living room,
watching the news and scrolling through social media on our respective phones. After a moment,
Ayman leaned over, holding his phone screen out so I could see his photos. He scrolled through
his library until he reached the video he was looking for. With a large grin, he started the video.
In it, Ayman loosed a loud whistle over a patch of empty desert in front of him. One by one, stray
dogs of all shapes and breeds emerged from the sand and debris around him, with only their
exposed ribs and dusty fur in common. In the video, Ayman tossed small chunks of meat and
bread to each dog. Some hung around, looking to him for more while others quickly skittered off.
“At first there were 8,” he told me, “Soon, there were over 120. They would come from all over.”
At the time, Ayman held an engineering job near the Queen Alia International Airport,
and he used to take his lunch breaks in this dusty field each day. Before he left for work, he
would collect whatever extra food he could from home, and at work, he would gather extra scraps
from his coworkers to feed to the stray dogs. When COVID-19 reached Jordan and the
government implemented a nationwide lockdown, Ayman quickly lost his job. For months,
people in Amman were only allowed to leave their apartments to walk to the nearest grocery
stores, bakeries, and pharmacies without a special government permit. Without his job, Ayman
was unable to acquire a permit to even drive his van. He called the police over and over, begging
them to let him return to the field to feed these stray dogs, but each time they denied his permit,
telling Ayman that he might unknowingly spread the virus to a new part of the city through such a
trip.
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When the government ended the lockdown and Ayman was again allowed to drive, he
quickly returned to that dusty patch of desert with a new bag of scraps. He again recorded a video
of himself whistling and feeding the dogs, but this time there were only four. Ayman’s remorse
was palpable, both in the latter video and as he told me this story. When I asked Ayman why he
had started feeding the dogs in the first place, he explained it to me as a religious act of charity,
the same reason he gave food and water to the stray cats around his apartment. As we chatted,
Ayman’s remorse quickly turned to frustration, as he argued that the police had essentially killed
those dogs.
Even with the lockdown gone, the nightly curfew remained in place. When I arrived in
Amman, no one was allowed outside their homes from 11:00 pm until 6:00 am, a policy Ayman
explained carefully to me on my first night. Given the intense heat of summer afternoons in
Amman, many Jordanians take brief naps during the day and are most active at night. Large
swaths of daily life, ranging from grocery store visits to social activities, are common well past
11:00 pm. With declining cases and increasing frustration from many, the Jordanian government
soon pushed the curfew back to 12:00 am. Neither curfews nor lockdowns were unique to Jordan;
cities, provinces, and countries around the world considered and implemented such policies early
in the pandemic. Yet, the longevity of Jordan’s curfew was substantial. The Jordanian
government did not lift the curfew for any until July 2021, and even then, the curfew was only
lifted for the vaccinated. During my time in Amman, many were skeptical of the reasons for the
curfew. From the perspectives of many I spoke with in Amman, the nightly curfew was less a tool
of disease prevention than a tool of population control.
The histories of disease outbreak and increasing government control are deeply
interwoven. In the years following the 1348 Black Death, Italian city-states developed some of
the first tools of disease surveillance to combat the plague. During this time, Venice and Florence
established the first boards of health, evolving into permanent government positions with the
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authority to restrict travel and trade and isolate infected individuals, eventually becoming early
building blocks of the administrative apparatus of the modern European state (de Waal, 2020). At
the end of the 19th century, the use of disease surveillance and interventions during a cholera
outbreak in Hamburg by Robert Koch – the medical scientist placed in charge of protecting the
German empire from infectious diseases – similarly contributed to the centralization of the
German state (de Waal, 2020). More recently, Donaldson and Wood (2004), in their analysis of
the 2001 foot and mouth disease epidemic in the United Kingdom, suggest that the government
used surveillance practices to construct territories to control humans in order to act on a
nonhuman virus. Caduff (2020) likewise argues that the COVID-19 pandemic contributed to the
normalization of extreme measures of government control.
At their core, such arguments consider the ways in which disease outbreaks can
legitimize the extension of practices of government population control, concerns expressed by
many in Amman in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. In this way, though the government
had justified the curfew as necessary through the COVID-19 Spectacle, it had failed to convince
many. Still, one does not need to be convinced by the spectacle to be impacted by it. Though the
nightly curfew eventually came to an end for the vaccinated in July 2021, friends of mine prior to
that often mused about whether or not the curfew would become a permanent feature of life in
Amman. Implicit in such worries were the role of the police in enforcing the curfew. Yet, the
police could not be everywhere at once; they could not catch every curfew violator. Instead, the
curfew was often enforced by self-surveillance.
“But It’s Past Curfew:” Self-Surveillance in the Name of Public Health
I pulled up a plastic lawn chair next to Ayman during one of my first weeks back in Amman. His
manicured grape vines hung over us in his driveway, and through the vines, a few of the brightest
stars outcompeted the lights surrounding Ayman’s apartment. I bounced my leg nervously as I
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reached for a conversation topic, trying to get back into the swing of speaking Arabic. Forgetting
the word for trash, I asked Ayman something along the lines of, “Where should I put the things in
my apartment that I do not want or need?” When my question was met with confusion, I ran into
my apartment and grabbed a full grocery bag of wrappers and receipts. “This,” I clarified.
“Ah,” Ayman replied, “Kareem!” Kareem bolted out of his family’s apartment. Ayman’s
eldest son, Kareem was a ball of fire who was always giddy to teach me about Amman. “Show
Patrick where to take the trash.”
Kareem froze, “But it’s past curfew, baba.” At the time, the Jordanian government had
implemented a nationwide 11:00 pm curfew to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. It was 11:45
pm, though I had thought little of this when asking Ayman my initial question.
“Go quickly,” Ayman answered sternly. With that, Kareem took the trash bag from me in
one hand and took my hand with his other.
As we left the gates of the driveway, Kareem’s voice quivered, “We need to be very
quiet. There could be police.” At his direction, we sprinted from car to car, ducking behind each
so that Kareem could peek out and scan the street ahead. After only a couple minutes, we turned a
corner, and I spotted the large dumpster a few hundred feet ahead. Kareem rushed to and from the
dumpster, throwing my trash in at the first possible moment. We quickly returned to the
driveway, upon which Kareem breathed a heavy sigh of relief.
For the remainder of my three-month stay with Ayman’s family, I never saw any sign of
police presence on the streets surrounding their apartment, day or night. Still, for Ayman’s
family, the Jordanian government’s response to the pandemic was intimately tied to enforcement
and surveillance by the police. Lockdowns, curfews, and mask wearing were often understood
and explained to me on the basis of their potential punishments for noncompliance, rather than
their potential benefits to curb the spread of COVID-19. Taking out the trash 45 minutes past
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curfew was seen as risky – though not so risky as to wait until morning – by both Ayman and
Kareem because of the potential for police response, not the potential for COVID-19 infection.
Yet, in this case, it was neither the police nor other actors of the government who pushed
Ayman and Kareem to follow the curfew, it was themselves. This self-surveillance was motivated
by the unknown: the possibility that a police officer could catch them, even as officers seemed
rare in their neighborhood. To explain such practices of control, Foucault (1995) draws on the
metaphor of Bentham’s panopticon: a prison with a central tower in which the guards can observe
all prisoners at once, but the prisoners cannot observe each other or the guards. He suggests that
the unknowable but ever-present possibility of observation forces the prisoners into a state of
constant and conscious visibility, making the prisoners act as their own guards and allowing
power to function automatically (Foucault, 1995). Couch et al. (2020) liken the extension of
government surveillance techniques during the COVID-19 pandemic to Foucault’s panopticon,
arguing that many accepted, embraced, and actively participated in new levels of surveillance on
the basis of the importance of health and fears of infection. Though Ayman and Kareem did not
embrace the curfew, nor did they believe it was necessary to prevent the spread of the pandemic,
they nonetheless participated in it, surveilling themselves and each other.
Similarly, on a sweltering afternoon early in my time in Amman, Kareem asked me to
walk with him to the grocery store a couple blocks away to buy ice cream.
“Do you have your mask with you?” Kareem asked. I replied with a nod of confirmation.
“Good. Put it on. The police will stop you and fine you if you are not wearing a mask, even in the
street. It is only okay to not wear one in the house or in the car. Anywhere else, you need your
mask.”
I listened to Kareem carefully, following his instructions in the weeks that came. Yet, as
the summer continued, I noticed that many others did not wear masks in the street. Gradually, I

51

relaxed my own mask wearing outdoors. Days before I left Amman, perhaps nostalgic for the
early summer, Kareem invited me to get ice cream again.
“Do you have your mask?” Kareem asked, in much the same way as when we began our
first walk. I pulled my mask from my pocket, flashing it in front of him. Then, I returned it to my
pocket, anticipating putting it on right before we entered the store, but Kareem furrowed his
eyebrows in frustration as I did so. “Put it on. The police will stop you, even on this short walk. I
don’t have to wear one because I’m a kid, but you would get fined. The fine was 20 JD before;
now it’s 60 JD, over a 10 qirsh mask.”
I was surprised by Kareem’s impassioned response. I had grown lax about wearing a
mask outside over the summer, and I had been passed by police without being stopped before
without a mask. My own self-surveillance had faded, but his had seemingly not wavered over the
prior three months. One could explain this difference as a matter of risk tolerance, but I think it is
more likely a difference of positionality. As a white American living in Amman, I was afforded a
level of privilege and leniency that made me far less likely to face police harassment, like Ayman
and his relatives had described. In this way, though the Jordanian government had extended its
control through its responses to the pandemic via the self-surveillance of individuals among its
population, this extension was not equal.
Rules for Thee, Not for Me: Privileged Surveillance Experiences
Five of us sat in the living room of my coworker’s apartment in Jabal Lwebdeih, the almost
muted noise of the television providing background static between shared laughs and
embarrassing stories. It was early in the summer, and this was one my first times meeting up with
my soon-to-be closest friend group in Amman. Introduced to the group by a coworker from CRP,
I had been nervous earlier in the night when we met for dinner, but they had quickly welcomed
me. Over the evening, I learned a bit more about each of them. That night, the group consisted of
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two Americans and two Jordanians. The American man and woman were both working at CRP at
the time. One of the Jordanian men also worked for CRP while the other was dating the American
woman. Both Jordanians came from wealthy families, and both had spent significant time
traveling and studying outside of Jordan. As the night grew later, I glanced down at my phone
and a jolt of panic ran through my body as I saw the time: 10:15 pm.
“I need to call an Uber right now,” I said as I jumped to my feet.
“What’s the rush?” one of the Jordanians asked.
“Curfew,” I responded, “I live in Al-Jubeiha. If I don’t leave right now, I won’t make it
in time.” At a low-traffic time, an Uber from Jabal Lwebdeih to Al-Jubeiha would only take
around 20 minutes, but the 11:00 pm curfew at the time brought traffic in Amman to a near
standstill each night.
“Don’t worry about it. I’ll drive you,” he replied. I thanked him and carried on chatting
until I glanced down at my phone again: 10:45 pm.
“We should probably get going now,” I said nervously.
As we said our goodbyes and headed out towards my neighborhood, my friend could see
my anxiousness. Without prompting, he turned to me and said, “Look, you don’t need to worry
about the curfew. As long as you’re home by midnight, no one will bother you.” I was
immediately relieved, happy to know that the curfew was not as strict as I had imagined.
My friend dropped me off at the driveway to my apartment complex at 11:15 pm; just
like he had said, no one had stopped us or given us any trouble. As I stepped into the driveway,
Ayman stepped out from behind his van. His face washed over with relief as he quickly asked me
if everything was okay. He had been pacing the driveway since curfew began, fearing that I had
been stopped by police. He was relieved when I told him that I had had no such issues and that

53

my friend had driven me home, but he warned me starkly that I should take the curfew very
seriously and not be late again.
To ease Ayman’s worries, I made sure to return to the apartment before curfew each
night, up until the Jordanian government ended the curfew for the vaccinated. Yet, the difference
between Ayman’s and my friend’s perspectives of the curfew was striking. For Ayman, who had
had many difficult encounters with the police throughout the pandemic, I suspect that the curfew
represented another opportunity for police harassment, one which it was best to mitigate entirely.
On the other hand, my friend imagined the curfew as little more than a formality, a rule put in
place to show that the government was doing “something,” but which was essentially unenforced
before the late night. This stark difference in perspectives came, at least in part, from the different
strata of society the two occupy in Amman. The upscale neighborhood that my friend lived in,
alongside his family’s wealth and status, sheltered him from the police harassment that Ayman
frequently faced.
Similarly, my status as an American living in Amman provided me with certain
privileges in my encounters with the police. Only a couple weeks after Ayman and the man from
the story earlier shared their stories of police harassment, I was walking down a busy street in
Amman, heading towards a café to meet with a friend. With no one near me on the sidewalk, I
peeled off my mask to catch some fresh air, the scorching summer sun having soaked my mask
with sweat. Without realizing it, I soon passed in front of the Jordanian House of Representatives,
with armed military officers guarding the gates. I made eye contact with one, and he wordlessly
pointed to his mask. I quickly nodded in response and put mine back on. At the time, I thought
little of this encounter. Days later, a TikTok video appeared on my feed of a white, American
man describing how his privilege means that he never gets bothered by the police about mask
wearing while many of his Jordanian friends do. The video’s comments, a mix of Arabic and
English, showed widespread agreement with the man’s feelings and shared similar stories. It is
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not altogether surprising that different COVID-19 rules applied to white “expats” in Jordan;
upper- and middle-class “expats” in the Middle East often not only avoid the negative impacts of
race and class stratification but actively benefit from them (Vora, 2012). Still, it is worth
considering how those officers might have treated Ayman had he been in my place.
Businesses similarly faced uneven enforcement of COVID-19 regulations. When I first
returned to Jordan, the Jordanian government required businesses to close by 10:00 pm to
encourage everyone to be home by the 11:00 pm curfew. While exceptions existed to this rule –
restaurants with delivery drivers were able to continue delivering food – I frequently saw
individual businesses staying open until 11:00 pm. One pharmacy near my apartment complex in
Al-Jubeiha, for example, was almost always open when I passed by it on my way home while the
others around it closed at the designated time. Moreover, Ayman often complained that COVID19 regulations went largely unenforced outside of Amman. For example, Ayman had family in
the city of As-Salt, and according to him, most businesses there would not close until 10:30 or
11:00 pm, even when the curfew had been earlier at 10:00 pm.
In mid-July, my friends and I decided to watch the European Championship finals
between England and Italy. One friend called around and found that the Irish pub Dubliners was
planning to show the game. As a pub located in the upscale neighborhood of Sweifieh, Dubliners
catered to a largely Western and wealthier audience. As midnight passed, I scanned the pub;
while the government had lifted the curfew for vaccinated individuals, businesses were still
required to close by midnight at the time. Though the servers began cleaning the bar and floors,
they made no moves to push people out, staying open until the game ended at nearly 1:00 am. As
with privileged individuals, privileged businesses – many of whom like Dubliners cater to
primarily white “expat” clientele – were able either avoid or ignore COVID-19 regulations that
most followed. Perhaps both these individuals and businesses felt confident that they could either
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avoid punishment or afford the fines should they encounter the police, or perhaps they felt
confident that they would not encounter the police at all.
Conclusions
As my friends and I cheered from the stands of the soccer stadium, the large clock on the
scoreboard flashed with the remaining time: “00:00.” The penalty kicks ended without an
additional goal, and Al Faisaly won 1-0. The crowd roared with excitement, with some leading
chants and others bashing on drums or waving flags with the team’s crest. As I made my way out
of the stadium, the same military officers who had inspected my credentials and searched my
person guided me towards the exit. By the time my friends and I stepped out onto the street, it
was a few minutes past 11:00 pm. “Looks like we’re late for curfew,” one of my friends joked.
The government had ended the nightly curfew for the vaccinated only a couple weeks
prior. We stood in the silence of that joke for a minute, and I imagine my friends – like me – were
contemplating how strange it felt to not have a curfew. I had only lived with the curfew for less
than two months, and yet I felt that it had profoundly affected my daily life. Every social activity,
every trip to the grocery store, they all had to be planned with a specific ending time in mind. An
ending time that occasionally changed with little to no warning. My friends had lived with the
curfew since the lockdowns ended, more than a year at that point. Curfew policies that constituted
and were constituted by the COVID-19 Spectacle had reshaped the daily lives of many in
Amman, bleeding into the when and where of all nighttime activities prior to the curfew’s
removal.
Relishing the opportunity and fearing that rising case counts could bring back the curfew
at any moment, I chose to walk home from the stadium. Over the course of this walk – a little
more than an hour and a half in total – I passed families, couples, groups of friends, all walking
and chatting, enjoying the coolness of the air when the days were so hot. I had no way of
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knowing whether or not the people I passed were vaccinated. In theory, those not vaccinated were
breaking curfew. In practice, I never heard of anyone being asked to prove their vaccination
status in this context. I could not help but feel that things were somehow returning to normal,
even as the threat of COVID-19 still loomed with news of the spreading delta variant.
On September 1, 2021, the Jordanian government fully removed its nightly curfew, and
for the first time since March 2020, there was no COVID-19 lockdown in Jordan (Omari, 2021b).
It is impossible, at this point, to say if the curfew will return, but – given its deep unpopularity in
Jordan – it seems unlikely. For many in Amman, the curfew was emblematic of the Jordanian
government’s attempts to control its population through surveillance and discipline in the name of
protecting its people from the spread of COVID-19. As one man said in response to the curfew’s
final lifting, “Curfew was not effective in containing COVID-19. The virus does not go to bed at
midnight,” a joke I often heard near-identical versions of when people discussed the curfew
(Omari, 2021b). Regardless of the effectiveness of the curfew and other surveillance measures
implemented by the Jordanian government, such policies powerfully impacted the daily lives of
many living in Amman. While these measures in theory applied to all equally, the privileged were
often able to avoid or ignore their consequences. While surveillant government responses shaped
many of the everyday practices of people living in Amman, others were shaped by businesses and
individual opinions regarding the virus. The following chapter examines the complex lives of
such practices.
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CHAPTER 4
“EVERYTHING IS HARD NOW:” EVERYDAY PRACTICES IN
UNCERTAIN TIMES
Ayman’s van sputtered to a halt as we approached a crowd of nearly a hundred men blocking the
street, only blocks away from our apartment complex. It was 1:11 pm on a Friday early in the
summer. Speakers on the minaret blasted the voice of the neighborhood mosque’s imam as he led
the crowd in Friday prayer. The men stood, most on top of prayer mats but some simply on the
street, facing towards Mecca. Ayman quickly threw the van in park and leapt out, rushing to find
a spot in the crowd to pray. When the speakers quieted, the crowd bowed and pressed their heads
to their mats, or to the street for those – like Ayman – without mats.
While Ayman prayed, I stayed in the van, looking around at the crowd. Through the open
doors of the mosque, I could see a room full of individuals standing and kneeling in rows with
physically distanced space between them. In the street, most of the crowd seemed to be wearing
masks, but many of these masks were pulled down either under the nose or under the mouth. At
1:15 pm, the Friday prayer finished. Slowly, the men in the crowd stood up, folded up their mats,
and scattered in many directions around the neighborhood. Ayman returned to the van and
restarted the engine.
When I asked Ayman why so many people were praying in the streets instead of the
mosque, he told me that it was because of COVID-19 regulations. As he described it, only half of
the people attending prayer were allowed to enter the mosque, yet this was not a set number. For
example, if 100 people came to pray, 50 could enter the mosque, but if 1,000 came, 500 would be
able to enter. Such regulations had caused complications for his worship. Before the pandemic, it
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was possible to perform wudu at the mosque, but these facilities had closed because of COVID19. Ayman had also previously not needed to bring a prayer mat with him since the carpet of the
mosque was clean. He expressed concerns as well that, should one person in the mosque catch
COVID-19, it would spread throughout the neighborhood.
Such concerns caused Ayman to pray in the mosque less often than he would like. In the
time I knew Ayman, he normally only attended Friday prayer at the mosque, but he often
reminisced about times before the pandemic when he went more often. “I wish that I could go
more,” he would tell me, “But everything is hard now.” In this way, Ayman’s experience with his
neighborhood mosque was emblematic of the everyday experiences of many in Amman during
the pandemic. People were forced to shift their daily practices, for some in ways they preferred
and for others in ways they did not.
In this chapter, I examine the shifting of everyday practices in the name of staying safe
during the COVID-19 pandemic at three sites: the business, the home, and the body. I begin by
examining the often-spectacular policies set in place by private businesses to prevent the spread
of COVID-19 as well as the ways customers and employees alike navigated these policies. I
argue that businesses in Amman used COVID-19 signs and policies framed by the greater
COVID-19 Spectacle to produce what Rajak (2011) calls “theaters of virtue” that acted to
manufacture consensus and derail criticism. Next, I consider how such concepts and imaginings
of the pandemic translated into the space of the home for many in Amman. I argue that many in
Amman – and refugees in particular – faced structural violence in this space, in part brought on
by the Jordanian government’s COVID-19 policies that exacerbated existing inequalities.
I conclude by reflecting on how these same imaginings transformed into changes – or
lack thereof – in bodily practice and individual behavior among those living in Amman. In the
space of the body, the handshake transformed into a discernible and symbolic gesture of trust,
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used both implicitly and explicitly to signal belief that the other person was “safe.” It is again
worth noting that many of the experiences of people in Amman discussed are not unique to the
context of Jordan. Businesses, homes, and bodies were reshaped and reinterpreted in similar ways
around the world.
Making the “Unsafe” Safe: Business Approaches to Pandemic Precautions
Only a few weeks after returning to Amman, I stepped out of my apartment on a warm weekend
morning and was quickly greeted by Ayman, “Can you come with me? I need help.”
“Of course! Where are we going?” I replied.
A little less than an hour later, Ayman’s van pulled to a stop outside a one-room shop in a
longer strip simply named “Printing Store.” Before we stepped out of the van Ayman turned to
me and explained, “I need help translating papers for my business.” He handed me a small flyer
with his name, a logo of a man with a toolbox, and a series of maintenance tasks in Arabic. “This
is my work, and I want to make a second one of these in English,” he told me. I confirmed that I
would happily help, and Ayman and I put on our masks, popped open our respective doors, and
stepped out onto the busy street. As we approached the entrance to the shop, I looked through the
windows. The shop was little more than a single aisle leading up to a desk with an employee. To
the right of the aisle sat at a row of office computers and to the left a series of printers of various
sizes. Taped to the window next to the door was a small sheet of paper with a photo of a mask; in
Arabic, it read, “Applying the defense order, we apologize for not serving anyone who is not
wearing a mask.”
As we stepped through the door, Ayman began chatting with the employee behind the
desk, telling him what we were there to do. While they negotiated prices, I took a closer look at
the store around me. To my left, immediately next to the door, was a small box of disposable
surgical masks resting atop one of many printers. A sheet of paper was taped above the box with
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the line, “Valued customers, please commit to wearing a mask. The cost of a mask is 0.25
dinars.” Another two sheets of paper were taped to a shelf above the computers. The first showed
a photo of Spider-Man from a recent movie, with a surgical mask haphazardly photoshopped over
the face of his costume. The second was another sign explaining the store’s COVID-19 policies.
It read, “Dear valued customers, our goal is your safety, not your inconvenience. We apologize
for not serving anyone who does not comply with the safety rules (the mask and gloves)
according to Defense Order 11.”
Though most businesses in Amman featured a sign of some form indicating their
COVID-19 policies, few featured so many in such a confined space; it was difficult to turn in the
small shop and not have at least one sign within your view. On this first visit, the employee wore
a mask but no gloves, and there were no other customers in the store. Yet, Ayman and I returned
to this printing shop many times, sometimes to print new copies of the flyers we put together that
day, other times to design or translate new flyers for his work. Gradually, mask wearing became
less and less common in the store. On our last visit together, in early July, the employee behind
the desk had fully abandoned his own mask. Of the two customers typing away on computers,
one had no mask on, and the other wore his mask below his nose, pulling it down to speak to the
employee. Though the enforcement of the COVID-19 policies in the store had clearly shifted, the
signs all remained.
Over the summer of 2021, I visited a wide range of businesses around Amman, including
but not limited to cafés, restaurants, supermarkets, and malls. While the vast majority of these
businesses hung signs indicating the need to follow certain COVID-19 precautions within their
premises – most often mask wearing – the forms and extents of enforcement for these policies
varied wildly between businesses. Despite the common presence of signs instructing people to
wear gloves, for example, I almost never saw anyone wearing them. Moreover, as the signs in the
printing shop evidence, these businesses often used signs to justify their COVID-19 precautions.
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In the case of the printing shop, the store requested that their customers “commit to wearing a
mask,” calling on the individual action from the customers. At the same time, in providing masks
at a low cost and saying that the policies existed for “your safety,” the shop framed itself as a
responsible party invested in protecting its “valued customers.” Lastly, while these signs framed
mask wearing in a positive light, they still cited the Jordanian government as the arbiter of such
rules by mentioning the “defense order” twice. For businesses with signs addressing their
COVID-19 policies, these three forms of framing were frequent motifs, at times individually and
at times overlapping.
Looking first at businesses that primarily called their customers to action, such signs
often moralized COVID-19 responses. A fashion store in the upscale Abdali Mall, for example,
had a large sign outside its entrance that began, “Welcome back! We missed you. Let’s take care
of each other by following the rules.” Beneath this, along with traditional COVID-19 precautions
like physical distancing and avoiding large groups, were calls for customers to “pay without
contact when possible” and to “be nice to each other and to our colleagues.” Similarly, a café in
Jabal Amman, which permanently closed due to the pandemic but left its COVID-19 signs
hanging, asked customers to “please wear your mask before you enter and while ordering” in both
English and Arabic. A second sign on the door told customers to “show the contact tracing app
AMAN on your mobile” when entering. A sticker at each entrance to the Galleria Mall in
Sweifieh displayed an image of a mask with hearts, saying “When I wear my mask, I protect you.
When you wear your mask, you protect me” and “Keep your health and their health by
commitment,” adopting similar language to awareness campaigns by the Jordanian government.
Other businesses used signs to places the onus of COVID-19 policies on the business
itself, often seemingly attempting to use this as a selling point to entice customers. A restaurant
and bar in Jabal Amman, for example, featured a sign at the entrance that read, “To keep you
safe, we’re limiting the number of customers in the restaurant at a time and there may be a wait.
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Thanks so much for your patience!” A café in Jabal Lwebdeih featured small signs on each table
with the lines, “This table has been sanitized” and “Not sure what to order yet? Scan QR code to
view our menu,” emphasizing the café’s attempts to shift its own practices in response to the
pandemic. A chain restaurant in Abdoun similarly included a long list of new requirements for
their employees with the heading “Because we care” in both English and Arabic on an enormous
poster at its entrance. The poster sat behind a small table with hand sanitizer labelled the
“Sanitizing Station” and included policies like “Employees wearing gloves and face masks at all
times” and “Measuring employees’ temperature daily.” Such signs represented attempts by
businesses to frame themselves as safe – and perhaps safer than their competitors – in an effort to
draw in customers.
This language differed substantially from businesses with signs that framed COVID-19
policies as existing only because of government requirements, pushing the onus of pandemic
response on the government alone. A pool hall in Al-Jubeiha, for example had a torn sign at its
entrance that featured a government crest at the top and read, “Defense Order 11 for the year
2020 issued pursuant to Defense Law 13 for the year 1992. The employees of all governmental
and private establishments and all users or customers of these establishments shall abide by the
following: wear gloves and masks.” Despite this sign, I never saw employees or customers of the
pool hall wearing either, further indicating that such policies did not come from the business
itself. I saw similar signs in supermarkets around Al-Jubeiha. These signs consistently featured a
government crest at the top and framed mask wearing only as a requirement of Defense Order 11.
Some also included the potential fines for both businesses and individuals for not following the
policy. Mask wearing in these spaces was often hit or miss, with certain employees and customers
following to varying extents. When Ayman and I went to a nearby supermarket for groceries, for
example, the butcher wore his mask around his neck as he and Ayman chatted.
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However, like printing shop, most businesses seemed to incorporate a mix of these
framing devices. Another café in Jabal Lwebdeih, for example, posted signs on each wall of the
business that read, “To guarantee your health and the health of users of the Institute, please
respect the following health instructions” with additional signs setting café policies of “1 person
per sofa, thank you!” A chain shawarma restaurant in Amman featured a sign on its front window
that stated, “Following the defense order and for the sake of your safety, we request that our
valued customers opt to wear masks and gloves before entering the store. Thank you,” drawing
on all three framing devices within a single sentence. A bowling alley hosted in an international
hotel similarly posted a sign that read, “As per Defense Law Number (11); For your safety, please
put on your GLOVES and MASK.” Other businesses shifted the framing of their signs over the
course of the pandemic. A chain café in Amman, for example, first posted a sign on its door with
the Arabic words, “Please wear a mask to receive service inside,” putting the onus of requiring
mask wearing on the business itself. Yet, later in the summer when I visited the same café, the
sign had been replaced with one in English that read, “We’re committed to everyone’s wellbeing. Our employees are wearing face masks. We ask that you wear yours too. Thank you for
your cooperation!” This new framing showcased both the business’ policies to protect its
customers and requested – rather than required – that its customers do the same.
In discussing discourses of corporate social responsibility (CSR) among transnational
corporations, Rajak (2011) argues that award ceremonies around CSR are highly visible “theaters
of virtue” that serve to manufacture consensus and marginalize critique of such practices. The
signs hung by businesses in Amman can be similarly imagined as “theaters of virtue.” The
presentation of such signs represents a similar spectacle of sorts, drawing the reader into their
logics. They frame the business as the unambiguous arbitrator of COVID-19 responses within
that space, supporting this claim through the rhetoric the given business chooses to incorporate,
empowered by the government, the business itself, and/or its customers. Images and colored fonts
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are frequently used to draw one’s eye to the sign first, and the sign leaves no space for negotiation
or discussion. In this sense, the sign is able to produce the consensus of those its affects – whether
that consensus is wanted or not – towards certain COVID-19 policies; like a theater, it is a
unidirectional presentation, with no space left for disagreement. Such “theaters of virtue” acted to
produce the COVID-19 Spectacle, with signs bringing the spectacle into the sights and minds of
people in Amman in these businesses. At the same time, these theaters used the spectacle to
further their own ends. For some businesses, this meant drawing on the spectacle as a form of
advertisement; for others, it meant using the spectacle to redirect potential criticism towards the
government.
Beyond signs, a variety of businesses in Amman implemented practices to make the
“unsafe” safe. The Al Hussein Technical University, for example, featured a “sterilizing gate” at
its entrance. Visitors were required to walk through this gate, being sprayed by presumably
sterilizing chemicals, before entering and after leaving the university. A bank that Ayman and I
visited in Al-Jubeiha, similarly hung signs that described how it had been “sterilized” against
COVID-19 by a pest control company. The bank also used tape to prevent people from sitting in
middle seats in an effort to ensure physical distancing. When Ayman was interested in buying a
new television, the family and I visited an electronics store in Al-Jubeiha. When we entered, we
were served coffee in disposable cups, with the employees pointing out that the disposable cups
were meant to prevent the spread of COVID-19. Several chain restaurants that I visited with
friends stationed employees at their entrances, holding boxes of disposable masks and denying
entrance to anyone who refused to where one. The Abdali Mall gave their existing security
personnel temperature guns, scanning the wrists of those entering to ensure that no one had
fevers. Similarly, at a chain restaurant in Al-Jubeiha, a temperature gun sat unused next to the
entrance.
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A chain falafel restaurant in Medina Riyadiya that I frequented during my previous time
in Amman completely transformed its inside organization in response to the pandemic. Prior to
the pandemic, I would enter through one door, follow the counter to the cashier ordering and
paying along the way, and then leave through the door on the opposite side of the small
restaurant. In response to the pandemic, however, the restaurant completely blocked off its main
entrance, placing a large barrier in front of the door. With only the back door accessible, the
restaurant moved the cash register to prevent customers from entering more than a few steps.
Customers would, thus, order at the cash register and wait for their food outside until they were
called, keeping customers away from both the food and workers inside.
Curious about how hammam’s – public bathhouses found throughout the Middle East –
might respond to the pandemic, two friends and I made our ways to one Jabal Amman on a cool
summer evening. As we approached the entrance, signs were posted along the wall of the
building telling customers to wear masks, yet the employees in the lobby were wearing their
masks around their necks. As we entered the changing room, another employee instructed us to
take our masks off completely and leave them in a locker. As I stepped into the hammam itself, I
was taken aback by the hot, steamy air. The steam rooms and saunas required us to gather in
closely, breathing the same stifled air without a mask. Massages put employees and customers in
close proximity, with neither party following any COVID-19 precautions. To some extent, such
risks seem unavoidable in the context of a hammam; masks would be miserable and perhaps even
unusable in such conditions, particularly for employees working long shifts. On the other hand,
temperature checks or vaccine checks would be feasible before allowing a potential customer to
enter, potentially protecting employees from exposure to the virus. Perhaps this hammam chose
not to do so out of fear of reminding customers about COVID-19 before entering such a
seemingly vulnerable space, or perhaps they simply did not consider such precautions priorities.
Regardless, the hammam provided a stark contrast to the largescale changes many businesses in
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Amman – including the chain falafel restaurant – undertook to protect their employees and
customers in seemingly less “risky” spaces.
On the other hand, a space that took such precautions very seriously was the Collateral
Repair Project (CRP), the refugee nongovernmental organization with whom I worked during my
summer in Amman. I spent the first month of the summer communicating with my boss and
coworkers largely over Skype call. At the time of my arrival in Amman, CRP had still not
resumed any in-person activities. Instead, a few days per week, I would meet my direct supervisor
and friend, an American working as a data officer at CRP, at a random café around Amman; we
often traded back and forth based on who was closer to the most recent café. It was not until midJune, approximately 15 months after the organization had initially closed its in-person offices for
the pandemic, that CRP began slowly returning employees to its office in Hashemi Shamali. For
the first few weeks, employees were assigned to come in on a specific day or two of the week
based on their roles and supervisors, and at first, only the vaccinated were allowed to return.
On June 16, I stepped out of my Uber in front of the CRP building for the first time. As I
approached the entrance, I was greeted happily by a guard who was one of my English students at
the time. He beamed with excitement at getting the chance to meet me in person, and apologized
as he told me, “Sorry. I have to check your temperature.” He lifted a temperature gun to my
forehead and quickly waved me through as the screen flashed green. As I stepped into the
courtyard, I was greeted by my American friend, and we headed upstairs to a tightly packed
office with a handful of computers, tables, and chairs and one of the only consistently functioning
air conditioning units in the building. My friend had been working at CRP for over a year now,
yet it was his first day in the building too. As we sat down in chairs that would soon become all
too familiar, we chatted about the organization’s mask policy. “I think we don’t need to wear
masks in our office, but I’m not sure about in the hallways,” my friend said. Later that afternoon,
I crossed the thin hallway to the bathroom, forgetting to don my mask. When I returned to my
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office, one of the heads of the organization was waiting for me. He asked that I be more cognizant
of my mask wearing, and I agreed. Over the coming weeks, more and more CRP employees
would join our small office, reaching a peak of around five people present on any given day.
In late June, CRP hung its first COVID-19 sign. Though beneficiaries had not yet been
allowed into the CRP building again, regardless of vaccination status, the sign was seemingly
placed in numerous spots around the building in anticipation of their imminent return. In bold
font at the top it read, “You are the trust in our necks!” an idiom that roughly means “You are
entrusted with our lives!” Below this were four bullet points instructing beneficiaries on CRP’s
COVID-19 policies. They stated in Arabic:
•

Please comply fully with wearing gloves and masks and not shaking hands and social
distancing.

•

Please no turning on the air conditioner and replace it with fans and/or proper natural
ventilation.

•

Please leave a safe distance of 1 meter between you and between other people.

•

Please leave the association immediately after finishing the activities and no staying the
purpose of social communication.

Interestingly, none of these four bullet points seemingly applied to CRP employees. I never
encountered anyone in CRP wearing gloves, and we did not wear masks in our office. We
frequently used the air conditioner on hot days, sealing the windows in doing so. With five people
in our small office, it was impossible to leave 1 meter between all of us, and much of the reason
employees began coming to the CRP building was for social communication during work.
As CRP began allowing beneficiaries to come into the building in the following weeks,
they were often restricted to the bottom floor, keeping them away from employees to reduce the
risk of us catching COVID-19. In early August, CRP posted a second COVID-19 sign, this one
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exclusively downstairs. I first spotted this sign on a bulletin board in main room, hanging under a
painted photo of King Abdullah II. Hung under “Association Advertisements,” it read in Arabic,
“Valued brothers and sisters, please all commit to wearing a mask inside everywhere under legal
accountability. Thank you for your cooperation.” Above this text was an English logo with a
picture of a mask and the text “No entry without a face mask.” After noticing this sign for the first
time, I looked around the downstairs floor of the building. The new sign was in nearly every
room open to beneficiaries, and it was even haphazardly taped to outside walls.
In this way, CRP seemingly operated two different COVID-19 policies. Employees were
largely allowed to ignore COVID-19 restrictions, with the exception of wearing a mask in the
hallways, while beneficiaries had seemingly strict COVID-19 guidelines to follow. In the
conversations I had with other CRP employees, we were under the impression that the strict
guidelines for beneficiaries largely existed to protect the employees. Perhaps tied into these
differences were imaginings of CRP employees – many of whom were either Westerners or
relatively well-off Jordanians – as somehow less likely to catch and spread COVID-19 than the
refugees and impoverished Jordanians the organization served. Regardless, such actions by CRP
were similar to many undertaken by businesses in Amman, directing a mixture of moralizing
language of individual action and threat of government action into its policies towards
beneficiaries. Moreover, such changes existed within a domain of many novel practices interested
in making the “unsafe” safe the uncertain times of a pandemic.
Filling the Time of the Pandemic: Reshaping the Space of the Home
Ayman and I sat next to each other on the couch in his living room. The television blared loudly
in the background, with the nightly news delivering the daily COVID-19 case counts. To me,
however, the television was little more than white noise. I was staring at my phone, scrolling
through the latest social media posts from my friends on Instagram. When I grew bored of those,
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I switched to Facebook, then to Reddit. I glanced over at Ayman; he was scrolling through videos
on Facebook. After a bit, he held out his phone, showing me a video of someone turning an old
television into a lighting fixture. “I want to do that,” he said. We chatted a bit about the feasibility
of such a project, then returned to our respective phones.
I later stumbled onto an album of photos from my cousin’s wedding on Facebook. I
turned to Ayman and held out my phone, saying, “Look! My cousin got married.” We again
chatted briefly about weddings in the United States and Jordan and about the difficulties of
weddings during the pandemic, then we returned to our phones yet again. I glanced over at
Ayman’s daughter – his eldest child. She was holding the family iPad, playing Roblox. With no
electronic devices left to occupy them, Ayman’s three sons were running frantically around the
living room, switching quickly been games of Jenga and wrestling. Every now and then, one of
the boys would be too rough, and they would shout to Ayman for attention. He would lightly
scold the offender and return to his phone. Ayman’s wife Layla would use this time to briefly get
away from the noise and demands of the children, sitting in a back office by herself where she
smoked shisha and talked on the phone with friends and family. This was our nightly routine for
much of the summer. On some nights, one of the boys would have the iPad, or Ayman would let
them borrow his phone, but the noteworthiness of these small changes reflects just how consistent
these nights were. Over a year into the COVID-19 pandemic, electronic devices had become
more and more of a focus and escape.
I chatted with Ayman and his wife Layla about this often. Ayman had lost his job
because of the pandemic, and schools had been closed since March 2020. For over a year, the
family had shared a single living room, with only occasional reasons to leave. It was hard for both
of them to occupy the children consistently for such a long time, and they found themselves
frequently frustrated. They set up ways to get away temporarily. Ayman rented a storage space a
few blocks away for maintenance supplies that he converted into a partial office for himself
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during the day. Layla portioned off the back office in the house in the evenings. The struggles
they faced with their family dynamics and relationships during the pandemic were not unlike
those of many families around the world. The pandemic reorganized and redefined the space of
the home in ways that felt trapping to some and liberating to others.
I often found myself feeling trapped by the pandemic, both during my time in Jordan and
before. Over the summer, I averaged eight to twelve hours of screen time on my phone per day, a
statistic that saddened me a bit each week when my phone notified me of it. On a normal week, I
spent more than 20 hours listening to podcasts and over six hours on TikTok and Reddit. I found
myself thinking more and more about my own relationship with the internet and my phone, and I
felt that my reliance on these as distractions had only escalated over the course of the pandemic.
Even on the low end of my averages – at eight hours per day of screen time – that represented
half of my time awake. During my alone time in my apartment, I founded myself bored by just a
single distraction; I would play games at the same time as listening to podcasts to ensure that no
moment went unfilled. I also picked up new hobbies to fill the time that I was not on my phone. I
practiced making different types of tea and drawing some of my experiences. Even with so much
time, I found it difficult to keep the space of my apartment clean. Empty water bottles were
strewn across the floor; clothes that had been dry for over a week hung from the rafters of my
apartment. When the sheet slipped off my bed, I would go days or even weeks sleeping on the
plastic cover that protected the mattress. All of this is to say that the pandemic substantially
reshaped the ways in which I interacted with the space of the home, as it did for Ayman’s family
and for so many others.
With the schools closed in Amman since March 2020, the Jordanian government opted to
host online classes for children in the country. Yet, these classes required an electronic device and
a stable internet connection to access. At times, Layla would express her concerns to me about the
children’s online schooling. In their household, with two cell phones and one iPad, it was difficult
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to coordinate online classes for their four school-age children. This problem was made worse by
the fact that Ayman and Layla often needed their own phones during the day. Layla also worried
that her children were not actually learning as well through online classes, a sentiment shared by
many parents I spoke with in Amman. In my interviews with CRP community members, I asked
about the ways in which parents felt that education had been affected by the pandemic, with many
reiterating Layla’s concerns. One Iraqi woman told me, “With the schools online, my daughter is
not taking the information in. She is not learning a lot.” Another Iraqi woman said, “There was no
education for children during the pandemic. Zero. The school was closed, and students did not
study at all.” A Yemeni woman and an Iraqi man both expressed similar difficulties as Layla in
terms of device access for their children as well. The Yemeni woman told me, “We only have one
phone, and we have five kids in classes. They had to take classes online, and internet costs money
and is hard to get.” The Iraqi man similarly said, “It is forbidden for kids to go to school. They
are not learning the information now. They are using electronics and the internet all day. We have
six people using one computer and phone, and our internet is limited.”
Though Ayman ran an informal maintenance business, we often chatted about his
difficulties without work. Having lost his job as an engineer at the start of the pandemic, he often
seemed insecure in his lack of formal work, at times calling his maintenance jobs work and at
other times snapping at me if I described them as such, responding, “I do not have work.” The
CRP community members that I interviewed often similarly experienced a lack of work. When I
asked how work had been impacted by the pandemic, many responded with a phrase I heard from
Ayman often, “maa fii shughal” (there is no work). As one Jordanian woman explained to me,
“There is no work because of COVID. I have no income, and I need money to pay for
electricity.” A Syrian man felt similarly, “I lost my job. Now, when I look for a new job, I can’t
find anything because everything closed in Jordan. After COVID companies shrunk substantially,
going from 100 employees to 50 or 25.” Other refugees often pointed out the legal inability of
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refugees to work in Jordan, though some – including likely that Syrian man – are able to find
work informally. As an Iraqi man told me, “Frankly, refugees are unable to work in Jordan, so the
pandemic had no impact there.”
The lack of work experienced by many pushed some people in Amman to go into debt
during the pandemic. One day, towards the end of my time in Amman as I was relaxing in my
apartment, Ayman brought a stranger over to tour it. After he left, I asked Ayman is the man was
interested in renting the apartment after me. Ayman replied, “No. He is from the bank. I want to
get a loan.” When I asked Ayman what he wanted the loan for, he responded, “I want to prepare
my office, and I want to buy a new car, but I don’t have any money.” Similarly, in my interviews
with CRP community members when I asked about the impacts of the pandemic on debt, a Syrian
man told me, “There was no work, so I had to take loans. I would go hungry otherwise.” A
Palestinian man who had his salary reduced because of his job as a teacher expressed similar
concerns, saying, “Everything became more expensive than before. The only way to survive was
to go to banks or ask family and friends for money to live.” Though Ayman did not need to seek
loans out of fears of surviving or going hungry, in large part – as he told me – because of the rent
I paid for my apartment, he too felt that he was forced to seek loans because of his lack of work
and lack of money.
For refugees receiving support from nongovernment organizations, most organizations
did not have the infrastructure or plans to maintain their services during lockdowns. When I asked
the Director of Emergency Assistance at CRP how the organization had changed during the
pandemic, he was quick to point out this fact. CRP, on the other hand, contacted individual
grocery stores near their beneficiaries and essentially created a system of IOUs in order to
continue their food voucher distributions. The director beamed with pride as he described this
system to me and emphasized how difficult and time-consuming it first was. It is thus

73

unsurprising that CRP was seemingly the exception in finding a way to continue this support
through lockdowns.
Though I already discussed some of the struggles Ayman and his family faced in their
relationships with each other because of the pandemic, it is worth mentioning that these feelings
were often complicated. The pride and love that Ayman and Layla had for their children were
evident, and there were many moments they shared with their children that might not have been
possible without the pandemic. When the boys feared that their pet turtle had accidentally ended
up in the trash, Ayman dug through the nearby dumpster for hours searching for it, though he
sadly never found it. There were evenings in which Ayman, his four children, and I would play
games in the driveway together, and he put in incredible effort to ensure these games were safe,
fair, and fun for all of them. Similarly, when I asked CRP community members about the impacts
of the pandemic on their relationships with their family, I often received mixed and complicated
responses. As one Sudanese woman told me, “Because of the lack of work and online school, the
father and kids have all been in the house. Some relationships are better and some worse because
I am seeing them all day every day in the house.” More positively, a Jordanian woman answered,
“My relationship was strong during COVID. Before I had to work, so there was not a strong
relationship. Because of COVID, I had more time to spend with the kids, and we’ve learned
things about each other.”
Yet, the complex dynamics of lockdown also made some family relationships difficult
outside of the household. As one Palestinian man told me, “I live in Amman. My family lives in
Zarqa. I was not allowed to go to Zarqa. My father doesn’t work, and he needs money. I could not
give him money to buy food.” Similarly, beginning with the initial lockdown, the UNHCR head
office in Amman shut down. After lockdowns ended, the office continued to be closed to inperson visits without a prior appointment at least until I left Amman. I spoke with a Syrian man
about his struggles with the UNHCR during the pandemic. According to him, if a refugee’s
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UNHCR card expires in Jordan, you cannot go to a health center. His UNHCR card had expired
in July 2021. He scheduled an appointment and met with a UNHCR employee on July 20 but –
nearly a month later – had still not heard from anyone. “Every month, I take my parents to the
health center to get their medicine,” he told me, “Now, in August, I can’t take them because my
UNHCR card is expired.” He told me that other refugees he knew had waited three to four
months and still had not received their renewed UNHCR card, and the UNHCR had provided
them no explanation for these delays. With the head office closed, all he could do was continue
calling and hope for an answer.
Each of these factors – and many more – in turn shaped the ways in which the pandemic
impacted the mental health of many in Amman. My relationship with my own mental health in
Amman was complicated. I started a new antidepressant medication at the start of my summer, so
I was dealing with that alongside the stress of meeting new people, starting a new job, and
conducting research all at the same time. I had moments that were very difficult, yet I also felt
able to be social again for the first time since the pandemic began. The CRP community members
who I spoke with similarly spoke to the difficulties they had faced in terms of their mental health
during the pandemic. Some tied those mental health struggles directly to the factors discussed
prior. For example, an Egyptian woman told me, “There are many problems in the house. There is
not enough food. My kids are in the house. There is no work. So, of course, there are mental
health problems.” Many also connected their struggles to the lockdown. As one Iraqi man said,
“The lockdown was like jail, so it had the same effects on mental health.” Another Palestinian
man similarly stated, “When you can’t move from your home and can’t communicate with
everybody, it is bad for your mental health. You can’t have any social interaction.” Lastly, an
Iraqi woman told me, “My baby could get sick. I can’t go see soccer. I can’t do anything.
Everything is no, no, no, COVID-19.”
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How then do we explain the suffering in the space of the home faced by many in Amman
and the differences between these experiences of suffering? As Galtung (1969) first posited, such
suffering can still be imagined as a form of violence. As he proposed, suffering in which harm is
not caused by an immediate actor is structural violence (Galtung, 1969). Farmer (2003) argues
that structural violence targets those at the “axes of oppression,” namely those that face racism,
sexism, and poverty, among others. Yet, this suffering does not appear from nothing; it is
intertwined with the actions of the powerful (Farmer, 2003). Through this lens, the suffering of
many in Amman who faced difficulties housing and feeding themselves and their families can be
imagined as a product of structural violence, with the agency of these individuals constrained by
many of the pandemic responses implemented by the Jordanian government. This was
particularly true for refugees, whose lack of citizenship placed them along an additional “axis of
oppression,” as government policies targeting refugees before the pandemic (e.g., a legal inability
to work) heightened the suffering many faced during the pandemic.
In my interviews with CRP community members, I also asked about the things that
helped them adapt to and get through the pandemic. One of the most consistent answers was
CRP’s English classes. As one Iraqi woman said, “The online programs were good. They filled
time while I was stuck in the house. They were very helpful and very nice.” Another Iraqi woman
said that the most helpful support she received during the pandemic were “English classes for me,
and my children could watch them to learn.” A Sudanese woman similarly stated, “All of us were
in our houses. There was no sickness in our family, thank God. CRP taught English classes to fill
the time. It gave us something to do, which was good.”
I taught one of CRP’s Beginner English classes over the summer, and I heard similar
feedback from my students. Our classes were hosted over Google Meet, likely presenting some of
the same issues that people discussed in terms of online schooling. Still, many were thankful for
the opportunity to do something that felt productive in their spare time, and I walked away feeling
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the same way about teaching the class. I grew close to many of my students, and I was sad to say
goodbye on our last day. Each of us joined the class from our respective homes, finding a way to
fill the time of the pandemic. The impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on home practices were
powerful for many, altering our relationships with and uses of the space of the home through
changes to education, work, debt, family relationships, and mental health in complex and
intersecting ways.
“It’s Okay with You:” COVID-19 Distance and Bodily Practice
“My brother is having an aqiqah for his daughter tomorrow. Do you want to come with me?”
Ayman asked me one evening in mid-June, as we sat on the couch in his living room chatting.
“Sure! What’s an aqiqah?” I replied.
“It is an animal sacrifice for the birth of a child. It is normally done on the seventh day
after the birth, but my brother had to delay it until now because of COVID. My whole family will
be there, so you can meet everyone,” he explained.
Ayman’s van braked in front of an apartment complex much like the one we lived in, a
little bit farther outside of Amman but still within Al-Jubeiha. As we pulled to a stop, his three
sons leaped out, sprinting towards the stairs to race to the apartment. I stayed close to Ayman,
unsure what to expect. As we stepped into Ayman’s brother’s apartment, I was immediately
struck by its enormous size. The apartment was two stories, with a living room and kitchen on the
first floor that seemed to stretch the entire length of the building. Ayman’s brother greeted us
each with a firm handshake. We chatted briefly about what I was doing in Amman and how I
liked the city. Then, he directed Ayman and I upstairs. Though we were the first guests to arrive,
one by one more of Ayman’s brothers poured in, with the men joining us upstairs. As each guest
entered, they would shake each person’s hands. The brothers I had met before greeted me as a
friend, and those I had not introduced themselves to me. Over the course of an hour, the room
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filled until there were no seats or couches left, with some of the younger boys relegated to the
floor or other pieces of furniture. There were over 20 people in this room alone and likely well
over 40 in the apartment including the women and children downstairs.
The couches and seats crowded around a small table. Between each couch sat a shisha.
As we settled into our seats, the eldest brothers began heating coals. Before long, many of the
brothers and their relatives were passing pipes back and forth, holding onto a given pipe only
long enough to take a quick pull of vapor. A few of the men – including Ayman – sat back,
electing to use their own personal vapes instead. The younger boys largely ignored their parents,
stealing sodas from the coolers around the room and chatting casually with each other. I bounced
back and forth between conversations, with some seemingly curious about my presence and
others more interested in catching up with their relatives. Soon after all the introductions were
made and everyone settled in, one of the boys spotted a delivery van outside of the apartment
complex. One by one, Ayman’s sons and some of the other boys sprinted down the stairs to grab
the food. After only a few minutes, they carried up an enormous plate of mansef: the Jordanian
national dish of rice, pine nuts, and lamb. Others carried in smaller dishes of fermented yogurt.
These dishes were placed on the small center table.
As the table was being set up, each person made their way to the bathroom to wash their
hands. Soon after, the meal began. Each person was handed a spoon, but most chose to forego its
use; mansef is traditionally eaten by hand. One of the brothers poured the fermented yogurt across
the dish, and it quickly became a free for all. I initially reached into the dish with the spoon I had
been handed before I was stopped by Ayman’s oldest son, Kareem. “That’s not how you eat
mansef,” he said, “Look!” Kareem reached into the mansef, grabbing a handful of rice, lamb, and
nuts that was soaked with the yogurt. He used the yogurt to clump the ingredients together in a
small ball, then ate the ball from his hand, narrating the process to me as he did so. Kareem then
looked to me expectantly, providing feedback as I made my first ball. “That’s too small. You
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need more rice,” he commented, as I dug back into the dish following his instructions. He beamed
with excitement as I took my first bite from the ball I had made. “That’s how you eat mansef.”
Over the next thirty minutes, people traded seats, rotating around the mansef to get at the parts
they wanted most, stepping back once they had had their fill. With their hunger sated, a few more
of Ayman’s relatives took interest in me.
“We can’t call you Patrick,” one of Ayman’s brothers told me, “It sounds strange.”
“What will you name your first son?” another brother chimed in.
“My fiancée and I have talked about the name Theodore,” I replied. I was met with a roar
of laughs from the crowd.
“You let your fiancée choose your son’s name? You’re a sheep,” the brother replied,
pointing to the scraps of the mansef left in front of us, “Abu Theodore sounds just as strange.
What about Abu Muhammad? Muhammad is a blessed name that brings good fortune.” The
brothers laughed heartily again in response to this. Over the course of the next few hours, a
different brother or son would call out, “Abu Muhammad” until I responded, causing another
uproar of laughter. After three hours, Ayman began to say his goodbyes. His brothers jokingly
criticized him for leaving early, and he countered by saying that everyone else had just shown up
late.
As we made our way out of the apartment, I began to reflect on the aqiqah as a whole.
Surrounded by family, COVID-19 precautions had gone completely out the window. Ayman,
who was vigilant about mask wearing in public spaces, had readily left his mask off, sitting close
to, shaking hands with, and sharing food with nearly 20 other people. I had been similarly quick
to forget about such precautions when surrounded by the welcoming kindness and scalding jokes
of Ayman’s family. The aqiqah was reflective of a larger trend I noticed with bodily practice
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during the pandemic in Jordan, and perhaps everywhere; people were quick to trust their family
and friends, considering them less “risky” in terms of spreading COVID-19.
Ayman and his family kept a series of disposable surgical masks on the key holder by the
front door. When a mask was lost or got worn out, everyone in the family knew that the box of
spares was in the cabinet above the fridge. Before we left the apartment, Ayman always double
checked with his sons and me, “Do you have your mask?” He was often unsatisfied with my
answer until I pulled my mask from my pocket to show him. In the countless shops Ayman and I
visited together, he never hesitated to put on his mask before entering, even in places where every
other person was not wearing one. He was frankly more careful about mask wearing than I was,
and he taught his children to maintain the same vigilance. Ayman’s daughter proudly wore a
specialty cloth mask, embroidered in a Bedouin pattern common among Jordanian souvenirs.
When Ayman’s oldest son and I would walk to the grocery store together, his son would similarly
insist that I show him my mask before leaving, and he would often tell me to put on my mask
before we even crossed the street the grocery store was on. I do not know if Ayman felt nervous
about COVID-19 at the aqiqah; if so, he never told me so. Still, it is interesting that someone so
vigilant about mask wearing in other parts of his life would be willing to forego one for his
family’s celebration.
In the weeks following the aqiqah, I found myself reflecting on my own mask wearing
philosophy. When I had first arrived in Amman, I had worn a mask anytime I stepped outside of
Ayman’s or my apartment. I wore a mask at all times as I walked down the street, as I rode in
public transportation, and as I entered stores. As I began to make friends in Amman, I found
myself wearing my mask less and less around them. I also soon became more comfortable with
not wearing a mask in restaurants and cafés, even after I finished my food or drink. As the
summer in Amman grew hotter, I found myself sweating through my mask outside. I first started
pulling it down to catch breaths occasionally, then only pulled it up as someone passed me on the
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sidewalk, before ultimately choosing to fully abandon the mask when outside. There was an
interesting logic behind these decisions for me. Some of it was based on the current information I
knew about the virus, such as the fact that transmission rates were substantially lower outside.
Yet, I did not change my habits as I learned that information. Instead, that information wore me
down slowly over time, with the discomfort of mask wearing eventually convincing me that my
actions would be “safe.” I suspect that many others went through similarly complex and perhaps
contradictory pathways of reasoning. One evening while walking home, for example, I passed a
family of three; the man and boy were not wearing masks while the woman was. In Amman’s
downtown, I would occasionally people watch to try to understand mask wearing patterns.
Towards the end of the summer, only about a third of people wore their masks outside in the area,
yet I could not identify a pattern visually in who did and did not. It was common to see different
habits within a single group, with a man without a mask chatting with another man wearing one.
There was a seeming randomness to the bodily practice of mask wearing.
Similarly, soon after my arrival, Ayman explained to me that the handshake had been
replaced with the fist bump in Jordan in an effort to combat the pandemic. Despite this statement,
repeated by not only Ayman but many others I spoke with, I only ever received a single fist
bump. In the weeks before CRP allowed employees to return to the office, my American
supervisor wanted to introduce me to an Iraqi refugee and friend of his that ran CRP’s IT, Omar.
My supervisor and I met at a chain restaurant in Jabal Amman one afternoon, and Omar joined us
after a short while. As Omar sat down across from me, he immediately extended his fist. We
exchanged a fist bump and continued our introductions without comment. Omar and I became
fast friends over the summer. Forced to flee Iraq after briefly sheltering U.S. soldiers in his
garden, Omar had lived in Amman for many years. When CRP returned to work in person, he
was one of the five that joined our office.
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On the other hand, other people I met in Amman were quick to reference the fist bump as
a seeming demonstration of trust in me in foregoing it. When I met one of Ayman’s brothers in
my second week in Amman, for example, he immediately reached out and gave me a handshake
while saying, “We shouldn’t shake hands anymore, but it’s okay with you.” Similarly, I visited a
former employer of mine in Amman in the midst of the summer. As I entered the office, the man
who greeted visitors immediately greeted me with a handshake while reminiscing on my time
with the office. My former boss then stepped out of his office and joked, “We need to keep
appropriate distance, or no distance in this case” as he opened his arms for a hug. Such greetings
share an acknowledgement of what is “proper” or “safe,” along with an active choice to defy that
based on an existing relationship with the person being greeted.
Body culture studies argue that the human body is a key site of political, social, cultural,
and economic contestation (Hancock et al., 2000). One focus of body culture studies is that of
bodily practice. Through the example of gestures in Cairo, Elyachar (2011) asserts that bodily
practice can take forms that are both easily discernible and symbolic, like many religious
practices, and forms that are subtle and difficult to describe, like how someone carries themselves
while walking. In both cases, bodily practices are communicative of identity, status, and beliefs
(Elyachar, 2011). In the context of disease outbreaks, bodily practices at times shift. During early
Ebola outbreaks in Uganda and the Congo in the 1990s and 2000s, for example, shaking hands
was seen as dangerous and was at times banned by the respective national governments because
of its potential to spread Ebola. In response, community members in the two nations developed
alternative greetings of bumping elbows and snapping fingers, respectively (Hewlett & Hewlett,
2005). During the COVID-19 pandemic in Amman, fist bumps were encouraged in a way
reflective of changes to bodily practice during the early Ebola outbreaks. Yet, such practices were
not universal. The handshake instead became a discernible and symbolic bodily practice, used as
a gesture to display both implicit and explicit trust. The significance of such a gesture is
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inherently spectacular, pushing the other person to frame a simple handshake or fist bump within
the larger context of the pandemic.
Conclusions
On a cool evening in the middle of the summer, Ayman invited me to accompany him and his
oldest son Kareem on a trip to the barber. They teased me on the drive over about my long hair,
suggesting that I should get a haircut too and debating how I might look with a buzz cut. As
Ayman parked the van, he turned to Kareem and I and said, “We have to wear a mask inside.”
We quickly donned our masks and followed Ayman inside. Three black couches lined the far
wall, angled slightly towards a television showing a live feed of the Ka’bah. The other wall was
lined with mirrors and three barber chairs. One barber was already working on a client while the
other chatted with a couple of men on the couch. None of them were wearing masks. I took a seat
on the couch next to Kareem as the barber guided Ayman into a chair. On either arm of the couch
sat a box of disposable face masks and a container of hand sanitizer. The barber asked Ayman to
remove his mask for the haircut and soon began to buzz the sides of Ayman’s hair. As I waited, I
listened to the conversation between the other barber and his client. Though I only caught the end
of their conversation, they seemed to be complaining about COVID-19 regulations. The barber
shrugged off the regulations, saying, “Corona is finished.”
Though I rarely heard others express this sentiment so explicitly, the conditions of the
signs of certain businesses seemingly said the same. A café in Jabal Lwebdeih featured a torn and
faded sheet of paper taped to the front door, with parts of its text illegible from damage. Piecing
together the missing letters, it read, “Safety First. COVID-19 Safe Zone” and below that, “This
site is inspected for compliance with Health and Safety measures by the special committees of the
Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities.” Inside, the employees no longer even wore masks. Another
restaurant and bar in Jabal Lwebdeih featured a large sticker on its outer wall. At some point, the
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sticker read, “Face mask required at all times” in a circle around an image of a face wearing a
mask. By the time I first passed this business, the sticker had peeled and curled in on itself,
leaving only the words “Face mask” and “-imes” visible. The employees I saw inside were
similarly not wearing masks.
The interaction at the barber shop and the aging signs each reflect the ways in which
COVID-19 imaginations and in turn practices shifted over time for many. Though businesses may
have enforced COVID-19 precautions early in the pandemic, time wore away at the vigilance of
many. While some sought to make the “unsafe” safe, others sought to return to everyday life
before the pandemic. While the changes to the everyday practices of businesses, homes, and
bodies were not always negative, they were almost always substantial. Though I felt the barber’s
assessment that “Corona is finished” was too hasty, it posed the question: When will Corona be
finished? How do we balance conceptions of “risk” and “normalcy” in our everyday lives? Will
we ever be able to return to the everyday practices prior to the pandemic? If so, when? Such
questions lack a single answer, but it too often feels like the answer is a never-ending “soon.”
On my night before last in Amman, Ayman called me and asked me to come back to the
apartment as soon as I could. I arrived to see a long table in the driveway with a wide variety of
foods along its length; Ayman and his family had put together an enormous dinner for me.
Ayman had grilled an array of different meats, and Layla had made a series of some of my
favorite dips. Ayman’s mother and one of his brothers had also come to say goodbye. As we
chatted and ate, I noticed that only Ayman’s mother was at first wearing a mask. Over the course
of the evening, however, she slowly removed it, moving it first below her chin and then leaving it
in her chair. Ayman’s children brought out a tray of cantaloupe to share for dessert, and we
shared stories of some of the silly moments we had shared over the summer.
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At the end of the night, I exchanged hugs with each person at the dinner. I was touched
by the gesture and spent the rest of the night reflecting on what an incredible host family they had
been. There is an interesting emotional and social distance created by the bodily practices of
COVID-19, like masks and fist bumps. Perhaps that distance is tied to ways in which these
precautions draw attention to the possibility of disease and sickness; perhaps it is simply rooted in
the ways in which these practices differ from what is “normal.” In either case, there was not a
moment that night when I considered sharing fist bumps with Ayman’s family instead of hugs.
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CHAPTER 5
MAKESHIFT SAFETY: SHARING THE SPACE OF PUBLIC
TRANSPORT
On a sweltering afternoon, I ducked into the shadows of my apartment complex, waiting for my
driver to arrive. I glanced down at my phone, and the Uber app informed me that my driver was
wearing a face mask and had a plastic divider to help prevent the spread of COVID-19. A few
minutes later, a silver Ford Fusion pulled up, and the driver cracked his window. “Batrick?” he
asked. I nodded in reply and walked around the car to the back right seat, farthest from the driver.
As I opened the door and take my seat, I asked “How are you?”
“Alhamdulillah,” he responded softly, taking off without another word. The heat of late
summer stifled the air in the car despite the struggles of the car’s the AC, and the late afternoon
sun shone through the window. I almost instinctually took note of the driver’s blue disposable
surgeon’s mask that he had strapped around his chin, leaving his mouth and nose uncovered.
After a few minutes in stand-still Amman traffic, the driver turned on the radio. “Ilbis
kamamatak,” crackled out in the break between songs, translating to “Wear your mask.” I tugged
on the ear loops of mine, adjusting its position slightly as I glanced up at the dashboard display.
The station read, “102.1 HALA,” as the speaker continued, asking the people of Amman to wear
their masks to protect their own health and the health of others. Between the driver and I was a
see-through plastic sheet, held in place by a few pieces of tape around the front seats. Perhaps this
sheet once separated the driver from his passengers, but it had now folded in on itself, with its top
resting roughly at chest height. At the sheet’s connections with the front passenger seat, a small
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bottle of hand sanitizer was taped to its face. When we arrived at my destination, I exited with a
quiet “Thank you,” his lack of response in stark contrast to the many boisterous taxi rides I had in
Amman before the pandemic.
In this chapter, I consider the daily pandemic experiences of many in Amman with three
modes of transportation: taxis, coaster buses, and the Bus Rapid Transit. These modes of
transportation – largely catering to different audiences – attempted to create “makeshift safety” to
varying extents, based on both the driver’s personal preferences and those of their employers.
Such differences provide an interesting subject for comparison in one of the most important
everyday spaces for those living in Amman without a car. I begin by exploring how the pandemic
powerfully shifted the space of the taxi, altering both its physical and cultural aspects. I argue that
the COVID-19 brought with it changes to the everyday relationships of driving and
“passengering” in taxis, pushing such interactions away from their prior host-guest dynamics.
I then examine how such changes occurred across other forms of transportation,
particularly affecting coaster buses and the opening of the government’s new Bus Rapid Transit
in Amman. I contend that the pandemic created a negative “affective atmosphere” in coaster
buses for many, breeding feelings of distrust and worries of potential sickness within such a
tightly packed space. In light of this, with the launch of a new bus system in Amman – intended
by the Jordanian government to act as a symbol of state power and progress – the government
took steps to deemphasize COVID-19 and the associated precautions against it. In this context,
the COVID-19 Spectacle, normally given precedence by the Jordanian government, became a
nuisance to the state.
Physical and Figurative Barriers: Taxi Interactions in a Pandemic
“Men, you should try to always sit in the front seat of taxis. It is considered rude to sit in the
back,” the lecturer explained, a stock photo of a yellow taxi projected on the wall behind him. He
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continued, “For women, it is normal to sit in the back for safety purposes.” It was the summer of
2019, well before the first known cases of COVID-19, and I was sitting in a small classroom at
the Qasid Arabic Institute in Amman. I had arrived in the city for the first time late the night
before, and having barely spoken a word to anyone in the country, I had rolled out of bed early
that morning to attend the institute’s “Orientation Day” for new students. I took quick note of the
taxi instructions but thought little of them at the time.
Later that week, in one of my early Arabic classes, another American student asked our
instructor why it was considered rude for men to sit in the back of taxis. She replied, “It’s about
respect. It shows that you view the driver as another human being.” With few other public
transportation options, particularly outside of the set routes of coaster buses, taxis became my
main mode of transportation in Amman for the nine months I lived there studying Arabic. Sitting
in the front seat of those taxis was soon as automatic as opening the door, and conversations with
the driver were a routine part of that experience. Before my male roommate and I would hail a
taxi or call an Uber, we always jokingly debated back and forth over who would take the front
seat.
“Well, I’m paying for this one, so I get the back seat,” I would say.
“You got the back seat last time!” he would shoot back.
More often than not, these halfhearted debates would boil down to a game of rock paper
scissors: loser takes the front seat. The front seat was not a punishment because of its proximity to
the driver or the nature of interactions with the driver – I have fond memories of many of taxi
conversations during that time in Amman – but because we were still early and nervous in our
Arabic language skills. I can remember often asking drivers to repeat themselves three or four
times and still only catching bits and pieces out of their stories. Yet, even though the two of us
could easily have sat in the back of any taxi, we never considered this; it would be rude.
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As I passed through customs in May 2021 and entered arrivals at the Queen Alia
International Airport, I expected to be bombarded by taxi drivers, each equipped with English
price charts, vying for the chance to charge an obvious foreigner a little more than the ride might
normally cost. Instead, the lobby was uncannily quiet, with only a few families waiting eagerly to
catch a glance of their relatives or friends stepping through the automatic doors. I approached the
taxi stall at the airport without being approached once. The stall quickly called a driver, and
within a few minutes, we had arrived at his car. He opened the door to the back right seat for me,
and I shuffled in with a strange sense of unease. Hand sanitizer and tissues rested on the seat next
to me, and a firm plastic shield separated the driver and me, with only a small hole at waist height
to pass change through. We exchanged few words in the hour drive to my apartment.
This first taxi ride was emblematic of the majority of both taxi and Uber rides I took
during my three months of fieldwork. During this time, I chose to always sit in the back right
seat, as far from the driver as possible, in an effort to create as safe of a distance as possible in
such an enclosed space. The Uber app similarly requested that all passengers sit in the back seats,
and many drivers enforced – or at least seemed to prefer – this seating arrangement, though prior
to the pandemic, it was customary for men to sit in the front seats of Ubers as well. In Amman,
Uber drivers often have more expensive and newer cars, at times using air conditioning instead of
rolling down the windows for ventilation. Ubers also normally cost 1-2 JDs more than street
taxis, making Ubers a somewhat “premium” alternative to taxis, reflected in the context of the
pandemic by the advertised safety precautions in the app. My first week back, I attempted to enter
an Uber from the door behind the driver, intending to scoot across to the farthest seat. He quickly
stopped me before I could and asked me to walk around to the farthest door, seemingly
uncomfortable with the thought that I might sit behind him despite plastic sheet between us.
In examining the dynamics of driving and “passengering” in the United Kingdom,
Laurier et al. (2008) suggest that journeys in cars represent routine and understudied spaces for
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everyday talk and activity. They argue that, in commuting relationships, drivers act as hosts for
their passengers, becoming temporarily responsible for the welfare and comfort of their guests in
limited ways. In turn, the confinement and proximity of the car push its occupants to speak,
concretizing hospitality through inquiring and listening to personal news and opinions (Laurier et
al., 2008). Though these observations emerge from the context of more long-term relationships
between regular commuters, there are interesting overlaps in notions of hosting and hospitality
present in the context of taxis in Amman. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, such hospitality was
often expressed through conversation with male passengers, as Laurier et al. (2008) discuss.
However, the pandemic altered this practice; literal and metaphorical barriers were erected
between the driver and passenger. Such barriers could be viewed as a transformation of
hospitality, protecting the safety of the passenger from the virus, but the accompanying reduced
conversation and interaction made it feel to me more like an action of distrust.
The vast majority of both taxi and Uber drivers hung plastic barriers between the front
and back seats, yet these barriers took many forms. Some chose the firm plastic shield of my first
driver while others only a loose sheet of plastic. Some included holes or gaps to pass change
through while others preferred to handle monetary exchanges through the window, perhaps trying
not to leave even a crack inside the car for the virus to slip through. One such sheet was even a
dark brown pleather, providing an almost limousine-like feel to the back seat, with only a thin,
clear stripe at eye level. Others improvised their plastic sheets, with one such driver clothespinning a plastic tarp to the roof of his car and closing it in the cracks of the doors. One driver’s
plastic sheet had advertisements for a local energy drink printed across it while another placed a
large sticker on his plastic shield that read in Arabic, “Glory and Praise be to Allah, Glory be to
Allah the Great.” For especially hot summer days, some drivers cut holes in their plastic sheets to
let air conditioning through or even chose to roll their plastic sheets up, removing the barrier
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between driver and passenger. Still others had no barrier at all. Even in something as simple as a
taxi plastic barrier, drivers found unique and personal ways to navigate COVID-19 precautions.
Uber drivers wanting to take extra precautions – or perhaps fearing negative ratings from
passengers who might want them – often kept masks, hand sanitizer, and tissues in the back seats
for their passengers. The Uber app was quick to advertise such amenities, listing them under the
statement, “Your driver has identified the following actions they have taken to prioritize the
safety of riders like you.” From my experience, taxis rarely did the same, and while most had
plastic barriers of some form, they were more likely to be falling down or torn. This was perhaps
reflective of the additional pressures Uber drivers face to ensure their passengers feel safe through
the rating system that sustains their livelihoods (Chan, 2019). Still, while most taxi and Uber
drivers took some precautions to prevent the spread of COVID-19, very few took all possible
precautions; drivers often seemed to pick and choose the precautions that they perhaps felt were
most effective or easiest to integrate into their daily working conditions.
As the summer pressed on, I noticed fewer and fewer of my drivers wearing masks, the
length of the pandemic and low case numbers perhaps making it difficult to be vigilant in the
stifling Amman heat of a car stuck in traffic. I found that, when Uber drivers noticed me wearing
a mask, they were normally quick to put one on. Standard taxi drivers who chose not to wear
masks, on the other hand, seemed largely uninterested in whether or not I wore one. This
difference is again perhaps reflective of the impact a ratings-based system of employment plays
in the everyday decisions of Uber drivers, be they in Amman or elsewhere (Chan, 2019). One
Uber driver quickly put on his mask as I entered his car wearing mine, but halfway through the
ride, as we sat in standstill traffic under the sweltering sun, he ripped his mask from his face,
drying the sweat from his face on his shirt. He took a few deep breaths, savoring the air outside of
the mask, glanced back at me for a moment, and then returned it to his face without saying a
word. Had I taken off my mask as well, I doubt he would have put his back on. For Uber and taxi
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drivers who chose not to wear their masks, they normally kept them accessible. I often saw these
masks wrapped around car keys, dangling from rearview mirrors, or resting in empty front seats.
Perhaps the change I noticed most in my day-to-day taxi rides, however, was the lack of
conversation. Sitting in the back seat prevented easy eye contact with the driver, and we were
often separated by plastic. I rarely exchanged more than few words with my drivers. I tried to
begin each ride with a quick “Hello! How are you?” and usually received little more than a
muffled platitude and a question about where I was going in response. When we reached my
destination, we exchanged brief thanks and parted ways. In contrast, I still have a handful of
phone numbers of taxi drivers saved from my first time in Amman, given in case I should ever
need help or want to share a meal. I learned much about Jordan through taxi rides then, making
the silence and radio static I encountered in taxis over the summer of 2021 especially striking.
When one driver asked me what I was doing in Amman and we talked briefly, I wrote in my field
notes that evening that he had “chatted with me more than most.”
Though I used to jokingly beg my roommate to let me sit in the back seat when I
previously lived in Jordan, I found myself missing the front seat over the summer. I felt unable to
connect with my drivers in the ways I had before, and I often spent taxi rides doing little more
than scrolling through social media on my phone. To me, it felt as though something had been
lost in the change; I have no idea if my drivers felt the same way. I suspect some celebrated the
chance to work in silence or talk on the phone with their friends and family instead of feeling the
need to entertain a stranger. Still, others likely missed the chance to share that moment of
connection. As the summer wore on, drivers began stopping with the passenger door next to me
instead of the back, and I noticed more and more men in other taxis sitting in the front seats,
removing both the physical and figurative barriers between themselves and their driver. Though I
never took this step, at times I looked longingly at those who did.
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You and Your 20 Closest Friends: Coaster Buses and COVID-19 Fatigue
“You should be able to take the coaster buses here and back home. They run up and down the
main street every few minutes,” my new boss explained. It was late 2019. I had moved to Amman
for the first time only a few months earlier and was excited for the first day of my internship at
the University of Jordan. “It should only cost 40 qirsh or so. Don’t pay any more than that,” he
instructed me. I had watched the coaster buses pass down Queen Alia Street many times since I
had arrived in Amman, but they had seemed unapproachable to me. They stopped only for a
moment, a man hanging out the window shouting their major destinations at the top of his lungs.
The side of the bus had only a large, yellow sticker with the starting and ending destinations of
the route in Arabic, the stops and paths only accessible by hearsay. It took me a week from
chatting with my boss to work up the courage to wave one of the buses down.
“Jami’a! Sweileh! Jami’a! Sweileh!” a man shouted as he stepped off the bus for a
moment, ushering a few people onboard in front of the mall.
“Jami’a ar-ra’isi?” I asked sheepishly, repeating the phrase my boss had told me to
indicate my stop at the main gate of the university. The man silently outstretched his arm in
response, gesturing for me to enter the bus. As I stepped on, I was immediately struck by both the
crowdedness and heat of the bus. Cracked windows and black curtains did what little they could
to deflect the heat of summer in Amman. Of the 21 available passenger seats on the bus, all but
one were already full. I took the last one, my legs pressing into the fake leather and metal of the
seat in front of me. As the bus rolled away from curb, I looked anxiously around to see if anyone
had taken note of me; no one had. Most people stared out the window or at their phones, paying
little mind to their fellow passengers.
The man who had previously ushered me onto the bus walked over to my seat and
extended his hand. I passed him a 1 JD bill, and he wordlessly placed 60 qirsh in change into my
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hand and walked away. A few minutes later, he shouted the name of the next stop, “Al-dustur! Aldustur!” A woman on the bus raised her hand, and the bus came to screeching halt, allowing her
to get off. “Al-mustashfa! Al-mustashfa!” the man shouted next. No one got off at this stop, but
the man quickly guided a small crowd of people onto the bus. He gestured for me and the man
next to me to move so that two women who just boarded could sit.
I did so, looking around the bus for where I was supposed to sit then. Instead, the
remaining men grabbed onto one of the two metal bars bolted along the ceiling and braced
themselves; I did the same. As the bus took off again, the force threw me into another passenger
nearby. I apologized profusely and braced myself again against the bar, using more strength this
time. With effort and focus, I was able to bounce around only in the aisle, not bothering the
passengers around me. I stood like for what felt like an eternity, as the bus slowly made its way
through the traffic of one of the busiest streets in Amman. A wave of relief washed over me when
the man turned around and shouted, “Jami’a ar-ra’isi! Jami’a ar-ra’isi!”
I shot my hand into the air and responded, “Me!” The driver slammed on the brakes
again, nearly sending me toppling to the floor as he stopped outside the gates to the university.
When I stepped off the bus, I was an anxious wreck, my right arm sore from gripping the metal
bar and my dress clothes soaked with sweat. My heart raced with the exhilaration of having
successfully done something completely unfamiliar. From that day on, I took coaster buses to and
from my internship, riding them to five to six times per week for the next six months. The stress
and exhilaration quickly faded, and they became little more than another form of transportation to
navigate Amman, though only for the routes I knew.
When I returned to Amman for my research, I knew that I wanted to see how coaster
buses had changed – or not changed – in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. I remembered
them as these tightly packed spaces of public transportation that were essential to the daily lives
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of many in Amman. Physical distancing, for example, would be impossible in such a small and
crammed space, particularly when the buses were often filled to the point of many having to stand
for the duration of the ride. Perhaps because of this, when I first arrived, I saw very few coaster
buses on the streets. When I asked people why that might be, they often replied that most of the
buses were not running because of the pandemic but offered little explanation beyond this. For
those in Amman who relied on these coaster buses for transportation, such a change was likely
harmful to their mobility, potentially limiting them to spaces within walking distance or requiring
them to pay for more expensive taxis instead.
Still, not everyone in Amman relied on coaster buses. When I had grabbed dinner with a
wealthier Jordanian friend in the United States before leaving for Amman, he was shocked when I
mentioned that I had ridden them often. “Aren’t those dangerous?” he asked concernedly. Though
he grew up in Amman, he had never known someone who had ridden one. Similarly, during my
research, I rarely met anyone else who took them regularly. Most middle class and wealthier
Jordanians exclusively drove their cars, and most of my Western friends preferred taxis. The
coaster buses along the routes I rode seemed to be most often taken by Jordanian university
students and low-wage workers, demographics different from most of my other participants.
I took my first coaster bus during my research in early June from Al-Dakhliya Circle to
the University of Jordan, from which my apartment was about a 40-minute walk. As I waved
down the coaster bus, with a man leaning out the window shouting, “Jami’a! Sweileh! Jami’a!
Sweileh!” much like the first time I stepped onto one, I was unsure what to expect. The black
curtains of the coaster bus windows were taut, revealing little about the people inside. As I
stepped on, I quickly realized that I was the only passenger on the bus, a phenomenon I had never
witnessed before. As we pulled away and the man approached me to pay, I saw his disposable
face mask, not being worn or on his person, tied to the door of the coaster bus. The driver was
similarly not wearing a mask, but he had hung a large plastic curtain between the front two seats
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and the rest of the bus. This curtain could be pulled and tied closed, creating a barrier much like
the plastic sheets in many taxis, but in this case, it had been left open. The two chatted happily,
paying me little mind as we rode to my stop without picking up another passenger.
A few days later, I hopped onto another coaster bus ride towards Al-Dakhliya Circle with
only three other passengers. Over the ride, the coaster bus picked up more passengers, reaching
12 at its peak. Yet, 12 passengers were still fewer than I had ever encountered during my previous
time in Amman. This bus featured another large plastic screen between the front seats and
passengers, this one closed off except for a small, arm-sized hole to pass money through. During
this ride, all the passengers save for one wore a mask, though some left their noses uncovered. By
the next week, I began to see more and more coaster buses, and the coaster buses I rode became
fuller and fuller. On one bus ride, the driver waited until every seat was filled before leaving, with
the money collector stepping into the street and shouting “Four! Four!” to say that there were
only four seats left open. Mask wearing among passengers was more mixed on this ride, with
some taking their masks off as the bus grew hotter waiting. In this coaster bus – and all others I
rode over the summer – neither the driver nor money collector ever put on a mask.
Near the end of my time in Amman, I boarded my first coaster bus since before the
pandemic that was packed full. Every seat was taken, and five men were already standing in the
aisle, gripping the metal bars that ran the bus’s length; I became the sixth man in this line. There
was no plastic sheet or curtain separating the driver on this bus, and only three out of the 26 other
passengers were wearing masks. Two more passengers had their masks wrapped around their
necks. As I stumbled around the aisle while the bus rapidly braked and accelerated through
traffic, I thought about how many people had likely touched that metal bar before me and how
long it had likely been since that bar had been cleaned, a thought – brought on by the pandemic –
that I had never had in my many previous months of riding coaster buses.
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As I looked around at the almost complete lack of masks on the bus, in stark contrast to
the almost fully masked bus rides just weeks before, I felt that I was witnessing a turning point of
some form in many Jordanian’s perceptions of COVID-19. Mask wearing had not been required
in coaster buses before; I had still never seen a driver or money collector wear a mask, so why
had passengers stopped wearing them now? The pattern held true over the remainder of my time
that summer, with very few wearing masks on coaster buses from that point forward. On my last
coaster bus ride to the airport in mid-August, I even added to my field notes, “one man got on
properly wearing a mask,” with this occurrence being so rare at that point that I found it
noteworthy.
The coaster bus thus represented an interesting space in which to imagine and observe
COVID-19 mask wearing behavior. The heat of the summer in Amman made the bus an
incredibly uncomfortable space in which to wear masks, and masks were seemingly fully
unrequired and unenforced in them. Passengers were often tightly packed in with closed or barely
cracked windows. People constantly entered and exited the bus, with sometimes 30 people on at
once. There would almost always be a stranger next to you and standing above you, assuming you
had a seat. In these ways, the coaster bus represented nearly the epitome of a risky space for
COVID-19 spread and exposure. The lack of COVID-19 responses in such a space, thus,
represented the limits of the COVID-19 Spectacle; the coaster bus was a space the spectacle
seemingly failed to penetrate in spite of the bus’s riskiness.
Bissell (2010) suggests that, while public transportation is often an isolating experience,
it is rarely experienced in isolation from other people. Instead, we submit ourselves to “being
with” a collective of often strangers. He goes on to argue that the “affective atmospheres” of
public transportation have the capacity to both bring people together and push them apart (Bissell,
2010). COVID-19 transformed the space of the coaster bus into one which – at least from my
perspective – had a powerfully negative “affective atmosphere.” The proximity and crowdedness
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of the bus made disease spread between passengers an ever-present possibility in a way that felt
much more visceral than prior to the pandemic. Physical barriers erected on the bus provided
perhaps some protection for the driver but none between passengers. When a passenger would
have even a single cough inside the bus, I found myself shifting nervously and glancing at them,
and I noticed others on the bus doing the same. In this way the “affective atmosphere” became
one of distrust and suspicion. Who might be sick? Who might be putting me at risk?
As one of the only consistent forms of public transportation – and the cheapest – in
Amman, many likely had few other options than to take coaster buses around the city, with the
only possible method for protection in the moment being mask wearing. Yet, as the summer wore
on, seemingly more people rode these buses and fewer of them wore masks. Those who
continued to wear masks largely used disposable surgical masks or cloth, with very few using
N95s. Changes in mask wearing habits were not related to a drop in COVID-19 cases in the
country or city, which stayed relatively stable over the period, but perhaps came as a result of
COVID-19 fatigue: the feeling that the pandemic might never end slowly wearing away at
people’s desire to wear masks and heightening people’s feelings of discomfort in them. It is in the
context of such COVID-19 fatigue that the Jordanian government launched its new public
transportation system: the Bus Rapid Transit.
“Amman Gets Public Buses, at Long Last:” Launching the Bus Rapid Transit
“It’s faster than every car on the road! It’s even faster than a cheetah!” Kareem shouted at me as I
entered the apartment.
“What is?” I responded.
“Al-baS al-sari’a!” he shouted back, literally translating to the rapid bus. It was late July,
and every news channel in Amman was talking about the launch of the city’s Bus Rapid Transit
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(BRT) system that day. As I sat on the couch watching the news, Kareem and Ayman
passionately debated the technology of the bus system.
“When the bus stops, the traffic lights change from red to green,” Ayman explained
“There’s no way. How could it do that?” Kareem probed.
“It’s just like you have in America, right?” Ayman asked, turning to me enthusiastically.
I responded by saying that some places in America have bus systems like that, but my city had
nothing that nice. After a bit, Ayman switched subjects, detailing the family’s plan to ride the
BRT end to end on Friday of that week. Ayman happily invited me to join them at the time,
though this ride ultimately never took place.
On the government website dedicated to the BRT, the system was described as made up
of “large-capacity buses that operate on dedicated tracks” (Greater Amman Municipality, 2022).
The government had high hopes for the project, saying it “will be the centerpiece of a fullyintegrated hierarchical public transportation network” (Greater Amman Municipality, 2022).
Alongside the basic description of the BRT, the website provides tabs showing “Global
examples” and “International Studies” of the BRT project. The first of these tabs provides links to
an English YouTube video from the National Association of Urban Transports Companies (NTU)
Brazil entitled “BRT – the future of urban transportation” and an English TED Talk by Jaime
Lerner on a BRT system in Curitiba, Brazil. The second tab features links to three brief articles
published by the project on examples of BRT systems in Guangzhou, Bogota, and Istanbul
(Greater Amman Municipality, 2022).
Moreover, officials claimed that the project would be “accessible to all, whatever their
social, financial, or cultural status is” and that access would be “facilitated for the most
vulnerable groups of society” (Dupire, 2018). Through these depictions of the BRT, the
Jordanian government attempted to create a vision of the project as one of modernization and
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accessibility, with the support of international expertise and examples from around the world. The
project was meant to be a political win for the government, a counter to statements like one
published by The National in response to its finished construction with the title “Amman gets
public buses, at long last.” In it, a reader from Bosnia and Herzegovina stated, “Finally, I couldn’t
believe that a capital has no public transportation” (The National, 2021).
Still, the BRT project has faced substantial controversy over its lifetime. Construction of
the BRT began in 2009, funded by a $166 million loan from the French Development Agency to
the Greater Amman Municipality. Only two years later, construction was suspended over doubts
of its benefits and, according to the governmental Audit Bureau, “fundamental inconsistencies in
decisions relating to bidding” (al-Rawashdeh, 2012). The project did not restart until 2015, at
which point the Jordanian government declared that it had cleared corruption suspicions
(Tabazah, 2018). Since then, the BRT has taken years of slow construction to complete, with
dedicated bus lanes sitting empty. In an article by The Jordan Times, one resident of Amman
described the BRT as “a joke,” stating, “While we hear promises about this modern, super fast
bus, all we see is money being spent and nothing happening” (Dupire, 2018).
I experienced similar feelings when I first lived in Amman. When I talked about the
empty bus lanes, Jordanian and Western friends of mine alike would joke that it might “be open
in another ten years.” I was surprised, on my first taxi ride down Queen Rania Street after
returning to Amman, when I saw how much progress had been made during the COVID-19
pandemic. In an area that had previously had no construction, the government had built new
dedicated bus lanes with escalators and bridges across at each stop. It seems likely that the
pandemic itself provided the opportunity for this construction, given the reduced traffic along one
of Amman’s busiest roads during lockdowns.
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When the BRT began its first days of operation, only one of its two intended lines had
opened: from Sweileh to the Jordan Museum on the edge of the wasat al-balad (downtown). To
encourage people to try the bus, the government set the price of a ride at only 1 qirsh – or 0.01
USD – for its first two weeks, with the plan to raise the price once this period ended. The early
days of the BRT were rocky; the previously unoccupied bus lanes often used by pedestrians and
other drivers had suddenly become occupied by fast-moving buses. For those first few days, bus
accidents became a frequent topic of conversation. Yet, what was not a topic of conversation
regarding the opening of the BRT was COVID-19. The pandemic went largely undiscussed
across news and government discourse of the BRT, with the government trying to encourage
people to ride the bus. In one of the only mentions of COVID-19 in the bus’s launch, the
Jordanian Prime Minister Bisher Al-Khasawneh, after doing a trial run of the bus route, “stressed
the importance of bus users adhering to public health and safety procedures and ensuring that bus
drivers receive the coronavirus vaccine” (Jordan Times, 2021).
Excited by the potential for a faster way to my apartment and curious about the
undiscussed COVID-19 procedures being implemented by the BRT, I walked from my friend’s
apartment downtown to the Jordan Museum bus station on August 2, a week after the bus
launched. As the automatic doors slid open, I was hit by a blast of cool air from air-conditioned
interior. The reflective, tiled floors and floor-to-ceiling windows encasing the building provided a
vision of the “modernity” that the city wanted the BRT to represent. Immediately in front of the
entrance sat a reception desk, with large plastic shields surrounding it, an unmasked employee
behind them selling bus cards.
As I turned to step into line, I was struck by how many people were there; more than a
hundred people wrapped back and forth in the empty lobby. Physical distancing was nonexistent
as people crammed in to try to reach the bus as quickly as possible, and most people were either
wearing masks around their chins or not wearing masks at all. There were no signs or warnings
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about COVID-19 in or around the building. Employees protecting the order and sanctity of the
line made no moves to enforce COVID-19 procedures. The atmosphere of the line was anxious,
with some excited to ride the bus and others obviously frustrated by the line. Children ran up and
down the line, doing cartwheels and playing games while waiting. I waited in line for 15 minutes
before I reached the exit to board.
The bus was a dark red with an image of the Amman skyline plastered on its sign. As an
employee waved me through to step on, I pulled out my phone, paying by scanning a QR code in
the Amman Bus app. As I walked down the aisle of the bus, shiny and clean in a way that only a
brand-new bus can be, I noticed that there were signs about not eating or drinking on the bus but
no signs about COVID-19. Given the presence of signs about COVID-19 and mask wearing in
nearly every building in the city, it seemed likely that a purposeful decision was made by the
government to not include such signs in the station or buses. The bus driver and most of the
passengers alike were not wearing masks on the bus and faced no complaints from the employees
that waved us in. Similarly, there was no enforced physical distancing on the bus; an employee
counted off the seats until each one was filled before the bus could leave.
Early in the pandemic, governments around the world implemented a number of
strategies to reduce or “make safe” public transportation systems. Istanbul, for example, increased
its routine cleanings for its public transit systems and installed disinfectants at over 40 bus rapid
transit stations (Null and Smith, 2020). Both individuals and governments also sought alternatives
to public transportation in an effort to reduce the spread of COVID-19. Over the first three weeks
of March, Istanbul witnessed a 50% decrease in public transit ridership, and New York City
Mayor Bill de Blasio called on city residents to “bike or walk to work if you can” (Null and
Smith, 2020). My sister and her partner live in New York City. Feeling uncomfortable with
sharing the space of the city’s subway during the pandemic, they bought a car together. While
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such a purchase was reflective of a level of privilege in their ability to do so, it was also reflective
of broader trends of avoiding public transportation by any means possible at the time.
With the BRT first opening well after these examples and at a time of relatively low case
counts in Jordan, it is perhaps not surprising that the Jordanian government did not attempt to
implement strict COVID-19 policies on the bus or in its stations. As Yazıcı (2013) suggests,
systems of public transportation, including highways and buses, are more than simple
infrastructure; they reflect symbolic attempts to elicit notions of state power, modernity, and
progress. Given the controversies surrounding the BRT’s long construction, the government may
have feared that strict COVID-19 precautions would result in diminished early ridership, given
the reminder of the pandemic such precautions brought and the frustrations many in Amman had
with such precautions. Images of empty buses and stations at the launch of the BRT would be
unlikely to symbolize state power or progress for many. The risks of such an image transformed
the COVID-19 Spectacle from a source of state power to a potential nuisance. With these two
spectacles of state power perceived as at odds, actors in the Jordanian government gave
precedence to the BRT, deemphasizing the COVID-19 Spectacle.
As I waited for the bus to fill, I overheard the men in front of me complaining frustratedly
about the bus, “Aish al-baS al-sari’a? Al-taxi asra’a,” roughly “What rapid bus? A taxi is faster.”
The next time I took the rapid bus, I heard similar complaints about the wait in line. Though the
line was shorter this time, with only around 75 people, the air conditioning was no longer
operating, making the station brutally hot. Sweat dripped down my back as I waited, and I again
heard people mock the bus’s name, sarcastically repeating, “Al-baS al-sari’a.” Perhaps it was
after hearing similar complaints from friends that Ayman chose not to take his family on their
Friday trip, or perhaps he grew nervous because of the accidents on the news. In either case, the
launch of the BRT – meant to be a political win for the government in a time of frustration – was
instead met with complaints by many.
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Moreover, despite the Jordanian government’s often strong and restrictive efforts to
combat the COVID-19 pandemic in other instances, the government made a seemingly
purposeful choice to deemphasize the pandemic in the space of the BRT. Such a decision stood in
stark contrast to the government’s spectacular rhetoric and operation in other spaces, particularly
the airport, even at the same time. Perhaps this distinction came from the differing intentions of
the spaces. The bus station and system, unlike the airport, was likely not intended for nor
expecting frequent use by foreign visitors, so the image that the government wanted to project
might differ. Another possible explanation might involve the domestic controversy that the BRT
had faced. The Jordanian government had faced over a decade of criticism from Jordanians
regarding the BRT, and many Jordanians strongly disliked wearing masks. Perhaps the
government was attempting to avoid associating the BRT with further controversy by tying it into
the government’s COVID-19 responses. Regardless, the lack of such enforcement represented an
interesting shift in the pandemic logic and practice of the Jordanian government.
Conclusions
Public transportation – be it taxis, coaster buses, or the BRT – represents a unique space of
everyday interaction. It is a spaced shared by individuals in a temporary economic and social
relationship that brings with it certain expectations. Prior to the pandemic, taxi drivers in Amman
expected a level of respect and social interaction with men through sitting in the front seat while
women often took the back seat out of concern for their safety from harassment by drivers. In
light of the COVID-19 pandemic, imaginations of safety pushed men to the back seats as well,
and many drivers attempted to implement interventions – like plastic shields and face masks –
that would keep both them and their passengers safe. Yet, as the pandemic wore on, such
interventions often fell to the wayside.
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Coaster buses, on the other hand, represent a less intimate and more anonymous space of
interaction. There are often little more than a few words exchanged between the driver and their
passengers. Passengers are jostled around and made to stand without particular concern for their
safety. As coaster buses returned to operation during the pandemic, little attention was similarly
paid to the role of COVID-19 for passengers in such spaces. Drivers made no efforts to enforce
mask wearing among passengers, and the only safety interventions were plastic shields for the
protection of the driver. In turn, coaster buses in Amman became quintessential risky spaces for
the spread of COVID-19, but few to no alternatives existed in the city for those without the
economic means to consistently take taxis or drive.
The BRT is even farther removed in its relationship with its passengers. Drivers – sealed
off in separate boxes – have no interactions with their passengers. Payments are handled by the
scan of a QR code or card; exiting is handled by the push of a button. Decisions regarding
COVID-19 safety likely rested in the hands of actors in the Jordanian government, who
seemingly chose to ignore such precautions to avoid further controversy and unpopularity among
many Jordanians. In each case, the operators of these forms of public transportation attempted to
create “makeshift safety” through small changes to everyday practices. Yet, the extents of these
attempts varied dramatically, both at scale of the system and the individual. Through the
differences in practices between individual drivers and between forms of public transportation,
abstract concepts of safety inequity and risk tolerance manifested into physical forms, shaping the
forms of public transportation people in Amman were able to take and the ways in which they
took them.
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CHAPTER 6
“VACCINATE ME, I AM HUNGRY:” COVID-19 VACCINE ACCESS
AND CHOICE
I narrowed my eyes to avoid the bright reflections of sunlight off the white, concrete buildings
around me as I emerged from the shade and air conditioning of a chain shawarma restaurant in
Jabal Lwebdeih. My friend Omar and I had just spent nearly two hours catching up, and I had an
online English class to teach shortly. I pulled my mask off and made my way towards the nearest
coaster bus stop. As I did so, a small piece of graffiti stood out in the corner of my vision,
plastered in all black on the side of an apartment complex. It showed a fist raised, grasping a
syringe with the needle pointing upwards. Around the image were the words T3mnii ju3aan,
literally “Feed me, I am hungry.” Unsure of the image’s intended message, I quickly snapped a
photo and continued my walk.
When I returned to my apartment that night, I showed the image to Ayman and asked him
what he thought it meant. He explained to me that T3mnii was a play on words, it could mean
both “Feed me” and “Vaccinate me.” Ayman suggested that the graffiti was demanding that the
government provide greater access to COVID-19 vaccines. Yet, this notion of being “hungry”
perhaps also reflected a yearning for something fundamental and basic. In this way, this artist’s
call for vaccines was also a biopolitical call for the government to provide and protect life for its
people.
The Jordanian government opened registration for COVID-19 vaccines in December
2020 and officially began its national COVID-19 vaccination plan in January 2021 (Al-Khalidi,
2021a; Xinhua, 2021a). This vaccination plan stated that anyone living in Jordan, including
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refugees and asylum seekers, was entitled to receive the vaccine free of charge, making Jordan
one of the first countries to start vaccinating refugees (UNHCR, 2021). The Jordanian
government prioritized vaccinations based on age, work sector, and preexisting conditions,
though it is worth noting that only 4% of the Jordanian population is over the age of 65, and 33%
are under the age of 15 (World Bank, 2020). By April, the Jordanian government had approved
five COVID-19 vaccines for use: Pfizer, AstraZeneca, Sinopharm, Johnson & Johnson, and
Sputnik V (Roya News, 2021).
When I arrived in Jordan, 800,000 of the approximately 10 million people living in the
country had received their first dose of a COVID-19 vaccine, and 286,000 had received two
doses. When I left three months later, those numbers had risen to 3.2 million and 2.5 million,
respectively. However, vaccine dose administration rates began declining in Jordan from the end
of June, and – by January 2022 – these numbers remained at only 4.5 million and 4.1 million,
respectively (Ritchie et al., 2021). Among the people I spoke with, Sinopharm and Pfizer were
the most common vaccines, with relatively few people receiving AstraZeneca. During my three
months of fieldwork, I never met anyone who had received – or been offered – the Johnson &
Johnson or Sputnik V vaccines.
In this chapter, I explore questions of vaccine access and choice in Jordan during the
COVID-19 pandemic. I look, first, at the state of Jordan’s access to vaccines and how the
government negotiated its strategic position and international interests to receive vaccines, despite
being a country in the Global South of only 10 million. I argue that international access to
COVID-19 vaccines followed similar patterns to bilateral aid, providing poorer states with access
to life-saving doses based largely on their perceived usefulness to wealthier countries in the
Global North. I then examine individual access to vaccines in Amman, Jordan, alongside
individual perceptions of vaccine brands and expressions of agency in vaccine choice. Drawing
on Sumba’s (2021) necropolitics at large, I consider the ways in which vaccine access within
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individual states reflected negligence to the fatal implications of inequality for some, much like at
the international scale. I then reflect on the rhetorical similarities between discussions of vaccine
brand choice and contraceptive choice. I conclude by considering efforts by the Jordanian
government to make the vaccine “mandatory” in an attempt to improve declining vaccination
rates. Lastly, I explore the “political etiologies” of COVID-19 vaccines in Amman, considering
the ways in which state efforts to encourage the vaccine as part of the larger COVID-19 Spectacle
became symbolically embroiled in perceptions of the vaccines themselves.
The Benefits of Being an Ally: How Jordan Acquired Vaccines Doses
On my way to catch the bus, I often walked past one of the government’s vaccination sites at the
University of Jordan. As I approached the university on foot, small signs lined the fence, simply
labelled markz al-t3Tiim, or “vaccination center” with a small arrow pointing towards the gate. At
the entrance stood a large white banner with “Center for Vaccination against the Novel
Coronavirus” plastered in Arabic on its face and smaller lettering providing the site name. The
center consisted of a parking lot with 10 white tents in a line, each slightly more than the width of
a car with metal fences blocking the tents that were closed for the day. The vaccination site was
rarely open during the days and times that I walked by it, normally little more than an empty
parking lot with the gate closed and a guard watching over it.
On one of the few days that the vaccination site was open as I passed, I took a moment to
watch the process. A single line of cars stretched out of the parking lot and down the busy street,
with cars loudly blaring their horns to get around what essentially became a closed lane for those
not waiting to get vaccinated. One by one, the guard at the gate would point the car at the front of
the line in the direction of one of only a few staffed white tents. The driver would pull into the
white tent, receive their vaccine dose in the car, and circle back out of the lot and into the busy
street. The entire process took only a matter of minutes. As I peered through the fence, watching
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the needles containing these doses emerge from obscured containers, I imagined the thousands of
miles those doses likely traveled, and I wondered about the politics of how they ended up in this
parking lot.
Perhaps these doses had come from the United States in a shipment of 500,000 Pfizer
vaccine doses to Jordan in July 2021. The United States had provided these doses via a “direct
arrangement with Jordan.” A U.S. official speaking of this effort – and countering claims of
vaccine diplomacy – stated, “We are sharing these doses not to secure favors or extract
concessions… We are doing this with the singular objective of saving lives” (AFP, 2021). At the
same time, the U.S. Embassy in Amman called the doses a “gift from Pres. Biden and the U.S.
government” in a tweet, stating that it “reflects the importance of our bilateral relationship”
(Petra, 2021b). These statements reflect an interesting contradiction, framing the global
distribution of COVID-19 vaccine doses as simultaneously politically neutral and potent. In the
context of Jordan, the latter seems more likely.
Jordan’s success in accessing COVID-19 vaccine doses was particularly surprising
because so many other countries in the Global South struggled to access COVID-19 vaccine
doses due to vaccine nationalism (Katz et al., 2021). When COVID-19 vaccines first arrived,
countries across the Global North quickly entered bilateral deals with the manufacturers to secure
their own supplies. Canada, for example, purchased enough vaccine doses to vaccinate their
entire population nine times. The United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom,
Australia, and Japan similarly secured the supplies to vaccinate their populations between two
and eight times over (Hassoun, 2021). What, then, of the many poorer countries – like Jordan –
left out of these early discussions and agreements? For these countries, the WHO and G7 created
the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) program to supply vaccine doses to low- and
middle-income countries.
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However, COVAX still relied on the donations of these wealthier countries, with initial
plans to vaccinate only 20% of participating countries by the end of 2021 (Katz et al., 2021). It
was not until June 2021 that the United States, for example, announced plans to share its excess
doses with the rest of the world. In this announcement, the U.S. stated that it would share 80
million “U.S. vaccine doses,” 75% of which would be through COVAX and 25% directly with
“countries in need.” Of the initial 25 million doses to be shared, the U.S. government targeted 6
million toward “regional priorities and partner recipients,” of which Jordan was one (White
House, 2021). Through the “soft power” of donating life-saving vaccine doses to strategic
partners and allies first, these doses were still able to serve the interests of the wealthier countries
that donated them.
Compared to many countries in the Global South, Jordan was relatively successful at
receiving early doses precisely because of its strategic usefulness to powerful countries in the
Global North. Jordan received priority vaccine doses from the United States due to the
government’s longstanding role as a strategic ally to the United States in the Middle East and
from the European Union because of the country’s role as a host for Syrian refugees. Focusing
first on the United States, in an article from the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (2020) on bilateral
assistance, for example, the U.S. government highlights its appreciation for “the leadership role
that Jordan plays in advancing peace and moderation in the region,” citing the Jordanian
government’s efforts to oppose terrorism and “assist wider U.S. interests” in the region (Bureau
of Near Eastern Affairs, 2020). Moreover, the article argues:
In light of ongoing regional unrest, as well as global disruptions stemming from the
COVID-19 pandemic, the United States has helped Jordan maintain its stability and
prosperity through economic and military assistance and through close political
cooperation (Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, 2020).
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It is from this perspective that the U.S. government proudly describes itself as “Jordan’s single
largest provider of bilateral assistance, providing more than $1.5 billion in 2020” alongside $35.4
million in assistance for Jordan’s COVID-19 response (Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, 2020).
Such statements provide evidence for why Jordan may have received priority for these doses.
Similarly, for the European Union, Jordan represents a “safe haven for refugees since the
start of the Syria crisis in 2011” (European Commission, 2021). Importantly, this “safe haven”
exists outside of and far from the borders of the EU itself, as Europe has become increasingly
hostile to accepting refugees and asylum seekers (Hyndman & Mountz, 2008). In turn, the EU
frames itself as “a significant aid contributor,” providing 3.2 billion euros in assistance to Jordan
“since the beginning of Syrian crisis.” In 2021, the EU provided an additional 17 million euros in
humanitarian assistance to “help Jordan tackle the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic”
(European Commission, 2021). It is in the context of this strategic position that Jordan was able
to receive its first doses from COVAX in March: 144,000 doses of AstraZeneca (WHO, 2021).
At the same time, COVAX provided the Jordanian government with 8 million euros
through its “Jordan Health Programme for Syrian Refugees and Vulnerable Jordanians” (WHO,
2021). The Jordanian government received its second batch of COVAX vaccines in April 2021
and what was anticipated to be its third and final batch of AstraZeneca doses through COVAX in
June, funded by the EU’s Syria Trust Fund. At the time, the Jordanian Minister of Health stated
that Jordan was “among the first countries in the Middle East and Africa to receive its third batch
of vaccines via the COVAX initiative” (Petra, 2021a). However, only one month later , Jordan
received another 40,950 vaccine doses through COVAX, again with explicit note of funding by
the EU Syria Trust Fund, bringing the total number of vaccine doses delivered to Jordan by
COVAX up to 477,750 (EU Neighbors, 2021).
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It is likely that the Jordanian government’s role as a strategic ally to the Global North
positioned the country to receive doses from COVAX so early in the process, among the first
countries in the Middle East and Africa. It comes as no surprise that such supplies were funded by
programs explicitly tied to refugees, as keeping refugees out of Europe is the primary strategic
role of Jordan from the perspective of the EU. Moreover, it is strange that, only one month after
Jordan became among the first countries to receive its “final” batch of COVAX vaccines, it
received an additional batch funded by the EU Syria Trust Fund. Such complex political
dynamics again speak to the dynamics of bilateral aid, in which vaccine doses and associated
funding are – at least in part – based on a state’s ability to serve the interests of the state originally
possessing the doses.
Yet, the dynamics present in the acquisition and distribution of COVID-19 vaccines are
not unique to this pandemic; they can be traced back to longer histories of bilateral aid, both in
the context of disease and otherwise. In 2009, for example, a new strain of H1N1 threatened to
cause a devastating global pandemic. With the WHO declaration of “full pandemic” on June 11,
many North American and European governments automatically activated advance-purchase
agreements for millions of doses of pandemic influenza vaccines under the assumption that global
supplies would be limited (Lakoff, 2017). As H1N1 spread without the feared death rates,
however, these countries attempted to renegotiate their agreements and to unload their excess
vaccine doses on poorer countries in the Global South, countries with limited to no access to
these doses when H1N1 was believed to be catastrophic (Lakoff, 2017).
Looking beyond new biomedical technologies like vaccines, in The Wretched of the
Earth, Fanon (1963) argues that formerly colonized states who signed bilateral agreements with
their former colonizers during the Cold War were, in turn, transformed merely from formerly
colonized territories into economically dependent countries. He continues, “The former colonizer,
which has kept intact and, in some cases, reinforced its colonial marketing channels, agrees to
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inject small doses into the independent nation’s budget in order to sustain it” (Fanon, 1963, p.
55). Yet, because of this relationship, the formerly colonized state is unable to escape its
dependence on the colonizer. As Fanon (1963) posits, the small doses of wealth that these states
vie for originate from their own former exploitation as colonies; as he states, “Europe’s wellbeing and progress were built with the sweat and corpses of blacks, Arabs, Indians, and Asians”
(p. 53).
In Rule of Experts, Mitchell (2002) expresses similar concerns with the role of USAID in
Egypt, arguing that the agency “operated, more of less successfully, as a form of state support to
the American corporate sector, while working in Egypt to dismantle state supports” (p. 240). All
the while, the discourse of USAID pretended to operate independently of Egyptian politics, at the
rational, detached level of “policy” (Mitchell, 2002). In this way, the hoarding of life-saving
vaccine doses by wealthy countries, only to be distributed later along lines of strategic benefit,
reflected similar relationships of economic dependence and exploitation. Through the seemingly
neutral discourse of “policy,” unequal distribution of vaccines at the international scale became
framed as an act of benevolence. Though the government of Jordan was able to utilize this
relationship to its benefit in receiving priority vaccine access, states with less “strategic”
relationships with wealthy countries in the Global North faced greater difficulties in accessing
such technologies.
Thus, despite being a relatively poor country outside of the Global North, Jordan was
able to use its position as a strategic partner with both the United States and the European Union
to navigate the difficulties of receiving sufficient COVID-19 vaccine doses. Receiving priority
for doses directly from the United States due to the “bilateral relationship” between the two states
and receiving priority for COVAX doses because of Jordan’s role as host for Syrian refugees. It is
worth noting, however, that at the same time COVAX was providing Jordan with AstraZeneca
doses in early 2021, many European nations had suspended the use of the same vaccine due to

113

health concerns, a point which I will explore later in this chapter in more depth. Jordan’s access
to vaccines from the Global North based on its “use” to those countries is reflective of the
continuing dynamics of bilateral aid, allocating access to life-saving vaccines for these
populations based on their abilities to serve the Global North. Still, the Jordanian government
receiving these doses was only the first step of the vaccination process; next, the government had
to distribute these vaccines to individuals within its borders.
The Bureaucracies of Vaccination: Trying to Get the Shot
As the Jordanian Ministry of Health’s vaccine registration website loads, the coat of arms of
Jordan flashes across the screen. The Jordanian coat of arms is then relegated to a banner at the
top, accompanied by “Ministry of Health, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,” and an option to
switch between the English and Arabic languages. Immediately below are two large green
buttons: “Start Registration” and “Enquiry.” Below that, the “Vaccination Instructions” are
broken down into five steps: Registration, Appointment Notification, On Your Appointment
Date, Vaccination Certificate, and Report Adverse Events. The registration step, completed on
this webpage, requires the user to enter their Jordanian National Number (if Jordanian) or the
Personal Number assigned to all noncitizens by the Jordanian government upon first entry into
the country (if non-Jordanian); the registration then fills in the user’s personal information based
on the number provided. Users are asked to enter their governorate, business sector, chronic
diseases, and mobile number. After the user authenticates their mobile number, they are
registered to receive the vaccine (Ministry of Health, 2021c).
The user then waits to receive an appointment notification on their phone. This
notification provides details of the appointment based on the user’s “eligibility and priority.”
According to Ministry of Health’s website, these priorities are assigned automatically based on
“risk, benefit, and justice, depending on such factors as age, work sectors, chronic diseases, and
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others” (Ministry of Health, 2021c). The ministry provides no further details on the definitions of
these criteria, perhaps leaving them purposefully vague to allow easier changes to distribution
priority. From the people I spoke with, the wait time to receive a notification ranged from a
matter of weeks to months. One Syrian woman, for example, registered for the vaccine in
December 2020 and did not receive her first dose until June 2021, while others of similar ages
both registered for and received their vaccines in May 2021.
On the user’s appointment date, they are asked to arrive shortly before the appointment
time and to bring with them their National ID (for Jordanians) or passport (for non-Jordanians)
alongside proof of their priority access, e.g., a professional ID for their work sector or medical
reports of chronic diseases (Ministry of Health, 2021c). These appointments take place at vaccine
sites, like the one described earlier. When the user receives the “necessary vaccine doses,” they
will receive a text message with a link to their vaccination certificate, which is only provided
electronically. The website asks them to save this link for future reference. Lastly, the user
receives a text message with a link to report any side effects. The government website notes
alongside this step that the “COVID-19 vaccines used in this campaign are safe” and explains that
this step exists only because “regulations mandate a reporting mechanism for suspected side
effects” (Ministry of Health, 2021c). The presence of both iconography and language of the
Jordanian government at each step of this process emphasized the government’s attempts to link
itself with the COVID-19 Spectacle, here as the life-saving solution to the pandemic.
A thick green border followed by a thin gold line encompasses the electronic vaccination
certificate. The top of the certificate is adorned by a somewhat blurry image of the Jordanian crest
of arms and the words “Ministry of Health, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.” The top right corner
has a circular, blue stamp with the same words and the top left a QR code that can be scanned to
prove the authenticity of the certificate. Under these rests the title: “COVID-19 Vaccination
Certification.” With the left side in English and the right in Arabic, the certificate for non-
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Jordanians lists the recipient’s personal Jordanian number, passport number, nationality, name,
date of birth, and reference number. A table at the bottom of the certificate provides the details of
the vaccine itself. For each dose, the dose number, vaccine brand, lot number, date, and
healthcare center are provided from right to left. Most people I knew kept their vaccination
certificate readily available on their phone, in case they needed to quickly prove their status, as I
did when I entered a soccer match (Chapter 4). Other places that legally required vaccination
certificates gave them nothing more than a cursory glance, and still others did not check at all.
Although the registration website launched in December 2020, by the beginning of the
Jordanian vaccination program in January 2021, only 200,000 people had registered to receive a
vaccine (Middle East Eye, 2021). After the first month of the vaccination program, only about
150,000 doses had been administered, and only 400,000 people had registered to receive the
vaccine (Al-Khalidi, 2021a). In turn, the Jordanian government partnered with external
organizations to advertise the registration process. As I scrolled through TikTok in my downtime
in Amman, for example, I frequently encountered a promoted advertisement by UNICEF Jordan.
In Arabic, the ad walked the viewer through how they could register for a COVID-19 vaccine on
their phone using the government website.
By the time I arrived in Jordan, campaigns to inform the public on how to register for the
vaccine had seemingly been successful, at least among refugees in Amman. Through surveys
with the Collateral Repair Project (CRP), I found that most CRP community members –
representing largely urban, impoverished refugees – knew how to register for the vaccine.
Moreover, of those who did not know how to register for the vaccine, most did not want to
receive the vaccine anyway. However, there were still a few refugees I spoke with who both
wanted the vaccine and did not know how to register. For these refugees, CRP planned to provide
instructions on how to use the registration website. That said, it is worth noting that CRP
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community members may represent a more privileged class compared to many refugees in Jordan
because they live in urban Amman and are perhaps self-selected in their access to CRP.
Many Jordanians and refugees alike viewed the vaccine registration and distribution
process as one of equality and oneness. As one Iraqi woman said, “Thank god, the vaccine is
equally available to everyone.” When I would ask people with the vaccine how the process had
been, they most often described it as easy, and the only consistent complaints that I encountered
were about wait times and vaccine brands. Still, some refugees felt that they had faced difficulties
in this process because of their refugee status. For example, one Iraqi man told me, “It has been
harder for refugees to get vaccinated, especially in the beginning.” Among those who held this
belief, most struggled to provide specific examples of such difficulties. Others faced registration
or vaccination inequalities that they could easily articulate.
One such example came from Muhammad, a young Palestinian man. In an early CRP
survey about the impacts of COVID-19, Muhammad had stated that he would be willing to do a
follow-up interview over the phone and had left a phone number. When I called his number, he
was quick to answer. As I asked him about his connection to CRP, he immediately switched from
Arabic to fluent English, recognizing my own limitations. I was surprised when he responded to
my question with one of his own, “What is CRP?” After describing the organization, he said that
he might have gotten help from them or taken a class with them at some point, but that was not
what he wanted to talk about.
Muhammad had taken CRP’s survey, regardless of how he found it, because he wanted to
talk about the unique administrative hardships faced by many Palestinian refugees in Jordan
during the pandemic. He spoke – uninterrupted – for nearly 40 minutes, telling me about his story
and that of his father. As Muhammad told me, he had been able to register for and receive the
vaccine because his wife was Jordanian. However, his 70-year-old father – who was originally

117

from Palestine – could not. According to him, the Jordanian government had refused to give his
father a residence card when he first came to Jordan, so the government would not recognize his
status as a refugee. As such, Muhammad’s father had only a Palestinian Authority passport for
external use, but – without a residence card – his father was prohibited from registering for the
vaccine.
After months of conversations with government authorities, they asked Muhammad’s
father to pay a fine of 1.5 JD (approximately 2 USD) per day since he had last entered Jordan in
2014 before he could receive an identification with which to register for the vaccine. This is the
same fine charged to tourists who overstay their visas in Jordan. Muhammad’s father, unable to
afford this fine, instead approached the UNRWA – the UN agency dedicated to Palestinian
refugees – for a vaccine, who in turn redirected him to the same government registration process.
Muhammad argued that this was the case for more than just his own father. As he told me, “There
are so many refugees, living in Jordan but originally from Palestine, that don’t have the vaccine
yet because Jordan has refused to give them residence cards.”
Though I only ever spoke to Muhammad over the phone, he provided me with valuable
insight into the often-conflicting bureaucracies that many Palestinian refugees faced during the
pandemic. Access to a COVID-19 vaccine was based first on access to a personal Jordanian
number. In this way, the Jordanian government’s own bureaucracy was hurting its goal of
increased vaccinations. Moreover, I suspect that these bureaucratic issues extended beyond
Palestinian refugees. I frequently heard stories of frustration about the UNHCR, which serves
non-Palestinian refugees in Jordan, from refugees at CRP whose UNHCR numbers had expired
during the pandemic. With the UNHCR office closed, there was nothing these refugees could do
to renew these numbers, and expired numbers at least prevented people from visiting their
families in the hospital. In rural spaces in which these identification numbers may be in less
frequent use, I suspect that such issues might be even more widespread.
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In response to Foucauldian biopolitics, which emphasizes the contemporary state’s role in
“making live” for its population, Mbembe (2019) argues that the state’s role in “making die” is
still just as present, with governments employing necropower in order to render certain groups
disposable. In response to the uneven distribution of COVID-19 vaccines at the international
scale, Sumba (2021) proposes the concept of necropolitics at large, which – rather than relying
on weapons and annihilation as Mbembe suggests – is instead based on “negligence,
acquiescence, and utter disregard for the fatal implications of global inequality” (p. 48). While
Sumba (2021) applies necropolitics at large at the international scale of vaccine access discussed
prior, this framework is similarly visible within individual states in the government programs
intended to distribute these same vaccines, in Jordan and elsewhere. The inability of
Muhammad’s father to access the vaccine based on his immigration status provides one such
example, in which the government’s vaccination system resigned him to be unable to access a
life-saving vaccine, purely out of negligence for those without identification numbers.
Yet, there were also opportunities for some in Jordan to navigate around the
government’s vaccination framework. One such opportunity was provided to CRP employees
early in the summer. At the time, many CRP employees had registered for the vaccine through the
government website months prior but had not yet been called on to receive it. Thus, when the
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) – another foreign NGO that works with refugees in Amman
– offered to let CRP employees get vaccinated, many were quick to volunteer. This was a onetime opportunity, requiring advanced sign-up. In some ways, such an event was reflective of the
abilities of Westerners and Western organizations to navigate COVID-19 vaccinations more
easily. At the same time, given the diversity of CRP’s staff – with a relatively equal mix of
Westerners, Jordanians, and refugees – the NRC’s offer also represented a chance for both
Jordanians and refugees to take agency over their own vaccinations and avoid the government
registration and wait processes. The brand of these vaccines was unknown to CRP employees
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until they arrived at the NRC vaccination site, at which time they learned they would be receiving
Sinopharm, a fact which pleased some and disappointed others. In the next section, I explore
further perceptions of COVID-19 vaccine brands and expressions of agency in navigating the
government vaccination campaign.
Vaccine Brands and Expressions of Agency
It was lunchtime on my first day in the CRP office. We crammed around a small plastic table in
the central courtyard, passing around bread, kababs, and tabbouleh to celebrate the first day that
anyone had been allowed to come in in over a year. The bright summer sun sweltered above us as
it neared midday; we gulped down plastic cups of water to evade the heat’s worst effects. As I
reached for another cup, our boss excitedly declared that he had received his second dose of the
Pfizer vaccine earlier that week.
Abdul, a Sudanese refugee who had worked at CRP for many years, chimed in, “I have
been trying to get Pfizer for weeks, but they have been out. I won’t get any other.” Said, a
Jordanian, replied that he was finally able to get the AstraZeneca vaccine a couple weeks ago.
Abdul responded with a low, drawn-out “Oh,” as a stiff silence descended over the group, with
many seemingly lost in thought at merely the idea of receiving AstraZeneca. The silence was only
broken when another person jumped in, adding that they had been able to get the Pfizer vaccine
as well.
I mentioned that I had actually gotten the Moderna vaccine in the United States before
coming to Jordan. There was confusion among a few of my coworkers who had not heard of it,
but someone quickly jumped in and said that it was “like Pfizer” – perhaps talking about its status
as an mRNA vaccine or perhaps simply meaning that it was “good” – but only for Americans,
assuaging their curiosity. As we continued around the circle, everyone chimed in, seemingly
without hesitation. The other five people at the table had either received the Sinopharm or Pfizer
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vaccine or had registered on the government website but were still waiting to get called on for the
vaccine. There were no reactions of surprise or confusion to any of these. Once we finished our
meal, we returned to work, and the day carried on.
At the end of the workday, as I stood on the street attempting to hail a taxi, Said walked
over and offered me a ride home. On the way, he returned to the conversation from lunch, “I
think that AstraZeneca is just as good as the others,” he argued passionately, as if back at that
small plastic table talking to Abdul. He expressed his frustration at the response of discomfort he
had received by merely mentioning that he had gotten AstraZeneca. His comments implied that
this was not the first time he had garnered that reaction.
This conversation about vaccine brands at CRP was not unique during my time in
Amman; vaccine brands were a frequent topic of discussion. Many casually chatted about which
brand they had received and their opinions of the efficacy and safety of that and other brands. In
the case of Said, he felt frustrated by the negative responses he received for having the
AstraZeneca vaccine despite his belief that it was as safe as any other. On the other hand, Abdul
was expressing his own agency within the framework of the government’s vaccination process
through his refusal receive any brand other than Pfizer. As Abdul described, the Jordanian
government’s stocks of the Pfizer vaccine were out, and he would wait until they acquired more
before getting vaccinated because he felt the Pfizer vaccine was both safer and more effective. An
Iraqi woman I spoke to similarly described wanting to get the vaccine as soon as possible but
only being willing to get Pfizer, so she too was waiting for it to become available again.
However, knowing that the government did not announce the vaccine brand for a given
vaccination site ahead of time, it was unclear to me what it meant to “wait” for the Pfizer vaccine.
I gained this insight from Omar, my Iraqi refugee friend. Like Abdul and the Iraqi woman, Omar
refused to receive any vaccine that was not Pfizer. When I asked him how he knew which vaccine
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a given appointment would have, he told me, “I didn’t know until I got there.” After being
notified that he was able to receive the vaccine, Omar had registered for a vaccination site and
time. When he arrived, he asked the worker providing the vaccine which brand they were giving
that day. After the employee told him that it was AstraZeneca, Omar immediately left.
When he got home, Omar scheduled a second vaccine appointment at a different site,
saying that he was unable to attend the first. Omar again went to this site at the time of his
appointment and was offered the AstraZeneca vaccine. He similarly refused the vaccine, left, and
scheduled a third appointment at a third site. When Omar arrived at this appointment, the worker
offered him the Pfizer vaccine, and he gladly took it. At the time of my conversation with Omar,
he had just gotten his first dose and was eagerly awaiting his second, secure in the knowledge that
he would be able to easily get Pfizer this time as the government had committed to giving second
doses in the same vaccine as the first. As he told me, he had experienced no side effects from the
Pfizer vaccine because of his “good immune system.” When I asked Omar why he had put in so
much effort to avoid the AstraZeneca vaccine, he quickly replied, “Because of the blood clots and
its reputation.”
When the AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccine came out, the company described it as the
“vaccine for the world,” charging one-tenth of the price of other vaccines and quickly licensing
its production to other manufacturers around the globe. AstraZeneca became the main source of
vaccines for the COVAX program, making it the primary – and often only – vaccine option
available in many poorer countries (Beaubien, 2021). However, just as Jordan received its first
shipment of the AstraZeneca vaccine through the COVAX program in March 2021, nine
European countries – including Germany, Italy, and France – suspended the use of the vaccine
over concerns that it might cause blood clots (Al Jazeera, 2021). At the time, there had been 37
reports of blood clots out of the 17 million people vaccinated with AstraZeneca in the EU and the
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UK. Despite these suspensions, the EMA at the time suggested that this rate seemed “not to be
higher than that seen in the general population” (Jordans, 2021).
Soon after, the EMA stated that the AstraZeneca vaccine was “safe and effective in
preventing COVID-19 and its benefits outweigh its risks,” causing most European countries to
resume its use. Although the agency argued that the vaccine “likely reduces the risk of thrombotic
incidents overall” because blood clots are associated with COVID-19, they still could not “rule
out definitively a link” between the vaccine and blood clots. At the same time, many medical
experts in Europe criticized the political decisions to suspend the use of AstraZeneca, arguing that
the suspensions would cast doubt on the safety of the vaccines despite the greater, known risks of
COVID-19 (Michaels, 2021). Even after the EMA’s recommendation, Norway suspended the use
of AstraZeneca entirely, and in May 2021, Canada announced that it would almost entirely shift
away from the vaccine (Beaubien, 2021).
However, the impacts of the AstraZeneca vaccine’s controversies were not limited to the
Global North. In March 2021, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Thailand, and Indonesia,
for example, were among the countries to temporarily suspend the use of the vaccine due to
concerns of blood clots (Al Jazeera, 2021). Moreover, these controversies – alongside the
vaccine’s lower efficacy rate and decreased efficacy against newer variants – spread the belief
that the AstraZeneca vaccine was a second-tier product among many in the Global South. In
Uganda, for example, Rose Wakikona – a lawyer with the Center for Health, Human Rights, and
Development – described the AstraZeneca vaccine as “the best [the WHO] could negotiate for
us,” stating that Ugandans had no other choice but to use the vaccine because “no one has offered
us any other options. None whatsoever” (Beaubien, 2021).
It is in this context that Abdul’s remark of discomfort at and Omar’s insistent avoidance
of the AstraZeneca vaccine become clearer. Many who I spoke with in Amman felt similarly that
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the AstraZeneca vaccine was dangerous. Despite the resumption of the vaccine’s use in much of
Europe only days after its suspension, the perception of the vaccine as unsafe had stuck, and
many were willing to sacrifice, by scheduling and attending three separate vaccine appointments
in the case of Omar or by remaining temporarily unvaccinated in the case of Abdul, to avoid the
AstraZeneca vaccine. Indeed, one of my first conversations when I arrived in Amman was about
AstraZeneca’s blood clots. As I checked in to my hotel, the owner bragged to me about how all
hotel workers in Jordan were required to be vaccinated because they would be interacting with
tourists. He proudly told me that he had already received both doses of the Pfizer vaccine, and in
the next breath told me that he was suspicious of the AstraZeneca vaccine because of its
propensity to cause blood clots.
The perspectives of vaccine brands that I encountered in Amman shared much in
common with literature relating to choices of a seemingly disparate pharmaceutical intervention:
contraception. In a literature review of existing qualitative research around the topic, Alspaugh et
al. (2020) examine women’s perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes surrounding contraception. They
argue that contraceptive beliefs and practices are inextricably linked to the discourses and
relations of power that women are embedded in. Moreover, they consider the ways in which
individual women’s language, subjectivity, and agency shape their own contraceptive choices
(Alspaugh et al., 2020). Their findings show striking similarities with the decisions many in
Amman – and around the world – made regarding COVID-19 vaccines. For example, Alspaugh et
al. (2020) suggest that women often expressed distrust in certain contraceptive methods based on
their perceptions of the efficacy and safety of those methods, using language often inconsistent
with scientific consensuses. Moreover, for many women, contraceptive use and control acted as
expressions of individual agency, allowing women to resist existing relations of power between
them and both their partners and health care providers (Alspaugh et al., 2020). For many in
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Amman, like Omar, choice in vaccine brand followed similar patterns, suggesting the importance
of language and agency, especially, in this context.
Among many Americans and Europeans that I spoke with in Jordan, the Sinopharm
vaccine was viewed through a similar lens of suspicion. One American working at CRP, for
example, attended the NRC vaccination opportunity because it was convenient, and he had hoped
that they would provide the Pfizer vaccine. Though he still took the vaccine, he was disappointed
when he discovered that they were receiving Sinopharm, and he would occasionally joke after
that about the possible long-term consequences of Sinopharm that he might face. On the other
hand, few Jordanians or refugees seemed to doubt the safety of the Sinopharm vaccine. Among
the people I spoke with, most had slight preferences for the Pfizer vaccine, but no one expressed
safety concerns about Sinopharm in the same vein as AstraZeneca. The most doubt in the safety
of Sinopharm that I witnessed came from a Syrian woman I spoke with, who had received the
Sinopharm vaccine and told me, “There was no problem with it, thank God. I do not know if one
vaccine is better than another. I am not sure if it is 100% safe and effective, but I still took it.”
Yet, even this comment is not necessarily about Sinopharm, as much as the COVID-19 vaccine
process.
It is worth considering, then, from where perceptions of these brands emerge. No one I
spoke with ever cited statistics regarding the efficacy or safety of these vaccines. Many
considered AstraZeneca a dangerous and second-tier vaccine because of a one-week suspension
of its use in a handful of countries in Europe, despite the quick resumption and continued use of
the vaccine in the vast majority of those countries. On the other hand, many seemed to view
Pfizer as the vaccine of choice for the Global North, giving it more weight and legitimacy. When
I would mention to people that I had been vaccinated in the United States before coming to
Jordan, many would immediately assume that I had gotten the Pfizer vaccine, despite that fact
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that I had actually received the Moderna vaccine, and people who knew of Moderna viewed it as
“another Pfizer.”
While people I spoke with in Amman described the Pfizer, AstraZeneca, and Moderna
vaccines by the company that produced them in Arabic and English alike, this was not the case
for the Sinopharm vaccine. Outside of official government documents, I never heard someone
refer to Sinopharm by its name in Arabic. Instead, it was exclusively called al-Sinii, roughly “the
Chinese one.” This is perhaps solely reflective of the fact that Sinopharm is more easily tied to a
national identity than Pfizer or AstraZeneca. Yet, it may also reflect differences in how people
imagine both China and Chinese products. During my time in Jordan, I frequently encountered
the belief that American- and European-made products were superior to those from other regions,
particularly China. It is perhaps this belief that led many I spoke with to have slight preferences
for Pfizer over Sinopharm, often citing beliefs that Sinopharm was slightly less effective, though
no less safe. I also occasionally encountered xenophobia from Jordanians directed at Chinese
migrants. While I am certain that these are not the ideas conjured by calling the Sinopharm
vaccine al-Sinii in Arabic for many, I am struck by the linguistic difference between it and the
other vaccines.
In addition to the perceived differences in vaccines brands among individuals, there were
also tangible implications for the lives of many based on the brand they received. Ayman had
received the Sinopharm vaccine before I arrived in Amman and was happy with it. In his opinion,
all of the vaccines were similarly safe and effective, and any perceived differences were only
based on politics. As the summer approached its end, Ayman and I discussed trying to visit his
brother in Budapest together, a trip he had never felt comfortable taking before because of his
lack of fluency in English. As I planned the trip, however, I realized that Ayman would not be
allowed to fly into Europe because the EMA had not authorized the Sinopharm vaccine. As I
disappointedly told Ayman this, he replied that it was the same with Saudi Arabia. He had wanted
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to make an ‘Umrah, a pilgrimage to Mecca outside of the dates of the Hajj, after getting
vaccinated but similarly learned that he would not be allowed in with the Sinopharm vaccine. In
these ways, the perceptions of these vaccine brands became tangible, with distinct political
implications for many like Ayman, and expressions of agency in vaccine choice were important
for more than health.
Making the Vaccine “Mandatory”
As I rode with Ayman in his van to the grocery store towards the middle of the summer, I glanced
up at a blue lanyard hanging from his rearview mirror. I had been living with Ayman for two
months and had never seen him wear a lanyard. When I asked Ayman what it was, he first replied
with only a large grin as he pulled it down and handed it to me. “Look!” he exclaimed. At the
base of the lanyard was a small rectangle of laminated paper. One side was blank, but the other
had a copy of Ayman’s vaccine certificate printed on it. The font was small, to the point of being
nearly illegible, but according to Ayman the QR code still worked.
I asked Ayman if he had gotten it for work. “It is not only for work,” he replied, “It is for
entering any place that requires vaccines.” At that point in my fieldwork, I had never been asked
for proof of vaccination, and by the time I returned from Amman, only a soccer match and the
airport would ever ask. Though Ayman provided me with no examples of places that he needed
his vaccine certificate for, I suspect that he needed it frequently, both because of his pride in his
lanyard when he first got it and because he wore it every day for over a month. When Ayman was
home, the lanyard adopted an almost permanent position on the key holder by the front door, right
under his mask. Each time he left the apartment, he would instinctually reach for both.
Ayman offered many times to have one made for me. As he explained, it was a custom
design the first time, but now the print shop would be able to make one easily for me for only a
couple dinar. What I found most curious about Ayman’s lanyard was that I never saw anyone else
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wear something similar. Being asked to show proof of vaccination was an infrequent occurrence
for most people who I spoke with, and when it did happen, many just had a screenshot or link to
their certificate saved on their phone that would suffice. In many ways, Ayman’s lanyard
represented the reach and everyday impacts of the COVID-19 Spectacle through the Jordanian
government’s attempts to make the vaccine feel “mandatory” – in the sense that it was necessary
to return to everyday life – without explicitly requiring it by law.
As the daily vaccination rate began to decrease, the Jordanian government attempted to
wield reopening procedures as a tool to encourage vaccinations. The nightly curfew was first
lifted for only those who could prove they were vaccinated. Gyms, museums, and soccer games
returned for those with at least one dose of the vaccine. A printed sheet of paper taped on a pillar
in a downtown café stated in an enormous Arabic font, “It is prohibited to give shisha to those
who have not taken the first dose of the COVID-19 vaccine and for whom 21 days have not
passed since taking the dose.” A much smaller font tucked into the bottom left corner of the same
sheet read, “By order of the Ministry of Health.” Soon after the government implemented these
measures, Ayman created and began wearing his vaccine certificate lanyard. Though Ayman
stopped wearing his lanyard later that summer, it remained on the key holder by the door,
accessible at any time. When I asked him why he had chosen to stop wearing it, he did not give
me an explanation.
As these measures failed to substantially increase vaccination rates, the government
implemented stricter measures. Public sector employees who were not fully vaccinated became
required to provide two negative COVID-19 tests per week, and the government stopped issuing
and renewing work and residency permits for those who were not fully vaccinated. Though it is
difficult to know which measures were most effective at making the vaccine feel mandatory, such
measures did prove effective. Ayman’s lanyard provides evidence of the day-to-day impact of
such measures, causing him to feel the need to be able readily prove his vaccination status at a
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moment’s notice. Moreover, as I talked with community members at CRP who had gotten
vaccinated about why they had chosen to do so, these mandates were the impetus for some. When
I asked one Syrian man this question, for example, he replied “Because it is mandatory.”
Similarly, a Jordanian woman told me that she had gotten vaccinated because she went for a job
interview, and they wanted to see proof of vaccination.
The connections many in Amman made between the COVID-19 vaccine and the
Jordanian government are reflective of what Hamdy (2008) calls “political etiologies” of disease.
Hamdy (2008) suggests that poor kidney-disease patients in Egypt often understand and
experience their illness within the larger sociopolitical contexts of the country, seeing the
breakdown of their kidneys as a direct outcome of the breakdown of the welfare state. Similarly,
in Amman, many understood the COVID-19 vaccine through the government’s efforts to
encourage people to receive it; in a sense, the state and the treatment became one. The COVID-19
vaccine no longer was a life-saving treatment that the government was pushing; it became
symbolically connected to and understood through the lens of efforts to make it “mandatory,” a
process encouraged by the government’s production of the COVID-19 Spectacle. Similarly,
vaccine brands became one with the states in which they were developed intertwining perceptions
of governance with that of vaccine effectiveness and safety.
Still, most CRP members that I spoke with about why they had chosen to get the vaccine
did not cite ideas of the vaccine being required or mandatory. Instead, many mentioned that they
had gotten vaccinated to “not have to fear the virus” or for “the good of society.” Many mothers
gave their children’s safety as the primary reason they got vaccinated, and one woman cited fears
that her diabetes would make the virus worse for her if she was not vaccinated. When I asked
CRP community members who did not want to be vaccinated about their reasoning, many cited
health conditions that they believed prevented them from getting the vaccine, including anemia
and vascular health conditions. Some mothers suggested that they wanted the vaccine as soon as
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possible but could not get it until their children finished breastfeeding. Still others argued that the
vaccine was pointless since they already followed COVID-19 precautions, like wearing a mask
and physical distancing, so they were already keeping safe. That said, of the 26 CRP community
members I interviewed, 16 were vaccinated, a proportion nearly double that of the national
population at the time.
For both those who had received the vaccine and those who did not want the vaccine, I
encountered arguments based largely on their own safety and the safety of their family. While the
government’s efforts to encourage vaccination created impressions among some that the vaccine
was either legally or essentially mandatory, they perhaps did little to assuage the concerns of
safety those that did not want the vaccine expressed.
Conclusions
Returning to the graffiti that I saw on the wall of the apartment complex in Jabal Lwebdeih, the
artist’s message was deceptively simple: “Vaccinate me, I am hungry.” While it might seem
straightforward for a government to provide its population with vaccines, the reality in Jordan
was far more complex, in part due to intersections of vaccine access and choice. It was difficult
for a country in the Global South to access COVID-19 vaccines when countries in the Global
North had advance-purchase agreements and bought stocks larger than what was needed to
vaccinate their populations. Yet, the Jordanian government, though limited in its vaccine access
by its country’s wealth and influence as a postcolonial state, was able to navigate the strategic
role it plays for the United States and the European Union to gain earlier priority shipments of
vaccine doses.
Furthermore, it was difficult to distribute those vaccines within Jordan in an equitable
manner. The Jordanian government pushed narratives of oneness and equality regarding vaccine
access for all who live in Jordan. While these narratives rang true for some, others struggled with
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and felt excluded from the vaccination process. Some were able to “skip the line” for vaccines,
gaining early access to vaccinations through their connections to Western organizations like CRP.
For the rural and impoverished, however, online-only systems made vaccine access potentially
difficult and government bureaucracies denied access to vaccines for certain Palestinian refugees
like Muhammad’s father.
Moreover, it was difficult for the Jordanian government to navigate the vaccine desires of
individuals in its population, with many – like Abdul and Omar – circumventing the
government’s vaccination system in the name of brand choice. In the face of individuals choosing
not to be vaccinated, the Jordanian government attempted to make the vaccine “mandatory” to
return to everyday life, gradually removing restrictions from the vaccinated and placing greater
restrictions on the unvaccinated. In these ways, vaccine access and choice posed challenges for
the Jordanian government as it attempted to answer the call of its “hungry” population by
providing lifesaving COVID-19 vaccines.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
What Lasts in the Post-Pandemic?
It was two days before I left Amman and returned home. I wanted to spend the next day with
Ayman and his family, so my friends and I had planned a trip up to a brewery just outside of
Amman to celebrate and say our goodbyes. As we made it back to Amman, we stopped at the
apartment of my Jordanian friend in the neighborhood of Tla’ Al-Ali.
“Do you want me to take you home?” he asked, “It’s no trouble at all.”
“Nah. I think I want to walk. Walking always helps clear my head,” I replied.
I had made this walk from my friend’s apartment a couple of times before. I knew that it
took about two hours, crossing both busy streets and quiet residential neighborhoods. Some
nights I had made the walk because I wanted to save the $5 Uber cost. Others, like this night, I
wanted to plug into some music and reflect on my time in Amman. The air was brisk that night;
the worst heat of the summer had already passed. During my walk, I spotted a crumpled up
disposable surgical mask, resting in the corner formed by the edge of sidewalk and the start of the
street. As in many cities around the world, litter is not an unusual sight in Amman. Wealthier
friends of mine – Jordanians and Westerners alike – often complained about the constant presence
of litter. Others, like Ayman and his sons, seemed unphased by it, even actively littering at times
when a trash can was not readily available. All of this is to say that litter was already very much a
part of the cityscape of Amman prior the pandemic. It was a part of daily life, and if one looked,
they would find it readily.
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What surprised me about the crumpled mask was not that it was there but that it looked
so clean. Though it was crumpled along the side of the road, I could see no traces of dirt on it; the
mask easily could have been left there only minutes prior. As my walk continued, I tried to keep
an eye out for littered masks. Over the next five minutes, I spotted another five. Over the next
hour, I spotted about thirty. The masks came in a variety of types, from N95s to surgical masks to
cloth. They came in a variety of conditions as well; some looked as though had been almost
carefully placed flatly on the ground while others were crumpled or torn. Yet, very few of them
still seemed to be dirty. I snapped photos of the most artistically posed masks I passed, thinking
that they might provide a poignant background for a future presentation.
Then, I began to wonder about these masks. How long had they been there? How long
would they be there? How long might it take for these masks to degrade? What will happen to the
masks on the keyholder in Ayman’s kitchen, and the box above his fridge? What of the mask a
taxi driver dangled from his rearview mirror? What of the mask I kept crumpled in the bottom in
the bottom of my backpack? Where will these masks be in ten years? Many will be thrown in the
trash, but will families keep a few stashed away just in case? Perhaps these masks will move
slowly from the keyholders, rearview mirrors, and backpacks to rarely accessed drawers around
the home, tucked away and hidden from sight but not fully gone. In their management and
maintenance of these disorderly materials (Stamatopoulou-Robbins, 2020), how will people
engage with disposed of masks? Long after people stop wearing masks to protect from COVID19, they will hang around these city streets as a reminder. Ten years from now, what will Ayman
or I think when we find a mask in the drawer or see one littered on the side of the street? For now,
they are distinctly recognizable, bringing with them specific memories and ideas of the pandemic.
Will they still be then?
What of the other everyday changes caused by the pandemic? How long will actors in the
Jordanian government push and rely on the COVID-19 Spectacle, asking the Jordanian people for
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their commitment? How long will businesses use their own COVID-19 responses to advertise
their services? How long will the surveilling and mandating of health behaviors that put people at
risk of the virus persist? What of those suffering from the virus itself, facing long-lasting
symptoms or the grief of having lost a loved one? The answers to such questions are inherently
complex and multifaceted, and the continued study of such impacts will be important long after
the COVID-19 pandemic comes to an end.
Is There a Post-Pandemic?
At the brewery, two nights before I left Amman, my Jordanian friend turned to me and said,
“You’re the expert. Do you think the world will ever go back to normal, or will we just have
strings of lockdowns and curfews between new strains?”
“I’m definitely no expert, and I don’t know. There always seems to be hope that the
pandemic will end soon, but it never seems to end,” I replied.
My friend’s question represented a stark change of tone. Over the summer, he had always
been one to look for the positives in any situation, pushing people – sometimes a little too much –
to live in the moment and enjoy themselves. To hear him worry about such things was
disconcerting for me. Over the summer, I went through phases in which I lost hope of the world
ever returning to “normalcy” and phases in which I believed “normalcy” was right around the
corner. For my friend to express such anxieties meant that similar thoughts were likely going
through his mind. It was a trend I noticed beyond just him, as the pandemic wore on, more and
more people seemed to lose hope that life might improve. Though I never asked him, I can only
imagine that such anxieties were only worsened by the emergence of the Omicron strain months
later. I know that I felt that way at least.
I spent the next day with Ayman and his family. In the mid-afternoon, Ayman and I sat
on lawn chairs in the driveway, sharing a small bowl of pumpkin seeds. Layla soon brought out a
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dish of mansef for us to share. As we rolled balls of rice, meat, and fermented yogurt, Ayman
turned to me with a clear look of worry and said, “The news is talking about this new virus in
Africa, Marburg. They say it will be the next COVID. What do you think?”
I did my best to reassure Ayman, telling him what little I knew about the history of the
Marburg virus. I explained that the virus itself was not new, even if there was a new outbreak. I
also told him that I suspected it would be dangerous and difficult – given its relatively high
mortality rates – within the areas it spread but that historically its outbreaks had been rather
geographically contained. “I think that COVID has spread so well in part because it is less deadly,
so you probably won’t need to worry about Marburg in Jordan,” I told Ayman.
Yet, after telling Ayman this, I also reflected on my early thoughts regarding this
pandemic. In late February 2020, as I was nearing the end of my studies in Jordan, an American
friend reached out, texting me, “Hey. How are you? Is coronavirus rampant in Jordan? The
mainstream news isn’t really covering it.”
I responded, “Nah. Jordan shut it down. There have been no cases, and everyone is
screened upon entering the country.”
My friend then joked about how masks were selling out already, sarcastically adding,
“Because the mask is gonna save you,” followed by three emojis of eyes rolled up. At the time,
many major health organizations and governments were recommending people not wear masks to
preserve them for health care workers.
I replied to my friend’s text, “I mean it definitely wouldn’t hurt. Luckily the virus isn’t
too bad symptoms-wise. It just spreads like crazy.” We then casually debated back and forth on to
what extent the United States would be impacted by the virus. I was concerned that the U.S.
health care system would discourage people from taking sick days, causing it to potentially
spread rapidly; she assumed that, if cases were going to explode in the United States, they already
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would have by then. I ended the conversation on a with a text that I can only laugh at in
retrospect: “We’ll see, but even worst case I doubt it’ll be too bad. Just like a really bad flu year.”
Of course, I had learned much in the nearly one and a half years between sending those
texts and chatting with Ayman, going from having little concern about the pandemic to dedicating
my thesis research to studying its impacts. It is with these lessons in mind that I felt a twinge of
guilt as I reassured Ayman about the Marburg virus. What if I was wrong? What if the Marburg
virus did become the next pandemic?
Layla soon changed the conversation topic, cutting through the anxiety building in my
chest around my answers. “Tomorrow is the first day of in-person school for the kids since
COVID started,” she said, “I’m sad that you’ll miss it, but I think it will go back online again
after about a month.” It had been more than one and a half years since the children had seen the
inside of a school building, more than one and a half years since they had seen their friends and
teachers in person. Still, Layla could not even express excitement for her children returning to
school without couching it in the possibility – or likelihood as she saw it – that it would be over
before long. COVID-19 anxieties cut across my last conversations in Amman, with Jordanians
worrying about both the future of this pandemic and the possibility of the next pandemic.
Such anxieties reflect the tensions of pandemic aftermath. In the wake of 9/11, Carby
(2002) suggested that new ideological constructions of the United States emerged, contradictory
though they were, and that such constructions threatened to destroy the essence of the United
States that existed before. With the departure of a controversial mining company in a village in
Ecuador, Kneas (2018) considers the ways in which community members actively avoided
discussion of the topic in their everyday lives. On the other hand, Frankfurter (2019) argues that
health care practice was transformed in a clinic in the post-Ebola Kissi Triangle, shifting from
primarily a site of care to one of disease surveillance in the hope of preventing a future outbreak.
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Examinations of the many forms of aftermath suggest that the trajectory of postpandemic life is still unclear. What new and contradictory ideological constructions might emerge
from the pandemic? Might pandemic fears become taboo matters of conversation best left
unvoiced, or might they become constant focuses of attention, transforming the operations of dayto-day life? Yet, the anxieties discussed here differ from those above in that they reflect concerns
that there will be no pandemic aftermath. Early in the pandemic, people often used the phrase
“new normal” to describe precautions and restrictions implemented to reduce the spread of
COVID-19, yet these anxieties reflect a different understanding of the “new normal,” a liminal
state that threatens to become permanent. I cannot speak to the truth in these anxieties; I share
them myself, but they speak to the ways in which the pandemic has reshaped conceptualizations
of the future for many.
Goodbye, Amman
As evening approached on my last day in Amman, I reached into my packed suitcase and pulled
out a piece of stationary and a pen, and I began to write. I thanked Ayman and his family for their
hospitality and friendship. I told them about my struggles with loneliness during my previous
time in Amman and the ways in which my connection to them had completely erased that feeling
this time. With tears in my eyes, I wrote that I hoped to see them again soon, and I thanked them
one last time, signing my letter “Patrick (Abu Muhammad) McKenzie.” Soon after I finished my
letter, it was time for me to say goodbye. We exchanged hugs and promises to keep in touch. As I
passed Layla the letter and the keys to my apartment, she passed me a sandwich and a cup of tea
for the road. Seeing that I was wearing sweatpants, Ayman and Layla worried that someone
might try to take my phone or passport. Kareem sprinted inside and brought me a fanny pack to
ensure that this would not be the case. As my Uber pulled up to the driveway of the apartment,
we exchanged a last set of hugs, and Ayman grabbed my suitcase and placed it in the trunk of the
car, telling my Uber driver to be careful with me.
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I donned my mask as the driver did the same and stepped into the Uber. Though there
was no plastic sheet or shield, I chose to sit in the back. I waved out the window as the car pulled
away. As we approached a busier road, the driver rolled up the windows and turned on the air
conditioning. It was a short ride to the Tabarbour bus station, during which the driver and I did
not exchange a word. I said a quiet, “Thank you,” as I stepped out of the car. I hopped from the
Uber into one of the coaster buses that runs to the airport each hour. I noted the plastic sheet
separating the driver from the rest of the bus, though I had to reach through a small hole in it to
pay him. He wore a mask but had pulled it down below his chin. As the end of the hour
approached, more people climbed aboard the bus. Of the other passengers, only one man wore his
mask properly; the rest wore their masks around their chin or carried them in their hands. I spent
the hourlong bus ride to the airport reflecting on how it felt to leave Amman again. Last time, I
had scrambled to purchase a plane ticket and leave before the COVID-19 border closures. Instead
of panicked, I felt simultaneously happy and sad this time. I was excited to return to my fiancée,
family, and friends in the U.S., but I was sad to leave behind the friends I had made over the
summer, with little assurance that I would see many of them again.
As I stepped off the bus at the entrance to the airport, I was greeted by three massive lines
to enter, stretching almost to the road. As I joined the closest of these lines, I noticed how tightly
packed it was, with little room to even turn around, and how – though almost everyone had a
mask with them – most were wearing their masks around their chins. Halfway through the line, as
I first stepped into the airport building itself, I passed a large television on my left. Between
advertisements for tourism and perfumes, the television would flash to some of the same airport
signs I saw when I arrived in May. First, an image of a man wearing a mask, captioned, “Always
wear a mask.” In small red font below was the extra line “In compliance with the Defense Orders,
entry without a face mask is strictly prohibited.” Next, an image of a hand sanitizer bottle flashed
on the screen with only the caption “Hand sanitizer.” Lastly, an image of two men with two
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meters between them appeared with the caption “Maintain 2M distance from others,” before the
television returned to advertisements. In the corners of each of these COVID-19 signs were the
same slogans as before, “Keeping Yourself Healthy, Keeping Everyone Healthy” and “QAIA
Cares.” As I walked further inside, worn stickers on the ground displayed footprints encouraging
passengers to “Please queue here” and “Maintain physical distancing.” These stickers went
largely ignored by the line around them, though most pulled up their masks as they entered.
The first line ended with showing my passport and scanning my bag before approaching
the ticket counters. From there, I stood in an additional line to get my tickets, another to go
through passport control, and a final line to go through security. These lines were similarly long
and similarly tightly packed. As I passed through security into the departure terminal, I noted that
both sides of the airport were open for the first time this summer. I also noticed the presence of
more English and seemingly more foreigners with backpacking backpacks. It seemed as though
tourism was returning to Jordan, after Amman had felt largely devoid of tourists over the
summer. An airline employee briefly checked my PCR test at the ticket counter. As I waited for
my flight to begin boarding, I stretched out on an empty bench, set an alarm, and napped. Around
two in the morning, the speaker at the desk crackled to life, “All passengers may now board
Austrian Airlines Flight 854 to Vienna.”
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APPENDIX A
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
The following list of questions was used as an outline for the interview questions with
CRP community members over the phone. Where appropriate, the interviewees were
asked to expand upon their answers.
1. Do you feel like you have experienced the pandemic differently as a refugee than a
Jordanian might have? Why or why not? (If a refugee)
2. Why did you choose to get the COVID-19 vaccine? (If vaccinated)
3. What led you to get the vaccine when you did? (If vaccinated)
4. Why do you want to or not want to be vaccinated (If not vaccinated)
5. Which of the following aspects of your life were strongly impacted by the pandemic.
In what ways? (Choose all that apply)
•

Ability to work or find a job

•

Amount of debt

•

Stability of housing

•

Relationship with family

•

Relationship with friends

•

Ability to attend community events

•

Children’s education (if applicable)

•

Diet

•

Ability to Exercise
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•

Mental Health

6. Were any of the following particularly helpful or not helpful in adapting to the
pandemic? In what ways? (Choose all that apply)
•

Your Family

•

Your Friends

•

Government Programs

•

CRP

•

Other NGOs

•

Your Mosque or Church

7. Is there anything else that you would like to talk about in terms of how the COVID-19
pandemic has impacted you?
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